From dawa to jihad

The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order
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Introduction

The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in international political relations, the consequences of which have become apparent. For politicians and public opinion in the West the attack on the United States was a serious setback or even meant the end of the pursued pax occidentalis (i.e. the realisation of stability and peace initiated from the democratic Western world, which, after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, seemed to have a good chance of being successful). Western societies are currently faced with an international threat from various radical Islamic quarters. Europe, including the Netherlands, has been confronted with extreme violence, such as the attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and the murder of film director Theo van Gogh by an Islamic radical in November 2004. Recruitment for the armed radical Islamic struggle (Jihad) among Dutch youth, in particular ethnic minorities, has proved to be a trend rather than just an incident in the Netherlands. This has prompted the government to put also the unsuccessful integration of certain minorities and the radicalisation tendencies among them on the political agenda. The murder of Van Gogh only demonstrated how opportune this was. In brief, the turning point in the international political arena is clearly reflected on the situation in the Netherlands.

The 11 September 2001 attacks and their aftermath were 'only' catalysts for the global breakthrough of a terrorist threat from radical Islam and the ensuing crumbling of the pax occidentalis. The underlying phenomena, such as the rise of radical Islam and international terrorism, had manifested themselves in various parts of the world for several decades. Initially, these phenomena manifested themselves in polarisation on a national level, but later they grew into international movements that gained a foothold in practically all parts of the world. The spread of radical Islam and related terrorism, like the dissemination of Western ideas worldwide, is the expression of a trend towards globalisation that has been developing on for quite some time. Tensions between Western and non-Western actors and interests as such are not new. It is the scale on which these tensions manifest themselves and their impact, which increasingly set the scene. Many conflicts in different parts of the world have their own history, dynamics and solutions. Blowing these up to global proportions makes it seem as if they are all part of one major conflict. All the same, however, we are indeed witnessing global connections in radical Islam. The challenge is to properly understand these connections in all their complexity and to develop adequate countermeasures.

1 See the AIVD report Rekrutering in Nederland voor de Jihad, van incident tot trend (recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands, from incident to trend) (2002).
Studying the various threats emanating from radical Islam, including the terrorist threat, should do justice to the complexity of these phenomena with all their national and international aspects. For this reason, the AIVD is now applying a broad approach in its study of radical Islam in the Netherlands, looking at phenomena such as poor integration, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorism from a wider perspective. Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of a development starting with radicalisation processes. These processes may manifest themselves in various ways and involve also other than terrorist threats (for example, interethnic tensions). For the AIVD combating terrorism starts by countering radicalisation processes. Preventing, isolating or curbing radicalisation are important means to combat terrorism with a long-lasting effect. Simultaneously, traditional investigations into terrorist organisations and networks are continued unabatedly. But traditional counter-terrorism without a focus on radicalisation processes and prevention will prove to be less effective in the long run. In addition, the AIVD emphasises the importance of enhancing society’s resistance capability and of the vital role of the Muslim minorities in this context. As concerns the threats emanating from radical Islam and radical Islam-related terrorism, we should firstly focus on the protection of the Dutch society and its vital infrastructure, and secondly on strengthening the relevant communities in the Netherlands, including Muslim communities.

Before we can decide which measures to take, we should first thoroughly analyse the problem. At the moment, more than three years after the 11 September 2001 attacks, the worldwide debate on how to fight radical Islamic terrorism effectively is still going on. There is still no international public consensus on how the situation should be assessed. Is it a conflict between civilisations? Or are socio-economic aspects of the breeding ground for radicalisation decisive for the international threat from terrorism? The strength of all-encompassing explanations is at the same time their weakness: the wish for absolute clarity might easily slip into unrealistic over-simplification. This also applies to the popular misperception of the terrorist threat from Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network as a monolithic phenomenon. Thorough study has shown that we are now confronted with a threat from fluid networks with varying international links rather than a threat from traditional groups. The complexity of these phenomena prompts us to give up our usual perceptions and to translate the new approach into policy measures.

This paper provides insight into the conceptual foundation of the AIVD’s study of radical Islam. It also seeks to contribute to the debate in society on countering the
threats that may emanate from radical Islam.
In this report radical Islam is understood to mean:
*The politico-religious pursuit of establishing - if necessary by extreme means - a society which reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.*

This paper starts from the premise that radical Islam is a multiform phenomenon. Radical Islam consists of many movements and groups that, although related (in particular concerning faith and anti-Western sentiments), may harbour very different views on aims and means. This means that various kinds of threats can emanate from radical Islam, one of which is terrorism. In addition to radical Islamic organisations and networks which concentrate on the jihad (in the sense of armed combat) against the West, there are other groups, which principally focus on 'Dawa' (the propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology), while some groups and networks combine both.

The Dawa-oriented forms of radical Islam are not necessarily violent by nature, but nevertheless they generate important security risks. Dawa is usually interpreted as 're-Islamisation' of Muslim minorities in the West. These minorities are seen as 'oppressed brothers' who should be liberated from the 'yoke of Western brainwashing'. The groups focusing on Dawa follow a long-term strategy of continuous influencing based on extreme puritanical, intolerant and anti-Western ideas. They want Muslims in the West to reject Western values and standards, propagating extreme isolation from Western society and often intolerance towards other groups in society. They also encourage these Muslims to (covertly) develop parallel structures in society and to take the law into their own hands. What they mean is that Muslims the West should turn their backs on the non-Islamic government and instead set up their own autonomous power structures based on specific interpretation of the Sharia.

This paper does not discuss manifest or anticipated specific threats emanating from the various forms of radical Islam. It should rather be read as a conceptual contribution to the broad approach to studying radical Islam and the debate on countermeasures. The AIVD therefore prefers to give general descriptions of the various types of radical Islam.

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2 In this paper we use the term 'radical Islam' as we prefer to reserve the term 'political Islam' for those forms of radical Islam which are focused on specific political ideologies and on establishing an Islamic form of government. The forms of radical Islam that are not very politico-ideologically oriented and rather focused on a return to the pure Islamic (individual) way of life from the early days of Islam have been described under 'radical-Islamic puritanism'. Obviously, however, their activities and objectives also have political consequences (and might therefore be interpreted as forms of 'political Islam' in a broad sense).

3 The term 'Dawa' literally means 'appeal' (to become Muslim).
Islam-related threats, starting from the premise that a good perception of these various types of threats is closely connected with a good insight into the interests to be protected. Translated into AIVD terms: without understanding the interest to be protected (in this case the democratic legal order) it is not possible to gain a good insight into the threat.

In chapter 1 we have therefore presented a detailed description of the democratic legal order. The essence is that our democratic legal order is not only a specific form of government (a democracy based on the rule of law), but also a certain form of society for the citizens. Hence certain forms of radical Islam that do not primarily pursue an Islamic form of government, but nevertheless reject societies based on democracy and the rule of law can also constitute a threat. They reject, for example, the open nature of our society, our respect for multiformity and diversity, or our personal autonomy in the area of ethics and ideology. Chapter 2 describes the major ideological and strategic views within radical Islam, followed by a description of the threats that may emanate from multiform radical Islam. Chapter 3 concerns itself with reinforcing the resistance capability of institutions and persons embodying the democratic legal order and interested parties in the democratic legal order.4

This paper is composed according to the usual model of AIVD risk assessments, i.e. the threesome structure of interest-threat-resistance. Chapter 1 focuses on the interest to be protected (the democratic legal order), chapter 2 on the threat (the various threats to the democratic legal order posed by radical Islam) and chapter 3 on the resistance against this threat (the counterbalance from persons and institutions embodying the democratic legal order and interested parties).

4 The institutions and persons referred to embody the interest of - in this case - the democratic legal order. Interested parties are those who have an interest in the continued existence of this democratic legal order.
The importance of the democratic legal order as a starting point for AIVD study of radical Islam

1.1 Counter-terrorism not the only starting point for AIVD study of radical Islam

Since 11 September 2001 the focus of the AIVD’s investigation into and study of radical Islam has hardly been under debate. The necessity of the investigation is widely accepted in view of the permanent global threat of terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups and networks. It is evident that such attacks can have an extremely disruptive effect on society, as was proved in the Netherlands recently. The fact that it seems unnecessary to explicitly substantiate the AIVD investigation into radical Islam also involves a risk. The risk is that the security aspects of radical Islam might too easily be reduced to the terrorist threat they may involve. This could lead to both an overestimation and an underestimation of this threat.

If too much emphasis is put on the ideological relationship between violent and non-violent forms of radical Islam (in particular as to religious convictions and anti-Western sentiments) this may lead to an overestimation of the threat. There are various forms of radical Islam which pursue very far-reaching changes in society, but which do not involve the use of violence. Those involved in combating terrorism often see these forms of non-violent radical Islam as an indirect threat. According to them, these non-violent versions can be a breeding ground for further radicalisation (a stepping stone to violent forms of radical Islam). In addition, non-violent radical-Islamic groups frequently proved to be an ideal shelter for terrorists. So, although it is often justified to regard non-violent forms of radical Islam as an indirect threat, this may also lead to an overestimation of the threat picture. This may give rise to, for example, unnecessary unrest among government and public about certain forms of Islamic extreme orthodoxy. For there are also variants which have no other political ambition than to secure the right to isolate themselves from society as a minority group.

5 In this chapter we discuss the question what is meant by the term ‘democratic legal order’ within the Dutch context on the basis of, for example, the government policy document Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving (Fundamental rights in a multiform society) (Parliamentary Documents II 2003/04, 29 624).

6 Hereafter we will discuss the boundary between acceptable forms of extreme-orthodox Islamic isolationism - with respect to the democratic legal order - and unacceptable forms of radical-Islamic isolationism, a boundary which is sometimes difficult to define.
A too one-sided focus on non-violent forms of radical Islam narrowed down to terrorism (centred on the question whether these forms facilitate the development of terrorism and provide a cover to terrorists) can also result in underestimating of even ignoring other kinds of threats that might emanate from these forms of radical Islam. After all, it is very well possible that in their pursuit of a society in which there is no place for other politico-religious convictions they prefer the ‘slower’ (but often surer) way of covert indoctrination of mainly young people to the brutal violence of terrorism.

1.2 Reasoning behind AIVD study of non-violent types of threats

The possible underestimation of these other kinds of potential threats from radical Islam is also a result of the fact that these are far more difficult to identify than acute threats of violence. They often involve insidious dangers. Also, the need for investigating such insidious dangers is more difficult to explain. Not everyone is immediately convinced that from the perspective of the democratic legal order certain forms of isolationism (taking the law into one’s own hands, no longer recognising the government’s authority, developing parallel social structures) may constitute a problem. Some may wonder, referring to fundamental rights and freedoms, whether it is justified that such phenomena are seen as a threat to the democratic legal order.

