February, 2007

ANDREW  I.  COHEN

 

Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center For Ethics

Department of Philosophy

Georgia State University

Box 4089

Atlanta, GA 30302-4089

404-654-5815

aicohen(at)gsu.edu

 

EDUCATION:

 

1994   Ph.D., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

DISSERTATION:  “Hobbesian Political Authority and the Right of Resistance”  Committee:  Bernard R. Boxill (Director), Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Gerald J. Postema, Christopher W. Morris, Jeannette Boxill

 

1990   M.A., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

THESIS:  “Basic Rights, Subsistence, and Positive Duties” 

Committee:  Bernard R. Boxill (Director), Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Gerald J. Postema

 

1988   B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, magna cum laude.

HONORS THESIS:  “Freedom of the Will and the Causation of Human Action”

Committee:  M.C. Dillon (Director), Anthony Preus, Leon J. Goldstein

 

POSITIONS HELD:

 

2005-present           Assistant Professor, Georgia State University

2003-present           Associate Director, Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics,

                                Georgia State University. (Acting Director, 2004-2005.)

 

Fall, 2001-present    Adjunct faculty, Independent and Distance Learning, University of Georgia.

 

1999-2003              Assistant Professor, University of Oklahoma.

 

Fall, 2001                Visiting Instructor, University of Georgia.

 

1997-1999              Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point.

 

1996-1997              Visiting Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina. 

 

1995‑1996              Visiting Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University. 

 

1994‑1995              Lecturer, University of North Carolina at Wilmington. 

 

Summer, 1994         Visiting Assistant Professor, Fayetteville State University. 


PUBLICATIONS:

 

Edited volumes:

        2005         (with Christopher Heath Wellman): Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford:

                         Blackwell).

This is an anthology of new essays featuring pairs of writers taking opposing views on enduring controversies in applied ethics.  Topics/authors include: values in nature: Bryan Norton, Baird Callicott; capital punishment: Louis Pojman, Stephen Nathanson; abortion: Patrick Lee/Robert George; M. Little; affirmative action: Celia Wolf-Devine, Albert Mosley; privacy and civil society: Amitai Etzioni, David Friedman; immigration: David Miller, Chandran Kukathas; cloning: John Harris, Jeremy Rifkin; pornography: Andrew Altman, Susan Brison; animals: Tom Regan, Ray Frey; euthaniasia: Michael Tooley, Daniel Callahan

 

Essays in anthologies:

 

   Forthcoming  “Pharmaceutical Advertising and Consumer Autonomy”,

in Jeremy Garrett and H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., eds., Title TBA (an anthology on medical innovation and pharmaceuticals) (M&M Scrivener Press). This essay considers whether the norms governing the direct-to-consumer advertisement of prescription drugs should differ in any substantial way from those for other consumer products. The essay approaches this issue indirectly, mostly by considering how key autonomy-based arguments for such stringent regulation are inconclusive. Pharmaceutical promotions, I argue, remain on a par with those for dish soap. Leaving consumers in the right relationship with the reasons that bind them, I suggest, requires leaving them to use whatever epistemic shortcuts they deem appropriate to assess the competing claims from all available sources of the merits of any product.

        2005         “Famine Relief and Human Virtue” (for inclusion in Contemporary Debates in Applied

                        Ethics, pp. 313-342).

This will be paired with another essay by Kit Wellman. I argue that while there are sometimes important moral reasons to provide aid to distant suffering persons, justice is not one such reason. Virtuous persons may and sometimes should provide aid, but there are significant moral reasons against licensing coercion to extract such aid should it not be forthcoming. Including some discretion in the fulfillment of positive duties is key for reliably fostering human virtue and for alleviating suffering in the long run.

 

2005         (with Christopher Heath Wellman) “Introduction” to Contemporary Debates in Applied

                 Ethics, pp. 1-9.

A brief discussion of the anthology and overview of the essays in the anthology.

 

 

Essays in refereed journals:

 

Forthcoming “Contractarianism,Other-regarding Attitudes, and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24 (2007).

ABSTRACT: Contractarianism roots moral standing in an agreement among rational agents in the circumstances of justice. Critics have argued that the theory must exclude nonhuman animals from the protection of justice. I argue that contractarianism can consistently allow that nonhuman animals are owed direct moral consideration. They can acquire their moral status indirectly, but their claims to justice can be as stringent as those among able-bodied adult humans. Any remaining criticisms of contractarianism likely rest on a disputable moral realism. Contractarianism can underwrite the direct moral considerability of nonhuman animals by appealing to a projectivist quasi-realism.