For this reason AIVD investigations into the risk of harmful effects to the democratic legal order other than acute threats of violence, require an extra solid foundation. The following sections will describe this foundation in detail, focusing on the key question: what exactly is the AIVD supposed to protect? In case of the AIVD study of the various threats to the democratic legal order (both directly violent and not directly violent threats) this question could be translated into: What is inextricably bound up with the democratic legal order and should therefore be protected?

1.3 The necessity of permanent reflection on the interest to be protected: the democratic legal order

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the AIVD, in consultation with the government and parliament, developed a broad vision on what the activities of an intelligence service within a democratic legal order should consist of. In addition to traditional focus areas such as violent extremism and intelligence activity of foreign powers, the AIVD also
identified new areas for special attention, for example: integrity of public administration, conflicts of interest in community-based organisations, interethnic tensions and radicalisation tendencies. The AIVD’s interest in these subjects can partly be explained by the politico-social climate of the past decade, during which questions about these problems became increasingly prominent. Interpreting these issues as subjects for AIVD investigation, however, is largely also a result of reflection within the AIVD on ‘the democratic legal order as an interest to be protected by the AIVD’. Without a clear understanding of this interest, it is not possible to have a good idea of what may threaten the democratic legal order.

1.4 A broad view on the democratic legal order

1.4.1 Analysis of the term democratic legal order

The term ‘democratic legal order’ consists of two parts: (a) what is a legal order? and (b) what makes a legal order democratic?

A legal order is the obligatory system of rules and regulations based on the rule of law that has been prescribed and accepted within that society (the system of principles, procedures and institutions that regulate basic social processes: dividing scarce resources, harmonising various interests, settling disputes, law enforcement and reprisal, etc.).

The obligatory order concerns the relations within society between citizens and government (vertical) and the relations between citizens themselves (horizontal). A legal order can be described as democratic if the citizens are involved in establishing and judging the obligatory order in society in a regular way and based on equal political rights. A democratic legal order can therefore never be a static order. It is dynamic in essence and, in fact, it has to be realised again and again.

1.4.2 The two dimensions of the democratic legal order

The democratic legal order is more than a specific form of government: democracy is only one of the conditions for the realisation of a democratic legal order. Hence a legal order in a society can only be called democratic if both the vertical relations (the interactions between government and citizens) and the horizontal relations (the

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7 Consequently, the legal order comprises more than just the judicial system only (‘the law’).

11 This system is a specific component of the legal order.
interactions between citizens themselves) meet certain conditions. These conditions can be described as follows:

- **First of all**, the vertical relations within society, i.e. the interactions between government and citizens, are to be modelled according to the principles, procedures and institutions of a democratic state under the rule of law. This refers to the (mainly) codified elements of the democratic legal order, such as the principle of legality, the separation of powers, decentralised powers, fundamental rights, the government monopoly on the use of force, the public nature of the independent state under the rule of law, a government keeping aloof from the privacy of citizens, the right to vote, the freedom to acquire political power, political fundamental rights, a democratic say in and control over decision-making processes, the public nature of administration, the rights of political minorities and the majority rule in political decision-making.

- **In addition**, the horizontal relations within society, between citizens should meet certain conditions. These non-codified conditions for a democratic legal order have occupied a more and more prominent place in modern thinking on democracy. A democratic legal order requires more than just formal recognition and compliance by the citizens of the principles and procedures of a democracy.

- **The proper functioning** of the democratic legal order is at stake when several conditions (which cannot really be embedded in legal rules) are not, or barely, met. A democratic legal order requires a certain amount of social trust, social cohesion, solidarity, active citizenship and loyalty. This involves several key values and standards, such as respect for the open nature of society, respect for multiformity and diversity within society, promoting social trust between citizens (or a wish to do so), respect for diverse interests and the wish to contribute as much as possible to the harmonisation of interests, respect for the personal privacy of fellow citizens, respect for other ethical and ideological orientations, etc. It is the citizens themselves who are primarily responsible for realising and meeting these values and standards. Enforceability by the government is only partially possible and desirable.

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9 These terms are also relevant because nowadays governments, realising that political parties can no longer be seen as the only representative bodies for groups within society, consult with community-based organisations and groups in order to realise so-called interactive policy-making.
1.4.3 Threats to the democratic legal order in the vertical and horizontal dimension

The above idea, that the democratic legal order has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension, provides insight into the possible threats to this legal order. These threats can affect both the relations between the government and citizens (vertical), and those between the citizens (horizontal). Within a society in which, for example, the government monopoly on the use of force is trampled on, the democratic legal order is at risk (a threat to the vertical dimension). Within a society in which various groups live as complete strangers, or where specific groups exclude other groups, a democratic legal order - especially in the Dutch context - can only function with difficulty (threats to the horizontal dimension).

1.5 Radicalism and the democratic legal order

1.5.1 Radicalism investigated by the AIVD

With reference to the above description of the democratic legal order, we should explain in which diverse ways radicalism in general may pose a threat to the legal order. Usually three components are distinguished in radicalism:

- The pursuit of far-reaching reforms of society (political, economic or regarding important social institutions).
- The acceptance of far-reaching personal or social consequences of this pursuit of far-reaching reforms, concerning both the use of resources and the effects.
- This pursuit of far-reaching reforms goes beyond moderate reformism, involves a general uncompromising attitude and tendencies towards confrontation (within and beyond the boundaries of the law) with those standing in the way.

From this general description we can derive a definition of radicalism as investigated by the AIVD.

The AIVD defines radicalism as:

*The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).*
In line with this, radicalisation can be interpreted as a person’s (growing) willingness to pursue and/or support such changes himself (in an undemocratic way or otherwise), or his encouraging others to do so.10

1.5.2 Categories of radicalism

This description of radicalism and radicalisation, and the concept of democratic legal order with a vertical and horizontal dimension as described above, enable us to formulate different categories of radicalism which may pose a threat to the democratic legal order.

• Antidemocratic radicalism

This type of radicalism is focused on the pursuit of a totally different interpretation of the vertical relations (between government and citizens). This may, however, also have a serious impact on the horizontal relations (the interaction between citizens). The main objective is the realisation of a form of government that is different from a democracy. Supporters of this type of radicalism are often motivated by a general non-acceptance of the democratic form of government, or by a partial rejection of essential elements of a democracy. This jeopardises fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of association with others, legal equality etc. Persons or groups adhering to these kinds of radicalism can opt for various strategies to achieve their objective: both armed combat with the intention of rapidly overthrowing the democratic form of government and insidiously undermining it by gradually winning over the public by means of propaganda or covert financing and influencing. Examples of this type of radicalism include forms of extreme right-wing

10 Radicalisation is explicitly seen here as a (one-way) process and not as a state.

In the description of the components of radicalism there is an obvious relationship with the term ‘extremism’. Reference is made to ‘far-reaching reforms’ and ‘far-reaching consequences’. The terms ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ are related (in common parlance). However, the latter term has an almost exclusively negative connotation, whereas this does not always have to be the case with the former. For example, some left-wing liberal parties and movements in several European countries call themselves ‘Radicals’ (but certainly not ‘Extremists’).

The following terms border on the term radicalism, but are sometimes - wrongly - used as synonyms. The terms are given in a specific order, ranging from ‘harmful’ to ‘bad’ and ‘worse’.

Related terms referring to a political objective:
Ultra: an extraordinary or exaggerated form of a known, usually political capacity (compare ultra left-wing, ultra right-wing).
Radical: see the definition used above.
Extreme: going to the limit. Description of groups operating on the fringe of the existing political spectrum.
Extremism: ‘going as far as, pushing to the ultimate consequences’. In general political terms, extremism thus is a phenomenon that considers the extreme acceptable or pursues the extreme in its aims and/or means. Within this context the extreme may mean violence - leading to death.

**Related terms referring to a religious objective:**
Orthodox: strictly upholding a traditional (mostly religious) doctrine, in accordance with all the doctrine’s precepts.
Fundamentalist: orthodox, anti-liberal (usually religious) movement, with an anti-intellectual slant (no freedom of debate, no room for doubt).

**Related terms referring to the use of means:**
Militant: obviously a term with a military connotation; in general meaning combative and aggressive, in general within the boundaries of the law.
Activist: in the means used, the focus is on action, instead of on words. In principle, actions (campaigns) do not have to cause damage to property, but they may involve disturbance of the public order.
Violent activist: involving damage to property, see also under activist, although this type of activism not necessarily involves disturbance of the public order.
Terrorist: causing serious damage to property, thus disrupting social processes and/or committing or threatening violence targeted at human lives (needless to say, from a political or religious objective) aimed at realising social changes and/or influencing the political decision-making process within the context of the democratic legal order.

- Undemocratic radicalism
  This type of radicalism does not primarily pursue a change in the relations between government and citizens or between citizens themselves. However, the effects of this type of radicalism on these relations may be substantial. A key element of this type of radicalism is the willingness to use undemocratic means, whether violent or not, (often without an explicit antidemocratic intention) which constitute a serious violation of the democratic legal order. Examples are forms of violent politically-motivated activism, such as anti-globalisation and animal rights activism. This type of radicalism may also involve a manipulation of democratic processes (covert influencing of interest groups via, for example, secret financing, of clandestine attempts to acquire a monopoly position in community-based organisations, etc.).

- Radicalism undermining democracy
  This type of radicalism does not have an intentionally anti-democratic or undemocratic ‘programme’, but it may seriously hamper or undermine the functioning of the democratic legal order. This type of radicalism is often neglected, but it pursues completely different horizontal relations (between the citizens themselves). This may affect the vertical relations (between government and citizens), but this is not the primary objective of those involved. They rather pursue a strictly
puritanical uniformity, an extensive social control of ‘virtuousness’ and a mono-ethnic and mono-cultural society, emphasising the inequality between people. The almost inevitable effect is that the open nature of society, the respect for multiformity and diversity, and personal autonomy in the area of ethics and ideology are abandoned, in brief: the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order is affected.

Within this context the AIVD previously drew attention to the security risks involved in anti-integration tendencies among (ethnic/religious) minorities. Some anti-integration tendencies are connected with specific forms of radicalism which can be qualified as ‘anti-integration radicalism’. We can distinguish three subcategories of this type of ‘anti-integration radicalism’ (the second and third subcategories embodying a further radicalisation of the first subcategory):

- Radical ‘isolationism’; groups isolate themselves as much as possible from social and political life.
- Radical ‘exclusivism’; withdrawal from society, involving expressions of a strongly discriminatory nature towards the rest of society or certain groups within society (accusation of heresy, demonising, conspiracy theories, inciting hostility).
- Radical ‘parallelism’; not only a withdrawal from society, but also the pursuit of a parallel society within the surrounding society, which involves parallel power structures and taking the law into one’s own hands. This type of radical isolationism transformed into radical parallelism manifests itself not only in a pursuit of changed relations between citizens, but also in a pursuit of changed relations between government and citizens (albeit in a different, often less developed way than antidemocratic radicalism as described above).

11 Anti-integration tendencies cannot always be linked to ‘anti-integration radicalism’. Forces countering integration can also be linked to covert attempts by the governments of countries of origin to keep diaspora communities under their control.

12 The next chapter will show how these forms of ‘anti-integration radicalism’ manifest themselves with versions of radical Islam which focus primarily on completely different horizontal relations within society (and therefore pose a threat to the horizontal ‘axis’ of the democratic legal order). Their radicalism is aimed at the realisation of completely different human relations. In the perception of these radical Muslims, human relations within society cannot be based on the values and standards of the ‘civic culture’ (which is based on a mutual recognition among the members of society as free and equal citizens), but on the ethics laid down in the Sharia.
In this chapter we explained that without a clear definition of democratic legal order (as an interest to be protected), it is not possible to gain good insight into what may threaten the democratic legal order. Without a good understanding of what a properly functioning democratic legal order is, it is not possible to have a good picture of the activities of third parties and of developments and processes which may constitute a serious danger to the democratic legal order.

In the previous sections we described that the democratic legal order has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. In a properly functioning democratic legal order both the vertical and the horizontal relations should meet certain conditions. The vertical dimension of the democratic legal order is connected with the principles, procedures and institutions of the democratic legal order, which actually regulate the rights and obligations of and between government and citizens. The horizontal dimension refers to the relations between the citizens themselves, which are based on a number of values and standards of what can be described as 'civic culture'.

From this perspective of the democratic legal order, it is clear that, in general terms, the threats from radicalism may manifest themselves both with respect to the vertical and the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order. The next chapter will show that this is also the case concerning radical Islam.
2 From Dawa to Jihad: Radical Islam as a multiform and dynamic phenomenon involving a variety of threats

2.1 Unity and diversity within present-day radical Islam

This paper starts from the key premise that radical Islam is a multiform and dynamic phenomenon involving a variety of threats. Radical Islam consists of a multitude of movements, organisations and groups which show a certain affinity with one another, but which may also have very different ideological and strategic views.

The various forms of present-day radical Islam share a common historical, sociological and (in part) psychological origin. The common basis for the many movements, organisations and groups stems from the dissatisfaction about and resistance against the political, economic and cultural dominance of the Western world shared by many Muslims all over the world.

The diversity within present-day radical Islam can be linked to a variety of perceptions regarding 'the evil of the Western oppression of Islam' and different views on alternatives for this. In this paper three types of radical Islam are distinguished (not to be confused with the aforementioned three types of radicalism), each of which involve a different focus on Western dominance and other ideas about alternatives for this.13

The first type of radical Islam highlights the resistance against the Western political (and hence also economic) oppression. The focus is on the political power of the West. This power should be broken and replaced by the political power of the Islam. A first step to that end is the islamisation of the political system in Muslim countries. The ultimate objective, however, is far more ambitious: the establishment of the 'universal caliphate' (the universal Islamic state) and the 'Umma' (the Islamic global community) as a super power capable of overruling the West. Because of its focus on the political dimension of Western oppression and the desired political alternative, this type of radical

13 Of course it should be emphasised that this characterisation is no more than an attempt to discover a certain ‘pattern’ in the complex phenomenon of radical Islam. Discussing only three types seems to be in contradiction to the multiformity of present-day radical Islam. However, the characterisation is only a simplification of reality allowing a trenchant analysis. After all, in reality we see many ‘combinations’ of the various types.
Islam can be described as radical-political Islam. So this type encompasses those forms of radical Islam which (violently or non-violently) pursue a political system based on their own interpretation of Islam on the basis of non-acceptance of the Western democratic government system, or a partial rejection of essential aspects of that system.\textsuperscript{14} We might also call this type of radical Islam: radical caliphatism.

The second type of radical Islam emphasises the resistance against Western cultural oppression. The focus is primarily on the ‘baneful’ Western lifestyle, which is considered a threat to ‘pure Islam’. This type of radical Islam can be described as radical-Islamic puritanism. Its adherents loathe the way in which human relations are given shape in Western society. They despise Western views on equal rights of men and women (in particular the right of women to participate in public life on an equal footing as men), freedom of speech, respect for ideological multiformity, autonomy in privacy, the secular nature of society, et cetera. As an alternative for the ‘loathsome’ Western society they propose a social order based on the Islamic ‘morals’ as set out in the Sharia.\textsuperscript{15} In present-day radical Islam this radical puritanism manifests itself within movements such as ‘Salafism’ and ‘Wahabism’, which put much emphasis on ‘purifying’ Islam from ‘heretical’ influences.\textsuperscript{16} The primary objective is the ‘re-Islamisation’ of Muslims who have been exposed to non-Islamic influences. Often these re-Islamisation efforts go hand in hand with ‘exclusivism’: the preaching of (religious and cultural) intolerance (Takfir: denunciation and exclusion of people who have different faiths, including ‘liberal’ Muslims) and ‘parallelism’ (the non-recognition or only partial recognition of non-Islamic government structures and the pursuance of autonomous Sharia areas).

The third type of radical Islam reacts against both the political and cultural dominance of the West, but is less religiously motivated in the proposed alternative. This type of
radical Islam can be described as radical Muslim nationalism (or radical Muslim communitarism). It involves the often ignored forms of radicalism which focus not really on Islam as a religion, but rather on what it means to be a Muslim (the ‘imagined community’ of the ‘Muslim nation’, the solidarity between Muslims all over the world). A phenomenon such as the Arabic European League (AEL) can be seen as a form of (radical) Muslim nationalism/communitarism. Muslim nationalism has certain aspects in common with radical-political Islam (the objective being the emancipation of Muslims) and radical-Islamic puritanism (with tendencies towards exclusivism and parallelism, although often less extreme and less religiously motivated).

In addition to differences, the three above-described types of radical Islam have one important factor in common. They all share a strongly mobilising force from the ideology of the Umma, the (ideal of an) Islamic global community. In the Islamic world the Umma is seen as a source of inspiration for identification and organisation, and as a fundament for the pursuit of implementing the aims of radical Islam. The - potentially - international Umma manifests itself as a (partly virtual) community intent on applying radical Islamic values internationally, as yet without having the disposal of a territorial entity.

The following sections will give more details about the ideological dimensions of the three types of present-day radical Islam as referred to above.

2.2 The first type of radical Islam: radical-political Islam

2.2.1 Does a democratic political Islam exist?

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall radical Islam has been frequently discussed within the context of future threats to democracy and Western standards and values. Ever since the late 1970s (in particular since the revolution in Iran and the Rushdie affair) a ‘green’ danger (Islam) has been recognised in addition to the ‘red’ (communist) danger. In the early 1990s, after the threat of communism had disappeared, several analysts and politicians anticipated a new international polarisation, this time between the West and radical Islam. Radical Islamic organisations and terrorist actions in various parts of the world were seen as the precursors of a new era.
In 1998, in a public report, the AIVD drew attention to the increasing role of Islam-based political movements. With respect to the Netherlands the AIVD concluded that political Islam had many manifestations, but that it played only a limited role within the total of Islamic communities in terms of quantity. Given the recent international developments, the then anticipated threats for the future gained momentum after 11 September 2001. Now, at the start of the 21st century, growing support to radical versions of Islam, polarisation between Muslims and the society in which they live, obstacles in the progress of integration processes as well as unadulterated Islamic terrorism are major challenges facing the Dutch democratic legal order.

Political Islam gives a political interpretation of the sources of Islam and claims to offer a comprehensive ideology, focused on the unity of religion and state. This is at odds with the Western government system, which postulates a separation of Church and State. Also, contrary to what many radical Muslims claim, the unity of religion and state cannot be linked to the Koran itself. Historically, it was the state which arrogated religion in order to justify the levying of taxes in Islamic territories. In Europe the situation was basically the other way around. Here it was the church that carried out tasks which later became the exclusive domain of the state.

By and large, Islam and democracy are not incompatible. The original sources of Islam include several concepts that may be associated with current democratic principles without explicitly referring to state orders. For example, the concept of ‘Shura’ provides for social consultation and the principle of ‘Bajat’ can be seen as a kind of social contract. However, such principles play only a marginal role in the present-day theological and social debate. In mainly autocratically governed countries with a predominantly Islamic population, liberal Islamic lines of thinking hardly play a role in political policy-development. But even in the Dutch democracy liberal Islamic movements are hardly involved in policy-making. However, in principle it cannot be ruled out that democratic political Islam may take shape in the Netherlands in the long term. The way in which Christian Democratic parties have developed in Europe, shows that a political movement based on religious grounds is viable and can contribute substantially to the (continued) existence of the European (and also Dutch) democratic legal order. Recently there have been several indications for such a development (albeit in an early stage) regarding Islam in the Netherlands (for example in connection with the Turkish Islamic Milli Görüş movement).


2.2.2 Radical-political Islam as an emerging form of totalitarianism

Radical-political Islam is an ideology which by referring to non-existing situations (such as a universal Islamic state) contributes to a mythologisation which is essential for the propagation of a totalitarian ideology. The totalitarian aspect includes the presumption that all social issues and problems can be resolved on the basis of radical-political Islam. The radical-religious dimension covers all aspects of life. This implies that radical-political Islam manifests itself as a totalitarian philosophy by demanding the sovereignty of a religious political government over all aspects of life, and - in its most extreme form - by imposing a general binding framework for thought and conduct. The radical Islamic view has no room for a reserved attitude by the government towards the privacy of citizens, let alone for personal autonomy with respect to ethics or philosophy. In this perception, the sovereignty of God is at odds with the contemporary principle of the sovereignty of the people as upheld by democratic states.

The causes of the emergence of radical-political Islamic movements are diverse. In many authoritarian countries in the Middle East radical-political Islam can be seen as a socio-political vehicle for pursuing political participation. Increasing urbanisation, difficult economic and demographic conditions, as well as failing governments all play a role in this context. Besides the national or regional context, there is also the influence of international aspects, such as the identification with often marginalised Muslims in conflict zones (the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, Kashmir). The prominent military presence of the West in predominantly Islamic countries (Afghanistan, Iraq) is also an important factor. In essence there is, however, also a purely religious ideological component of radical-political Islam, which plays an increasingly important role in many countries (including the Netherlands) both on a national level and on an international level.