2004         “Must Rights Impose Enforceable Positive Duties?” Journal of Social Philosophy 35,

                 pp. 264-76.

ABSTRACT: On some recent accounts, there are no purely negative rights because all rights must entail some positive duties. I show why this sort of conceptual argument fails. I focus on the arguments of Henry Shue, Stephen Holmes, and Cass Sunstein. At most they adduce substantive but not conceptual considerations for why rights must impose positive duties.

 


2003         “Examining the Bonds and Bounds of Friendship,” Dialogue: The Canadian

Philosophical Review XLII (2003), pp. 321-44.

ABSTRACT:  Friends exhibit a trust, spontaneous care and mutual regard that may seem to clash with examining a friendship for considerations of reciprocity and moral worth. In this essay I argue that the dynamic qualities of friendship sometimes require friends to reflect on their relationship. Friends sustain their relationship partly by assessing the terms of reciprocity.  Friends must also sometimes examine their relationship for moral worth because they must adjudicate clashes between the demands of friendship and other moral considerations, and they must sometimes serve as a moral steward for a friend. I discuss how friends may monitor their relationship without betraying attitudes that clash with what we expect of friends.

 

2002         “Warmongers, Martyrs, and Madmen versus the Hobbesian Laws of Nature,”

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (No. 4, Dec. 2002), pp. 561-86.

ABSTRACT: Thomas Hobbes casts the laws of nature as principles of peace that are conclusions of right reason. Glory-driven reason, however, seems to argue against the laws of nature.  Hobbes might then claim that seekers of glory are irrational, but, as I show, this is not available to him.  Instead, Hobbes must argue that valid reasons to seek glory do not count against the normative force of the laws of nature. I thus explore a Hobbesian account of reason given that some glory seekers by reason oppose peace.

 

        1998         “Retained Liberties and Absolute Hobbesian Authorization,” Hobbes Studies 11 (1998): 33-45.

ABSTRACT: Hobbes claims that the sovereign’s absolute authority is consistent with the subjects’ retaining liberties to resist certain commands.  In this essay, I explore what it means for subjects to authorize a sovereign with a right to command. I show how retained rights are compatible with sovereignty.  Though any given subject does not authorize the sovereign to do anything, I argue that the sovereign power is absolute.  The sovereign has the most power anyone could command. 

 

        1997         “Virtues, Opportunities, and the Right to Do Wrong,” Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (1997): 43-55.

ABSTRACT:  Rights theorists often defend a right to do wrong by appealing to a commitment to self-definition.  I argue that considerations of self-constitution and personal integrity are inconclusive foundations for the right to do wrong.  There are instrumentalist appeals to autonomy that argue against a right to do wrong.  A fuller statement of what rights are, and what is the nature and role of autonomy, must precede any defense of the right to do wrong.

 

Invited book reviews: 

 

        2003         Review of Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand, Mimi Reisel Gladstein and Chris Matthew Sciabarra, eds., (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press, 1999).  Hypatia 18 (2003): 226-29.

 

Encyclopedia entries: 

        Forthcoming         "Social Contract,"International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, second edition(Macmillian, 2007). 


WORKS IN PROGRESS:

 

 "Ecological Interdependencies and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals" (submitted).

ABSTRACT: An instrumentalist environmental ethic could give reasons to extend moral consideration regarding nonhuman animals but it might fall short of justifying their moral standing. This essay explores whether ecological interdependencies might justify the direct moral considerability of nonhuman animals. The essay sets out a conception of moral standing as relational, scalar, and unilateral and then considers the scope and stringency of any moral standing that might be traced to ecological interdependencies.

 

 “Reparations for Historic Injustices: The Boxill/Sher Argument”

ABSTRACT: A common criticism against reparation arguments is that many purported beneficiaries owe their existence to the injustice for which they claim damages. I explore a recent argument by Bernard Boxill and George Sher that pegs the compensable wrong for an injustice that occurs after a child is born: the failure to compensate her parents for an earlier injustice. I consider the limits of this argument.