19 Within radical Islam the basic principle is the concept of Hakimiyya (rule, sovereignty of God). Within radical Islamic (theological) thinking this sovereignty of God is perceived in a much more absolute way than within, for example, 19th and 20th century neo-orthodox Christian or Jewish thinking. This philosophy includes ideas such as 'man as a caretaker' and 'partnership between man and God'. Hence in this neo-orthodox Christian or Jewish thinking there is no discrepancy between religion and politics. It is possible that there is sovereignty of God and sovereignty of man/people at the same time (as to making the world habitable, organising society). Among liberal Islamic thinkers we find views which are comparable to Christian and Jewish views on man as a caretaker and partner. Referring to the Koran, these liberal Islamic thinkers argue that man is Khalifa (caliph, literally 'substitute') of God on earth. It should also be noted that within the Dutch constitutional tradition the concept of 'popular sovereignty' is avoided.
2.3 The second type of radical Islam: radical-Islamic puritanism

2.3.1 The ‘puritanisation’ of radical Islam

Within radical Islam there has been an ideological shift of emphasis, in particular during the last two decades, which can be described as the ‘puritanisation’ of radical Islam. This involves a shift in the paradigm of radical Islam as a result of which radical-Islamic puritanism has prevailed over ‘traditional’ radical-political Islam. The key aim of ‘traditional’ radical-political Islam (as postulated for example by the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood) is the establishment of an Islamic state (either an Islamic state in the Muslim world or a universal caliphate). Radical-Islamic Puritanism, on the other hand, is not primarily focused on establishing an Islamic state, but on the return of all Muslims to the ‘purity’ of the early stages of Islam before it was ‘tarnished’ by ‘heretical’ influences from, for example, Shi’ism, Hinduism or Western thinking. According to radical-Islamic Puritanism, such influences are unacceptable forms of ‘Bida’ (modernisation) and ‘Shirk’ (idolatry) which are to be banned and combated.

Present-day radical-Islamic puritanism is in principle far more intolerant than traditional political Islam and has a much stronger anti-Western orientation. Whereas adherents of traditional political Islam see it as a challenge to seek alternatives to the Western political, legal and economic system, radical Islamic puritans see the West as a destructive enemy of Islam that is to be combated with all possible means.

2.3.2 Radical-Islamic puritanism and extreme isolationism/exclusivism/parallelism

Radical-Islamic puritans often call themselves ‘Salafists’: they wish to return to the pure Islam of the Salaf (the first followers of Mohammed). Historically, Salafism should be seen as a broad ideological movement with also liberal ramifications, which, however, were gradually largely oppressed. The movement has its roots in the reformers of the late 19th and first half of the 20th century, such as Afghani, Abduh and Ridah, who saw a return to the pure Islam of the first followers of Mohammed as the solution to the crisis in the Islamic world. Gradually Salafism shifted towards more conservative and ultra-orthodox views, in particular under the influence of Saudi Wahhabism.

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20 Djamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Ridah (1865-1935) sought answers to the political and cultural crisis in which they perceived the Islamic world to be as a result of Western colonialism. Whereas Afghani and Abduh’s thinking favoured reform, Ridah tended more and more towards conservatism (thus making him one of the originators of Islamic fundamentalism in the 20th century).
Today, the terms Wahhabism and Salafism are often used as synonyms."

Present-day (radicalised) Salafism is far removed from the original Salafiyya, which was championed by Afghani and Abduh. Present-day Salafists regard the ‘return to pure Islam’ as excising everything what in their view has tarnished Islam. Consequently, present-day Salafism has mostly a very intolerant nature. In particular Western ‘modernity’ is an abomination to radical Salafists. A radical Salafist leader put it as follows: "Modernity is an invention of the West to oppress Muslims". For this reason present-day radical Salafism is sometimes described as ‘resentment Islam’. Characteristic for many puritan Salafist groups in the West is not only a radical rejection of Western society, but also branding those who do not adhere to the Salafist principles (including other non-Salafist Muslims) as ‘heretics’ (takfir).

The diagram below shows several aspects of the shift in paradigm from ‘traditional’ radical-political Islam to radical puritanism.

21 However, it is preferable to reserve the term ‘Wahhabism’ for the (mainly) Saudi variant of Salafism. Salafism also has other variants (both historically and geographically).

### 2.3.3 The typological differences between 'traditional' radical-political Islam and radical-Islamic puritanism in a diagram

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Traditional' radical-political Islam</th>
<th>Radical-Islamic puritanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogenous, organised</td>
<td>Heterogeneous, diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed ideology; specific definitions of the alternative society (not based on Western principles)</td>
<td>Hardly ideological; the alternative is a return to the society of the early stages of Islam (of the Salaf, the first companions of Mohammed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The focus is on strategic thinking: there is a clear picture of the ultimate objectives and the paths leading to these objectives</td>
<td>The focus is on utopian thinking: vague, Messianic'-idealised pictures of Islamic society; very general slogans (about the Sharia, the universal caliphate et cetera) predominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The (peaceful) political path is in principle possible, but has been cut off by the West</td>
<td>The (peaceful) political path is in principle impossible. The focus is on a strongly dualistic world view: the world is divided into the territory of the 'sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness' (in Islamic terms: Dar al Islam, the territory of Islam, and Dar al harb, the territory of war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad is a military struggle, being the political struggle continued on the battlefield</td>
<td>Jihad is an apocalyptic battle between the 'sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3.4 Re-Islamisation of Western Muslims as main objective

Many radical-puritan groups in the Islamic world see the Muslim minorities in the West as their main target group. They see these minorities not directly as potential fighters or supporters, but rather as ‘oppressed brothers’ who must be liberated from the ‘yoke of Western brainwashing’. Within radical-Islamic puritanism there are different views on how this is to be achieved.

In addition to organisations and networks concentrating on Dawa (the intensive propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology through missionary work) there are others who focus on the Jihad (in the sense of armed conflict). Some groups combine the two. The choice of Dawa-oriented groups for non-violent activities does not always imply that they are non-violent on principle. Often they simply do not yet consider armed Jihad expedient for practical reasons (Jihad can be counterproductive or impossible because of the other side’s superiority) or for religious reasons (the Jihad against non-believers is only possible when all Muslims have returned to the ‘pure’ faith).

Furthermore, Dawa-oriented groups often make ambiguous comments about the legitimacy of the armed Jihad in areas where Muslims are oppressed and persecuted (for example, Kashmir, Chechnya or - recently - Iraq). With the support of prominent Mullahs they often implicitly approve of such a form of armed Jihad, although they are careful not to explicitly incite people to it or to be associated with recruitment activities for this struggle.23

In particular Dawa-oriented radical-Salafist organisations and networks from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states strongly emphasise ‘re-Islamisation’ of the Muslim minorities in the West. These organisations include missionary, socio-cultural and finance organisations which claim not to be politically orientated or violent, but whose activities are often based upon extreme puritan, intolerant and strongly anti-Western ideas. Their efforts are purposefully aimed at encouraging Muslims in the West to turn their back on Western values and standards. They preach an extreme isolationism from Western society and propagate ‘exclusivism’ and parallelism. In some cases they propagate the creation of fully Islamised districts in big cities in the West or even pursue parallel social structures in the form of autonomous Sharia areas, as a sort of enclaves foreshadowing the Umma. In the future the Umma is to spread across the whole world, including the West.24


24 O. Roy (2002) states that pursuing such ‘espaces islamisés’ is taking the place of pursuit of an ‘Islamic state’ (in the politico-ideological sense). Compare also the term ‘non-territorial Islamic state’ of the radical-Islamic ideologue K. Siddiqui.
Present-day radical puritanism has a strong appeal for certain segments of the Muslim communities in the West, especially some groups of young Muslims, in particular because it offers apparently simple solutions to the identity problems with which many of them are faced. According to radical-Islamic Puritanism, one's identity can be found in ‘being a pure Muslim’. There is a simple recipe to achieve this: you can become a ‘pure Muslim’ by ban everything which is ‘un-Islamic’ from your life, and in certain cases even fight against it. This sounds innocent enough if being a ‘pure Muslim’ means strict compliance with the many detailed, strictly puritan rules of the Sharia (regarding clothing, personal hygiene, eating habits, manners between men and women, et cetera). However, in particular ‘born-again Muslims’ often interpret their choice for ‘being a pure Muslim’ in a more radical way. They perceive the ‘un-Islamic’ aspects to be banned and combated as other philosophies, views of society and, in particular, the ‘baneful’ Western society.

In order to assess the strength of especially radical-Islamic puritan groups, we should realise that most of these groups are not organised in a structured hierarchy, but rather in diffuse networks, the coherence of which is based on a shared ideological range of ideas. The increasing importance of the ‘network strategy’ is especially apparent in the growing use of the Internet by radical-Islamic groups. It also accounts for the increasingly prominent phenomenon of (individually operating) itinerant Imams and other preachers.

2.4 The third type of radical Islam: radical Muslim nationalism

2.4.1 ‘Ethnicisation’ of being a Muslim in the West

In this paper we also identify a third manifestation of radical Islam; radical Muslim nationalism (or radical Muslim communitarism). Like radical-Islamic Puritanism, it is rooted in dissatisfaction about the current political and cultural dominance of the West. Although both types of radicalism share the same origin (both from a historical, social and psychological perspective), they are essentially different. Whereas radical-Islamic puritanism propagates a withdrawal from (Western) society, Muslim nationalism focuses on securing a place of its own within that society. Muslim nationalism in the West is a relatively new and often still ignored phenomenon. We must, however, take into account the possibility that this phenomenon may become increasingly important in the future.
This new Muslim nationalism focuses rather on being a Muslim (the ‘imagined community’ of the ‘Muslim nation’, the solidarity between Muslims all over the world) than on Islam as a religion. The increasing support for this movement in the West should be seen against the background of several factors:

- For second and third generation Muslim migrants the ties with the country of origin has largely disappeared. The issue of identity of the second and third generations leads to an ‘ethnicisation’ of ‘being a Muslim’. They consider themselves as belonging to a separate ethnic group within society: the Muslims (primarily experienced as an ethnic category rather than a religious category).
- This ‘ethnicisation’ of ‘being a Muslim’ fits in perfectly with the debate (and until recently often policy as well) in many Western countries on the integration of minorities (based on a perception of society that has irreversibly been transformed into a ‘multicultural society’ in which each population group is entitled to its own ‘individuality’).
- The rising middle classes within the Muslim minorities (linked to the emergence of their own protest generation) are demanding a place (of their own) in the public and political arena.

### 2.4.2 Radical exclusivism and parallelism in some forms of Muslim nationalism

Some forms of Muslim nationalism may demonstrate characteristics of radical ‘exclusivism’ as described above. In that case confirming the Muslim identity involves discriminatory expressions towards the rest of society ( demonisation, hostility). Within some segments of Muslim communities we can distinguish a relation between rising radical Muslim nationalism and growing anti-Semitism. We should be aware of the fact that in the case of many other nationalist movements in the world, the nationalist myth often has a negative character. Many forms of nationalism share a negative definition of nation, based on a ‘counter nation’ which is the oppressor (for example, Serbian nationalism). We also see this in the new radical Muslim nationalism. For many Muslim nationalists the ‘myth’ of the oppression of Muslims all over the world plays a key role. For that reason, the views of many Muslim nationalists in the West contain a strongly militant component. They strongly identify themselves with Muslims in conflict areas. Their militant language should, however, often be seen as part of the myth on which the creation of a ‘Muslim nation’ in the West is based.

The above-described radical Muslim nationalism may, in principle, have an emancipatory function and a positive effect on the integration of minorities into Dutch
society. However, apart from the question whether Muslim nationalist movements have a hidden agenda, it is possible that the role such movements play in society undermines the social cohesion. In a homogenous society (as to composition of the population, ideologies and lifestyles) the democratic legal order is the binding agent between all population groups. In view of the radical-Islamic principles, such a central focus on the Muslim identity and relating ideals may lead to a weakening of the values and institutions in Dutch society which unite us. If this emphasis on the Muslim identity involves an implicit and virulent rejection of the democratic legal order, radical Muslim nationalism can become a fertile breeding ground for violence.

2.5 From Dawa to Jihad: Various strategic views within radical Islam

2.5.1 The necessity of studying the strategic views within radical Islam

Many analyses of present-day radical Islam fail to systematically address the question as to the strategies employed. Partly this can be explained by the fact that those involved play their cards close to their chests. Often we can only formulate hypotheses, as radical Islam hardly has a tradition of explicit, well-formulated strategies (laid down in handbooks or tracts, for example). It is, however, possible to get an idea of the strategies on the basis of statements and comments of radical-Islamic leaders and activities displayed by groups.

An additional problem is the frequent lack of rationally and fully shaped strategies. But the movements do have certain strategic orientations. After all, a less coherent and consistent strategy is still a strategy. But in studying the various strategic orientations within radical Islam, we may not ignore the fact that various forms of radical Islam cannot be understood on the basis of a clearly identifiable end-means rationality (i.e., a coherent strategy). The activities displayed are not really based on clear views regarding ends and means, but the motives can rather be associated with (extreme) ideas about the perceived enemy, and about how to fight this enemy.

2.5.2 Different views within radical Islam on ends and means

According to general definitions, a strategy is an overall vision on the goals to be achieved, and the means used to that end. A strategy describes the ultimate goal, the intermediate goals to be pursued in order to reach the ultimate goal, and the means to
be employed or the activities to be displayed to that end.27 A distinction should be made between strategy and tactics. Tactics involve a more detailed plan of action (‘specific moves’). In present-day radical Islam a number of strategic varieties can be distinguished which differ as to their ultimate ends, intermediate ends and the means to be used.

2.5.2.1 Different views on ultimate ends and intermediate ends

It is often believed that there is a great consensus within radical Islam as to the ultimate end to be reached. This is believed to encompass the Islamisation of the whole world. However, it may well be that there are very different views of the ultimate goal (and, consequently, different views of the intermediate goals that are supposed to bring the ultimate goal closer). We have pointed out above the basic difference in goals between ‘traditional’ political Islam and radical-Islamic puritanism. Whereas ‘traditional’ political Islam focuses primarily on an Islam-based form of government, radical puritanism primarily seeks to convert the masses to the pure Islam. We refer to chapter 1: ‘traditional’ political Islam focuses primarily on far-reaching changes in the relationship between government and citizens (i.e., a different form of government), whereas radical puritanism mainly pursues far-reaching changes in the interaction between citizens. As far as the threat to the Western world is concerned, this means that ‘traditional’ political Islam is aimed primarily at the vertical axis of the democratic legal order, whereas radical puritanism is aimed at the horizontal axis.

It seems that in particular in very violent radical-Islamic puritanism the Islamisation of the entire world is not really the leitmotif, but rather the idea of an apocalypse in terms of bringing the struggle between the world of Islam (Dar al Islam) and the heretical world (Dar al Harb) to such a climax that the end of times (the Last Judgement) can dawn. For groups advocating this view, the Jihad is an end in itself. Jihadists are keen on inciting the apocalyptic fight between good and evil, thus to enable Islam to triumph and its martyrs to enter eternal paradise.

If we consider the nature of radical Muslim nationalism as described above, this movement is likely to foster less extremist views on what this ultimate goal entails (the existence of a ‘Muslim nation’ alongside other nations). Because this manifestation of radical Islam is only a very recent phenomenon in the Western world, it is too early for a proper assessment.

27 One of the founders of Western strategic thinking, C. von Clausewitz, makes a distinction between Ziel (ultimate goal), Zweck (intermediate goal) and Mittel. See his Vom Kriege, 1832.
2.5.2.2 Different views on means and activities

In present-day radical Islam we can distinguish various strategic views on the means and activities to achieve its goals. Basically, these can be found in two areas. Firstly, some forms of radical Islam opt for not directly violent long-term strategies of continuous influencing (Dawa). Other forms of radical Islam may primarily focus on short-term strategies of violent activism and terrorism (Jihad). Jihad and Dawa may also be combined as two complementary strategies which, according to circumstances, are to be used either simultaneously or separately. Secondly, we can make a distinction between a predominantly open and a more covert character of the activities. The covert strategies involve activities such as clandestine financing, infiltration in community-based organisations under false colours and/or with a hidden agenda, the deliberate dissemination of false rumours and conspiracy theories to encourage tensions between groups, and so on.

2.6 Jihadism and terrorism

In the above analysis we have shown an interaction between Dawa and Jihad that may ultimately result in terrorism. This interaction is confirmed by analyses - also by the AIVD - of the backgrounds of Islamic terrorist groups and networks that are posing a serious threat to the Dutch democratic legal order as well as to the international legal order. The network strategy, international missionary efforts and the interaction or even interwovenness of Dawa and Jihad demonstrate the relationship between the various forms of radical Islam and the phenomenon of radical-Islamic terrorism. The ideological objectives of and the means actually used by the various forms of radical Islam (in combination with the present followers and geographical scattering) strongly add to the increasing endogenous threat (in addition to the existing exogenous threat) from radical-Islamic terrorism.

At the beginning of the 21st century, attacks, in particular those of 11 September 2001, have put terrorism in a different perspective than before and have shifted the boundaries of the imaginable and predictable. The disruptive consequences of the attacks have made citizens and authorities aware of the vulnerabilities of complex, industrialised and open democratic societies. Effective counter-terrorism can no longer
be considered separately from the protection of society’s vulnerable sectors, property and prominent persons. Attacks on such targets have disruptive consequences for society at large. Following the attacks in the United States and Spain, several measures have been initiated in the Netherlands on the basis of extensive stock-taking, in order to optimise the security of vulnerable property, vital sectors and specific persons.

In the War on Terrorism headed by the United States following the attacks of 11 September, several relative successes have been achieved which were decisive for the present nature of the threat from international radical-Islamic terrorism. The dismantling of Al Qaeda’s infrastructural facilities in Afghanistan as well as the elimination or arrest of several of its foremost leaders have resulted in a fragmentation of Al Qaeda. As a result, its actual strength and organisational powers have been reduced. This has caused a decentralisation of international Islamic terrorism. There are no longer any global networks controlled by a central Al Qaeda leadership. Instead, local networks have emerged which are related on the basis of a common Al Qaeda ideology, rather than by organisational ties. Within the local networks in particular in the Western world (especially in Europe) Al Qaeda’s ideology is interpreted in an even more extremist way than by the Al Qaeda’s leadership itself. Often the actors in these networks are not really driven by strategic-tactical considerations; they see themselves as participants in a mythical, apocalyptic final battle with Evil (the Western world) in the context of which, in principle, all exponents of Evil (in fact any Western citizen) should be destroyed. This perception may lead to a willingness to participate in ruthless mass destruction.

The willingness among members of local radical-Islamic networks in the Western world to use extreme violence is mainly fuelled by the part of Al Qaeda’s ideology that is based on the ideas of one of the founders of Al Qaeda, Abdallah Azzam (1941-1989). He contended that each Muslim individually has an obligation (‘Fard ayn’) to wage an armed Jihad against the nonbelievers.29 Islam is threatened to such an extent that each Muslim individually (independently of a higher religious authority) is fully justified to engage in an armed Jihad. Local radical-Islamic networks in the Western world are also characterised by a further radicalisation of ideological thinking about Takfir (‘branding as heretics’). In particular the ideas of Shukri Mustafa (1942-1978), the founder of the Takfir wal Hidjra (literally: ‘branding as heretics and leaving’) movement have contributed to this further radicalisation. According to this movement, in effect all those who adhere to another faith (both non-Muslims and Muslims who, according to

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29 According to Azzam the armed Jihad is an individual commitment and no longer a collective commitment (‘fard kifaya’) which releases the individual if there is a group that performs this task.
the Takfiri, do not adhere to the proper form of Islam) are nonbelievers who are to be combated. This means that, in effect, society as a whole is designated as a target."

Violent radical Muslims increasingly make use of the rhetoric and means of the asymmetrical war. Violent radical Muslims use means against powerful states that go beyond the territorial character of states whilst selecting targets that are hard to defend with the traditional means of defence of states. Where earlier forms of terrorism still tried to raise sympathy among the population, radical-Islamic terrorism is heading for uncompromising confrontation. Even restrictions to the democratic liberties as possibly indispensable consequences of counter-terrorism strictly speaking conform to the objectives of radical-Islamic terrorism, because these can be seen as part of the intended revolution or even dismantling of Western societies.

2.7 From Dawa to Jihad: The threats from radical Islam versus the democratic legal order

In chapter I the democratic legal order was shown as a model with a horizontal and a vertical dimension. In a diagram this can be represented by means of two crossing axes. We will use such a diagram to illustrate how the different types of radical Islam described above affect the two dimensions of the democratic legal order.

As we mentioned before, in principle radicalism will be the subject of study for the AIVD, a) where it concerns the willingness to pursue changes in society that are radical to such an extent that they may harm the democratic legal order or its functioning, and/or b) where in the pursuit of far-reaching changes in society means or activities are planned that violate and may harm the democratic legal order.

The questions that arise in studying the security problems of radical Islam include: a) Which changes in society are pursued by the various forms of radical Islam, and in what way do these pose a threat to the democratic legal order? b) Which means are opted for in this pursuit? c) What possible effects can be expected in the realisation of this pursuit?