 

 “Reparations and the Paradox of Apologies”(submitted)

ABSTRACT:How can one meaningfully apologize for an injustice to which one owes one’s existence? Some scholars argue that we must come up with an attenuated sense of the relevant apology, but I argue that one’s failure to yield resources that are rightly claimed by the descendants of victims of earlier injustices can in many cases be an injustice for which one owes at least a sincere apology.

 

SELECT RECENT AWARDS, GRANTS, AND HONORS RECEIVED:

 

        2005&06        Arts and Sciences Freshman Learning Community Development grant, Georgia State University: $2000

        2004    Arts and Sciences Arts and Sciences Writing Across the Curriculum Development grant, Georgia State University, $2000 Development grant, Georgia State University: $2000

 

PRESENTATIONS:

 

“The Obligation of Western Pharmaceutical Companies in the AIDS Crisis of sub-Saharan Africa,” Ethics and Africa Conference, University of Cape Town, May 30, 2006.

“Pharmaceutical Advertising and Patient Autonomy,” Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Jacksonville, FL, March 3, 2006.

“Lunch with an author”, for Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics at Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Jacksonville, FL, March 3, 2006.

“Environmental Community and Moral Standing,” Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Environment, University of Oklahoma, February 26, 2003.

Comments on Rex Martin, “Just War and Human Rights,” Southwestern Philosophical Society, Kansas City, MO, November 9, 2002.

“Warmongers, Martyrs, and Madmen, versus the Hobbesian LawS of Nature,” West Chester University of Pennsylvania Department of Philosophy, June 17, 2002; University of Georgia Department of Philosophy, February 22, 2002.

“Monitoring the Moral Bonds and Bounds of Friendship,” American Philosophical Association Central Division, Minneapolis, MN, May 3, 2001.

“Natural Hobbesian Right Reason,” Ohio University Department of Philosophy, February 6, 2001; University of Oklahoma Department of Philosophy, February 9, 2001.

“Conditional Love as Ultimate Love:  Friendship and Reciprocity,” UWSP Humanities Forum, February 25, 1999.

“Public Reason and the ‘Reasonable’ Person”: Isaac Ferris Lecture at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, April 9, 1998.

“May Subjects Have a Right to Resist an Absolutely Authorized Hobbesian Sovereign?”:  American Philosophical Association Central Division, Pittsburgh, PA, April 1997.

“Rawls, Hobbes, and ‘Political Schizophrenia’”: University of South Carolina Department of Philosophy, December 5, 1996.

“Hobbesian Political Obligation and the Right of Private Judgment”:  Ohio University Department of Philosophy, February 3, 1995; The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Department of Philosophy, January 20, 1995; The University of North Carolina at Wilmington Department of Philosophy, November 4, 1994.

“Power and Freedom:  Can We Hinder a Hobbesian Liberty?”:  Fayetteville State University Department of Philosophy, September 30, 1994.

“Right Reason and the Authority of the Hobbesian Sovereign”:  Intermountain Philosophy Conference, Cullowhee, NC, September 24, 1994.

“Absolute Hobbesian Sovereignty and Inalienable Rights”:  Intermountain Philosophy Conference, Boone, NC, November 20, 1993.

 

SELECT OTHER PRESENTATIONS:

“Research Ethics,” presented to the Research, Education, and Development Program forum on Responsible Conduct of Research, Georgia State Univ., Sept. 18, 2003, and Sept. 17, 2004; Department of Psychology first-year research ethics program, September 2006 and September 2005.

“Business, Profits, and Social Obligations,” presentation to North Dekalb Rotary, February 10, 2006.

“Rejuvenating Ethics in the Liberal Arts: Ethics Centers in the University Community,” presentation to the annual meetings of the American Association of Colleges and Universities, January 2004, Washington, D.C.

  “Freelance Ethics,” presented to the Freelance Forum of Atlanta at the Creative Circus, October 2, 2003.


RECENT DEPARTMENTAL AND UNIVERSITY SERVICE:

2006           Vice-chair, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee

2005           JD/MA joint program advisor

2005           JD/MA joint program advisor

2005           Pre-law advisor

2004           Faculty advisor – Phi Sigma Tau philosophy honor society

2004           Faculty advisor – SACFE (Center for Ethics Student Forum)

 

TEACHING COMPETENCIES:

Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Contemporary Moral Theory,

Early Modern Philosophy, Symbolic Logic, General Introduction to Philosophy, Applied Ethics (such as Medical Ethics, Business Ethics, Environmental Ethics)