30 Shukri Mustafa’s view of Takfir is a further radicalisation of the views of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who argued that regimes in Muslim countries that do not observe the ‘laws of the Islam’) are to be considered as renegades to be fought with arms. The fight against the ‘renegade’ regimes also entails a fight against non-Islamic powers that support and finance them.
2.7.1 Typology of threats from radical Islam

The diagram in section 2.7.2 contains eight types of threat posed by radical Islam, based on the differences described in the previous sections. The subdivision is made on the basis of three criteria:

- **An orientation on the horizontal or the vertical axis of the democratic legal order.** This is the pursuit of far-reaching changes in the relations between the government and the citizens, the pursuit of a different form of government (vertical axis), or radical changes in the relations between the citizens in society (horizontal axis).

- **An orientation on not directly violent, long-term influencing activities (Dawa), or a short-term orientation via violent activism and terrorism (Jihad).** The right-hand side of the figure below represents the Dawa-related variants, the left-hand side the variants arising from Jihad-oriented activities.

- **An orientation on the overt or covert deployment of the above activities.** The upper half of the circle shows the variants related to the overt activities, the lower half those relating to covert activities.

In the description of the criteria we have opted for the term ‘orientation’ rather than ‘threat’, because we prefer neutrality in this context. Only in relation to the possible effects of the orientation-induced activities does the nature of a threat become manifest.

It is important not to consider the diagram in 2.7.2 as a definitive classification of radical Islam. Nor is it our intention to relate various forms of radical Islam to one type of threat only. The diagram primarily serves as a frame of reference to enable a better understanding of the diversity and relationships between the different ideological and strategic orientations within radical Islam. It also serves to provide a better insight into the various types of threat as a result of the possible effects of the orientations once these have been converted into activities.
2.7.2 Eight types of threat from radical Islam

**OVERT JIHAD**

- Efforts to create anti-democratic views on the state by violent means.
- Non-violent anti-democratic political Islam or non-violent radical Muslim nationalism

**COVERT JIHAD**

- Covert pursuit of subversion of democratic legal order.
- Violent anti-democratic political Islam

**OVERT DAWA**

- Overt propagation of exclusivism and parallelism.
- Non-violent radical-Islamic puritanism

**COVERT DAWA**

- Covert attempts to undermine structures of democratic legal order.
- Non-violent anti-democratic political Islam

**Vertical dimension of the democratic legal order**

- Pursuit of exclusivism and parallelism via overt violent activities.
- Violent radical-Islamic puritanism

- Secret encouragement of serious tensions among groups in society, which may lead to violence.
- Violent radical-Islamic puritanism Violent Muslim nationalism

- Efforts to create anti-democratic views on the state by non-violent means.
- Non-violent anti-democratic political Islam or non-violent radical Muslim nationalism

- Covert propagation of exclusivism and parallelism using hidden agenda/under false pretences.
- Non-violent radical-Islamic puritanism

- Efforts to create anti-democratic views on the state by violent means.
- Violent anti-democratic political Islam or violent radical Muslim nationalism

**Horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order**

- Efforts to create anti-democratic views on the state by non-violent means.
- Non-violent anti-democratic political Islam or non-violent radical Muslim nationalism

- Covert propagation of exclusivism and parallelism using hidden agenda/under false pretences.
- Non-violent radical-Islamic puritanism

- Efforts to create anti-democratic views on the state by violent means.
- Violent anti-democratic political Islam or violent radical Muslim nationalism

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- Non-violent anti-democratic political Islam

- Efforts to create anti-democratic views on the state by violent means.
- Violent anti-democratic political Islam or violent radical Muslim nationalism
2.7.3 Eight types of threat from radical Islam - explanation

1. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a form of government that is totally different from that of the democratic legal order, using overt, non-violent means (overt Dawa).

Based on a rejection of the democratic legal order as a whole or on essential parts, these forms of radical Islam pursue a completely different form of government (the Islamic state), supposedly by democratic means only. Its adherents wish, for example, to 'introduce the Sharia via elections'. In the Netherlands such an orientation can be found with a movement such as the Arab European League (AEL).

Assessing the security risks with regard to such forms of radical Islam we run up against the problem of the democratic paradox: how to deal - in a democracy - with movements that, via democratic procedures, wish to put an end to democracy? Based on the broader view of the democratic legal order as described above, however, efforts to destroy, via democratic procedures, the democratic legal order can indeed be considered a threat against which action can be taken. For the democratic legal order implies more than just the majority principle. It also covers inalienable constitutional rights (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly), rights of political minorities (the opposition should, in principle, be able to seize political power), a government keeping aloof from the privacy of citizens (as opposed to a totalitarian attitude where the state interferes in its citizens' lives in every respect). Consequently, regarding some forms of active pursuit of antidemocratic objectives, even by democratic means, government intervention is justified. Relevant in this context is a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 2003.\footnote{This concerns a judgment of 13 February 2003 of the Enlarged Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights confirming an earlier judgment of 31 July 2001 of the 3rd section of the European Court. In the latter it was ruled (with a narrow majority of four out of seven judges) that the dissolution of the Turkish Refah Party (Welfare party) by the Turkish Constitutional Court was not in violation of article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court ruled at the time that prominent members of the Welfare party had publicly taken positions that could imply a threat to the fundamental safeguards of democracy and of the rights and freedoms as protected under the ECHR.} The Court ruled that a government may act against groups that, using democratic means, seek to subvert or undermine the democratic legal order, in particular if there is a real risk that their activities may have effective results. Obviously, such measures should be within the boundaries of the democratic legal order. However, on the basis of the traditional political and administrative considerations in the Netherlands in this respect, it has been argued that non-judicial
forms to counterbalance non-violent antidemocratic radical groups are often more effective as well as more democratic.

2. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of society that is completely different (different interpersonal relationships) from the Western ‘civic culture’ using overt and non-violent means (overt Dawa).

These forms of radical Islam pursue, via overt and non-violent means (overt Dawa), radical social reforms (with respect to the interaction between citizens) that are at odds with the horizontal dimension of the (present Dutch) democratic legal order. These forms of radical Islam are primarily aimed against the cultural dominance of the Islamic world by the Western world (and only secondly against the political dominance). Adherents of this group primarily have objections against the Western type of society that can be described as civic culture. In this type of society all members acknowledge one another as free and equal citizens. Some forms of radical Islam are aimed at creating totally different forms of society, based on principles that are completely different from those of a civic culture. They wish to overturn the open character of society, the respect for multiformity and diversity, and the personal moral and philosophical autonomy in order to create a strictly puritan uniformity with, for example, tight social control of people’s ‘virtuousness’. They oppose the ideal of freedom as propagated in the Western world, equal rights for men and women, and so on. The realisation of these objectives is certainly to be characterised as a threat to the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order.

These variants of radical Islam manifest themselves in non-violent, radical-Islamic puritan groups, which, via overt propagation of an often isolationist message, frequently advocate exclusivism and parallelism (for example, groups like some not directly violent radical Salafist groups or globally operating missionary organisations such as the Tablighi Jamaat). In the Western world the view is winning ground that deeper study is necessary into the exclusivism and parallelism advocated by these groups.

Dawa activities can manifest themselves in various ways. For example, Dawa may be aimed at trying to convince Muslim communities that non-Muslim communities are hostile towards Islam and wish to oppress or even destroy it. Dawa may also serve to convince Muslim communities that the values and standards of non-Muslims are
incompatible with those of Islam and should therefore be considered as depraved. In such a form of Dawa, Muslim communities are often encouraged to emphasise (in a provocative way) the differences with other groups and sometimes also to express their contempt and hatred towards standards and values and the culture of non-Muslims.

In the Netherlands the overt Dawa as described above is preached at a limited number of mosques of a Salafist character. In these mosques views are propagated that are in line with Salafism, which is often anti-Western and anti-integration, but not explicitly Jihadist. This movement is largely linked to the Saudi clergy, which is loyal towards the Saudi government or is tolerated by it. By propagating the Salafist doctrine the worshippers in these mosques are presented with ideas about a far-reaching isolation and evasion of those with different convictions, thus effectively inciting to extreme isolationism. The resulting orientation on the own community of 'true' Muslims and rejection of nonbelieving outsiders may lead to intolerance towards anyone who does not adhere to the strictly puritan Islamic view of Salafism (exclusivism) and to tendencies to consider Islamic laws as superior to Dutch legislation (parallelism).

3. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of society that is completely different (as to interpersonal relationships) from the Western 'civic culture', using covert, non-violent means (covert Dawa)

These forms of radical Islam pursue far-reaching social changes (with respect to the interpersonal relationships between citizens) via covert, non-violent means (covert Dawa), which are at odds with the horizontal dimension of the present Dutch democratic legal order. These efforts include, for example, activities of the radical-Islamic nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) from Islamic model countries, in particular the radical-puritan Islamic missionary, socio-cultural and finance organisations from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. These organisations often operate ‘with a hidden agenda and under false pretences’, with a focus on secretly propagating and financing exclusivism and parallelism. To the outside world, these NGOs present themselves as legitimate humanitarian organisations and discussion partners for the government, but in fact they advocate and propagate a highly intolerant exclusivism and parallelism (hidden from the government’s and the public’s view). The realisation of this pursuit can be characterised as a threat, all the more so because the methods to achieve it are characterised by secrecy.
In the Netherlands, a number of Islamic missionary organisations are active. It is important to recognise, however, that the above-described Dawa activities are not only carried out by institutionalised (and by Islamic model countries such as Saudi Arabia facilitated) Dawa organisations, but that in addition to this institutionalised Dawa, also the informal Dawa is gaining influence. We refer to the Dawa activities of individual, itinerant preachers, who may or may not have a link with religious scholars in, for example, Egypt or Saudi Arabia, who have a strained relationship with the governments of these countries. The 'virtual' Dawa propagated via the Internet is also a factor that should not be neglected. Especially young people have found their way to the websites of radical-Islamic Mullahs. These websites increasingly contribute to the radicalisation of parts of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands. But it also important to mention that the virtual Dawa is not only preached through web sites, but also via chat rooms. We are witnessing a new trend in which the role of 'intermediaries' (preachers who personally indoctrinate) in preaching the radical-Islamic Dawa is becoming less important, whereas the importance of an intensive exchange of radical-Islamic doctrines via the electronic highway is growing. The participants in the chat sessions progressively infect themselves and one another with the radical-Islamic ideology. This creates an 'autonomous' radicalisation process. This new trend of radical-Islamic 'Dawa without preachers' may also manifest itself elsewhere (outside the Internet). 'Risk areas' in this context are in particular prisons, some schools, and mosques.

4. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal order, emanating from forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of society that is completely different from the democratic legal order, using covert and non-violent means (covert Dawa)

These forms of radical Islam try to undermine the structures of the democratic legal order via covert Dawa. At an international level there have been indications that in particular the radical branches of the Muslim Brotherhood employ covert Dawa strategies. Rather than confronting the state power with direct violence, this strategy seeks to gradually undermine it by infiltrating and eventually taking over the civil service, the judicature, schools, local administrations, et cetera. Apart from clandestine infiltration, covert Dawa may also be aimed at inciting Muslim minorities to civil

34 We can identify such strategy in particular in the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, with respect to their activities in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood can be described as a global movement with a globally branched network. Two main movements have dominated the organisation for decades. Firstly, there is the anti-Western, anti-democratic but nonviolent line of Hassan al Banna (1906-1949), one of the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood, and secondly, there is the much more radical and violent line of Sayyd Qutb (1906-1966), one of the originators of modern Jihad.
disobedience, promoting parallel power structures or even inciting Muslim masses to a revolt.

In the Netherlands some forms of covert Dawa, aiming at a clandestine infiltration of political and social institutions, are also conceivable, for example, attempts to infiltrate community-based organisations with the aim of monopolising them (thus obstructing the proper functioning of ‘civil society’). But in the long run, more serious forms of such covert subversion are also conceivable, for example attempts by radical Islamic organisations to infiltrate local administration, the judicature et cetera, whilst concealing their actual objectives and loyalties.

Although such activities are carried out within the boundaries of what can be considered tolerable within a healthy democracy, the effects are undesirable. Hence the above-described activities may be qualified as somewhat threatening.

5. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a form of government that is completely different from that of a democratic legal order, using covert violent means (covert Jihad)

These forms of radical Islam pursue the subversion of the democratic legal order via covert Jihad. Whereas variant 4 is characterised by a long-term goal, this variant seeks to effect an assumption of power or an evident obstruction of the current legitimate power in the short term. If such a pursuit really seems to have a chance of achieving effective results, it obviously constitutes an evident threat. In the Western world there are at present no examples of forms of radical Islam that employ the above-described (currently hardly realistic) strategy.

6. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that by using covert and violent means pursue a type of society that is completely different (as to interpersonal relationships) from the Western civic culture, (covert Jihad)

These forms of radical-puritan Islam seek to spark violence via the covert use of inspiration and influencing methods (hence covert Jihad; the instigators themselves do
not wish to openly present themselves as Jihadists or even be associated with the armed Jihad; however, they wish to promote violence in a covert way). In this way they seek to realise far-reaching social changes (with respect to the relationships between citizens) that are at odds with the horizontal dimension of the (present Dutch) democratic legal order. Obviously, this constitutes an evident threat. Modes of operation include secretly encouraging (provoking) serious tensions between groups in society, which may lead to violence. The radical-puritan preaching by these types of actors may result in inciting to violence against other groups (for example, violent anti-Semitism). This incitement may take place for example via covertly spreading conspiracy theories, false rumours, ideas about the perceived enemy and, more generally, creating a climate in which violence can thrive.

There are indications that, for example, the Hizb ut Tahrir, an international radical Islamic organisation which is also active in the Netherlands, uses this strategy of covert Jihad. Publicly, this organisation claims to be against the armed Jihad, but in a number of European countries its followers have evidently been involved in anti-Semitic incidents and deliberate incitement to violence.

7. Orientation on the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a type of society that is completely different (as to interpersonal relationships) from the Western civic culture, using overt and violent means (overt Jihad)

These forms of radical Islam pursue, via overt and violent means (overt Jihad), radical social changes (with respect to the relations between citizens) which evidently conflict with the horizontal dimension of the (present Dutch) democratic legal order. As is the case for threat types 2 and 3, these forms of radical-puritan Islam oppose the civil society/civic culture as it has taken shape in the Western world. Unlike the above-described forms, they combine their resistance with a willingness to wage armed Jihad. Hence these forms of radical puritan Islam constitute an evident threat. An example of this violent radical-puritan Islam is the submovement within present-day Salafism, which is described as Salafiyya Jihadiyya. This variant of Salafism should be clearly distinguished from certain forms of Salafism based on the creed of spiritual leaders affiliated with, or tolerated by, governments of Islamic model countries (in particular Saudi Arabia) which are indeed strongly anti-Western and isolationist, but not explicitly Jihadist.

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35 See the previously cited AIVD memorandum Saudi influences in the Netherlands.
The above-described radical-puritan Islam also manifests itself in the Takfir ideology as expressed in the Takfir wal Hidjra (literally: 'branding as heretics and leaving') movement. According to the Takfir, all non-Muslims (both governments and ordinary citizens) and all moderate Muslims are heretic and should therefore be combated (they see moderate Muslims also as ‘renegades’, which makes them even more heretic). All means are permitted in this struggle, ranging from ordinary crime to extreme and ruthless violence.

The Jihad activities of these forms of violent radical-puritan Islam manifest themselves rather in violence against non-Muslims and against Muslims perceived as having gone astray than in a direct struggle against the established political power. More in particular, this involves risks of violence against exponents and/or symbols of the perceived depraved non-Islamic philosophies and cultures (in particular the Western culture). We can range certain endogenous terrorist networks that have recently manifested themselves in the Netherlands under this category of violent, radical-puritan Islam.

8. Orientation on the vertical dimension of the democratic legal order. Forms of radical Islam that pursue a form of government that is totally different from that of a democratic legal order, using overt and violent means (overt Jihad)

These forms of radical Islam pursue a completely different form of government (the Islamic state), based on a rejection of the democratic legal order as a whole or in essential parts. To that end, the followers of this category of radical Islam are prepared to use violent (terrorist) means. For them the Jihad is the direct, violent struggle against the established political power. Most of the internationally operating radical-Islamic networks can be ranged under this form of radical Islam. Obviously, this form poses an evident threat.
3 Counter strategies and resistance against the various threats from radical Islam

3.1 Institutions and persons embodying the democratic legal order

In risk assessments developed by the AIVD the resistance capability of parties embodying the democratic legal order is a key issue. By resistance capability we mean the capability of those embodying the democratic legal order and those having an interest in the continued existence of the democratic legal order (including society as a whole) to defend themselves against the threats they are confronted with.

The main task of a democratically controlled state power is to safeguard the vertical relationships as these have been agreed and laid down in the democratic state under the rule of law. This encompasses guarding the compliance with and observance of agreements (often laid down in laws), regulations, and standards that regulate the relationship between the government and its citizens. The responsibility for fulfilling the conditions of the democratic legal order that enable the horizontal relations rests primarily with the citizens, in organised forms or otherwise. The government can only play a supportive role. So the democratic legal order has a wide range of parties embodying this interest as well as interested parties: in fact all national, regional and local authorities. And, as we mentioned before, society at large is, in fact, an interested party.

From the perspective of the AIVD, the manifestations of radical Islam described in chapter 2 constitute a security problem because they all involve specific risks to the integrity of the democratic legal order. It is important to realise that infringements on the democratic legal order investigated by the AIVD cannot always, or exclusively, be dealt with by judicial means. The AIVD is not a law enforcement agency and therefore does not collect evidence for a (possible) criminal investigation. Nevertheless, it is possible that during the performance of its statutory tasks, the AIVD obtains reasonable grounds for suspicion that an offence has been committed, which may form the basis of subsequent legal action. This will always be the responsibility of the Public Prosecutions Department. It is also the nature of the phenomena studied by the AIVD, in particular those concerning radical Dawa activities as described above, that makes
judicial interference not always possible or even desirable. The phenomena may, for example, not always be punishable under Dutch law. It is a fact, however, that these phenomena sometimes come close to the boundaries of what is permissible according to constitutional freedoms of religion and speech, and the right of association, thus posing a threat to the democratic legal order. These cases require government action outside the judicial context, while actors like political policymakers, other national authorities, local administration, community-based organisations, and especially the moderate part of the Muslim community itself should provide counterbalance to the threats. This is how we envisage the broad approach to the wide-ranging and multiform phenomenon of radical Islam.

3.2 Combating the threat from radical Islam: interference and resistance

When radical Islam leads to the use of undemocratic means (terrorist violence), there is no doubt about it that government action and (in particular) judicial interference are called for. However, within the boundaries of the democratic legal order, certain forms of radicalism may to some extent be permissible. For example, isolationism as such does not pose a threat to the democratic legal order. In a democratic society citizens enjoy the freedom to choose a lifestyle in which the interaction with other citizens and with the government - although within certain boundaries - can be shaped according to their own wishes. However, if this isolationism threatens the freedoms and constitutional rights of others, it is an infringement on the democratic legal order. Forms of isolationism that are particularly threatening to the democratic legal order are those which evolve into exclusivism of one group towards other groups (manifested in discrimination and inciting hatred) and parallelism (meaning that the non-Islamic government is not recognised, nor the legal system, and that a different, specifically Sharia-based form of justice is propagated, as well as the creation of autonomous Sharia enclaves within the non-Islamic society). The question is, however, whether manifestations of such forms of radicalism can be combated and tackled by judicial means (such an approach may be at odds with the constitutional rights) and whether this will be sufficiently effective. For an effective approach to this type of radicalism it seems that enhancing the resistance capability of national and local administrators as well as community-based organisations is a more successful strategy.
3.3 Present capability to resist the various threats from radical Islam

The capability in Dutch society to resist the threats from radical Islam is low. Recently, however, Dutch society has shown a willingness to adopt a more resistant attitude. The low resistance capability can be explained by, among other things, the insidious character of radicalisation processes. Processes that may initially seem innocent, may threaten the democratic legal order in the longer term. When, for example, there is a not immediately visible but steady increase in the number of persons with radical-political or religious ideas, this can in due course lead to tensions between different groups in society that are not publicly apparent yet. This applies to, for example, the role of some radical mosques and religious Islamic leaders in radicalisation process among Muslim communities. It is difficult for especially local authorities to gain insight into what is going on inside these mosques. In a number of cases it turned out that a mosque board’s viewpoints expressed to the local authorities were quite different from those propagated within smaller, more private circles.

The resistance capability within the various Islamic communities themselves is also low, both as regards the breeding ground for radicalisation and the radicalisation process itself. Naturally, within the Muslim communities there are also people and organisations that are more moderate and/or moderating, but so far hey have insufficiently been able to counterbalance the radicalising forces within their community. Sometimes this is due to the fact that they, like the local authorities, have insufficient insight into the effects of these forces upon their community or are unable to assess and neutralise these effects. Consequently, one of the strategies to counter the processes of radicalisation is to enhance the resistance capability of the moderating forces. Attempts should be made to support and encourage them in such a way that a successful division between radical and moderate forces within the relevant group or community is effected. In our contact with the moderate forces we should be well aware of the fact that their actions frequently result in a more antagonistic community spirit within radical circles. A consequence of this is that the ranks in the more radical part of this community will close and the moderating forces may lose their influence.

3.4 Counterstrategies against the various threats from radical Islam

In chapter 2 we presented eight types of threats constituted by radical Islam. In the chart on the next pages we mention a number of counterstrategies and actors with
respect to the forms of radical Islam relating to these eight types of threat. The chart seeks to offer a structure on the basis of which counterstrategies tailored to the individual types of threat may be formulated methodically, in combination with the relevant actors. The chart does not presume to be complete, but it may be used as a first step to a more complete overview, to be extended by the various actors themselves. It also provides insight into the connections between types of threat, countermeasures and actors.
### 3.4.1 Counterstrategies against the eight types of threat from radical Islam - a chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of threat</th>
<th>Overt Dawa against vertical dimension DLO (type of threat 1 in 2.7.2)</th>
<th>Overt Dawa against horizontal dimension DLO (type of threat 2 in 2.7.2)</th>
<th>Covert Dawa against horizontal dimension DLO (type of threat 3 in 2.7.2)</th>
<th>Covert Dawa against vertical dimension DLO (type of threat 4 in 2.7.2)</th>
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<td>Sensibilisation of/dispersing information among public and public bodies</td>
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## DLO = democratic legal order

### Jihad

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<tr>
<th>Covert Jihad against vertical dimension DLO (type of threat 5 in 2.7.2)</th>
<th>Covert Jihad against horizontal dimension DLO (type of threat 6 in 2.7.2)</th>
<th>Overt Jihad against horizontal dimension DLO (type of threat 7 in 2.7.2)</th>
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3.4.2 Counterstrategies against the eight types of threat from radical Islam - explanation

Below we will provide a number of proposals for possible counterstrategies against the described phenomena of Dawa and Jihad to be implemented by the authorities, the communities involved and society as a whole. The counterstrategies are explained briefly, leaving aside, however, organisational aspects as well as powers and responsibilities.

3.4.2.1 Counterstrategies against Dawa-related types of threat

1. Provision of information to government bodies and the public
   National, regional and local bodies embodying the democratic legal order should be informed continuously on the real objectives of Dawa-oriented radical-Islamic groups. This is a task for the judicial authorities, the police, the AIVD as well as the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism. They should give policymakers and politicians at a national, regional and local level general advice in relation to policies on radicalisation, on the basis of what they know about the objectives of the above-mentioned groups. Counterbalancing specific forms of religious radicalisation is a complicated matter, because radical expressions by in particular Dawa-oriented radical-Islamic groups often do not exceed the boundaries of Dutch law, but they do touch upon the boundaries of what is permissible under the constitution, in particular with respect to freedom of religion and freedom of expression. We suspect that certain actors in the field of religious radicalisation are well aware of these boundaries and take care not go beyond them in public, whereas in private circles they voice different viewpoints. Although government bodies have their own responsibilities, in some cases the AIVD can help them to gain insight into possible underlying intentions.

2. Cooperation with moderate forces
   Cooperation with moderate forces in the communities themselves, in terms of supporting and encouraging them, is of great importance. This is a task for all government bodies as well as the communities themselves. The purpose of this cooperation is to encourage the communities to voice different ideas and to help them develop a ‘self-cleaning capacity’.

3. Promotion of competitive views
   It is recommended to stimulate a more moderate ideology to counterbalance the radical range of ideas. It is important in this context to seek alliance with existing organisations
and initiatives and to promote these. This may help authoritative experts both within and outside the communities to emasculate the radical-Islamic ideological arguments. This is a task for government bodies and for the communities themselves, as well as the media and academia (in terms of support and encouragement).

4. Identity development
In some way or other we have to help particularly the younger generations in coping with their identity crisis. We should avoid that the often hybrid or ambiguous perception of identity turns into a rigid identity perception tending towards radical Islam. Stimulating a capacity for empathy and, in line with this, self-criticism, is important. Emphasis should also be put on the individual’s responsibility towards society at large (as opposed to responsibility towards a limited group). This is a task for both the Muslim community and educational institutes.

5. Stimulation of positive role models
In line with the previous point, it is important that the community has its own positive role models with whom the members of the community can identify themselves and who may stimulate positive actions. The problems involved in criminal role models who are sometimes idolised by young people are to be solved in no uncertain terms.

6. Encouragement of the emancipation of women
Based on views held in the Netherlands on the horizontal dimension of the democratic legal order, stimulating the emancipation of women seems natural enough. This emancipation, which still meets with considerable resistance in Muslim communities, due to both traditional standards and values (for example, views on honour and shame) and the rhetoric of radical Islam, requires its own specific policy.

7. Education
The tasks of the educational sector within the context of radicalisation problems are quite comprehensive. We may identify two distinct directions. Firstly, schools might play a role in the identification of radicalisation and informing the competent authorities. Secondly, they can obviously transfer and encourage the internalisation of the Western democratic ideas on legal order.

8. Political-administrative measures
There is a wide range of possible measures to be taken at a national, regional and local level. A detailed listing of the many options does not fit in with the character of this
paper. The government is currently working on these measures. We will confine ourselves to mentioning some options.

National level: Measures under the aliens law Financial measures (including promoting transparency) Measures relating to subsidies (granting or withholding) Measures to stimulate integration Continuous consultation with the communities, characterised by both encouragement and confrontation (attention for representativeness, loyalty and integrity of the representatives of the communities) Direct debate with radical actors with the purpose to impress on them the undesirability and/or unacceptability of their activities.

Regional level: Measures relating to subsidies (granting or withholding)

Municipal level: Encouraging the inter-ethnic and inter-religious debate Measures to stimulate integration Continuous consultation with the communities, characterised by both encouragement and confrontation (attention for representativeness, loyalty and integrity of the representatives of the communities) Direct debate with radical actors with the purpose to impress on them the undesirability and/or unacceptability of their activities.

9. Media coverage
First and foremost, the absolute independence of the media should be safeguarded at all times. However, by publishing correct and relevant background information on phenomena relating to radical Islam, the media can create an objective picture of the nature, seriousness and scope of the threats from radical Islam. Thus the media can offset any biased reports about Muslims in our Dutch society that pave the way for xenophobia and mutual mistrust. We expect that this will also enhance the capability within society to resist these phenomena. When these phenomena and the risks involved are known to a wider public, they may also be identified sooner, which enables us to counterbalance undesirable developments at an earlier stage. This is particularly a task for political and administrative bodies.

10. Financial investigation
Financial investigation as conducted by, for example, the Financial Expertise Centre (FEC, the co-operation group of financial auditors, tax authorities, the relevant law enforcement agencies and the AIVD) should be continued and, where possible, result in sanctions. In those cases in which it appears that radicalisation is supported through financial injections (from, for example, foreign NGOs) into Dutch institutions,
mosques, schools etc. (and that even radical networks may be financed in this way),
blocking these flows of money may frustrate the activities of these actors in the short or
longer term.

11. Continuous testing against the Penal Code of possible cases of discrimination, or
incitement of hatred and rebellion
At present several of articles in the Penal Code (in particular the articles 131, 132, 137d
and 137e) provide the judicial authorities with tools to actively employ the Penal Code in
cases of rabble-rousing, incitement of hatred and discrimination. These articles enable
the Public Prosecutions Department to test specific Dawa preaching against the law in
terms of discovering the presence of any statements and expressions of a rabble-
rousing, discriminatory or hatred-inciting nature.

12. Cooperation with governments of motherland countries
Ideas about cooperation with governments of motherland countries and governments
of states from where radical-Islamic missionary activities are carried out are as yet of a
rudimentary nature. The constellation of interests within which this possible
cooporation might be set up is very complex. Discussions about it have not yet started.
But the outcome of such discussions may be the basis for a policy to be developed.

13. Socio-economic factors
Socio-economic deprivation is widely seen as one of the causes of radicalisation. It is
highly likely that economic deprivation impedes integration. But it is becoming
increasingly clear that there is no unambiguous connection between economic
depreivation and radicalisation among the Muslim communities. Improving the socio-
economic situation of persons is, obviously, always a good thing to pursue, but the idea
that this will create an effective barrier against radicalisation is questionable.

14. Dialogue between the civil society and moderate forces in the Muslim communities
It is important that within the civil society there is a clear internalised understanding of
the meaning and dimensions of the democratic legal order. Projects to stimulate this -
for example through dialogue, the provision of information, exchanges etc. - initiated by
community-based organisations, religious/ideological organisations or representative
bodies from the Muslim communities may play an important role in this context.
3.4.2.2 Counterstrategies against Jihad-related types of threat

15. Cooperation between intelligence and security services, judicial authorities (Public Prosecutions Department), the police and others

It goes without saying that the cooperation between the various partners in counter-terrorism should be continued and intensified. The role of the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism will have to be fleshed out. Firstly, an understanding of the complementary expertise and skills of the cooperation partners in combating terrorism (violent Jihad) should lead to a better and more structured collection, comparison and assessment of information on the phenomena in question. Secondly, the cooperation should also lead to the collective development and implementation of appropriate intervention strategies concerning terrorism and radicalisation processes, in the context of which the various partners - each from their own specialty - will develop a broad range of properly coordinated, complementary measures.

16. Arrests

The identification of, for example, recruiters or (suspected) attackers within terrorist networks, and their possible prosecution by the judicial authorities (for example, legal action against arms trade and trafficking in false passports) continues to be a spearhead of our policy. The recently adopted, specific antiterrorist provisions in Dutch legislation will serve as an important handle in this respect.

17. Infiltration, frustration, obstruction

Although arrests (followed, ideally, by prosecution and conviction) and possibly dismantling, obviously disrupt the activities of radical networks, other counterstrategies to frustrate the activities of radical Muslims are also conceivable.

18. Security and protection

The threat from radical-Islamic terrorism is currently largely aimed at disrupting society, as well as at creating havoc (both economically/financially and to humans), while the ‘softness’ or ‘hardness’ of the targets plays an important role. The infrastructure of the Netherlands as such and of the Netherlands as a vital part of the EU is a possible target of radical-Islamic terrorists. The protection of the vital infrastructure as well as of prominent persons must therefore be guaranteed by the Dutch government, with due observance of the provisions laid down in the System for Security and Protection (Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen). The AIVD has mainly an advisory role, involving a timely and accurately assessment of threats and drawing up
threat and risk analyses. Within the context of security and protection, the AIVD also advises the National Coordinator for Security and Protection.

19. Sensibilisation
The aforementioned (government) bodies as well as the public in a wider sense should continuously be provided with accurate information about as many aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism as possible. Attention should in particular be paid to the possible contribution they can make to the combat of terrorism.