What Makes a
Terrorist?
James Q. Wilson
Until the nineteenth century, religion was
usually the only acceptable justification of terror. It is not hard to
understand why: religion gives its true believers an account of the good
life and a way of recognizing evil; if you believe that evil in the form
of wrong beliefs and mistaken customs weakens or corrupts a life
ordained by God, you are under a profound obligation to combat that
evil. If you enjoy the companionship of like-minded believers, combating
that evil can require that you commit violent, even suicidal, acts.
The Thuggees of India during their several centuries of existence may
have killed by slow strangulation 1 million people as sacrifices to the
Hindu goddess Kali. The Thugs had no political objective and, when
caught, looked forward to their execution as a quick route to paradise.
In the Muslim world, one kind of terrorism, assassination, has
existed since shortly after the death of the prophet Muhammad. Of his
early successors, three were killed with daggers. The very word
“assassin” comes from a group founded by Hasan Ibn al-Sabbah, whose
devotees, starting in the eleventh century, spread terror throughout the
Muslim world until they were virtually exterminated two centuries later.
They killed rival Sunni Muslims, probably in large numbers. Perhaps
one-third of all Muslim caliphs have been killed.
The Assassins were perhaps the world’s first terrorists in two
senses. They did not seek simply to change rulers through murder but to
replace a social system by changing an allegedly corrupt Sunni regime
into a supposedly ideal Shiite one. Moreover, the Assassins attacked
using only daggers, in ways that made their capture and execution, often
after gruesome torture, inevitable. Murder was an act of piety, and as
Bernard Lewis has suggested, surviving such a mission was often viewed
as shameful.
In modern times, killers have taken the
lives of the presidents of Syria and of Sri Lanka; two prime ministers
each of Iran and India; the presidents of Aden, Afghanistan, and South
Yemen; the president-elect of Lebanon and the president of Egypt; and
countless judges and political leaders.
But religiously oriented violence has by no means been confined to
Islam. In the United States, abortion clinics have been bombed and their
doctors shot because, to the perpetrators, the Christian Bible commands
it. Jim Jones killed or required the suicide of his own followers at his
camp in Guyana, and David Koresh did nothing to prevent the mass death
of his followers at Waco. As Blaise Pascal put it, “men never do evil
so openly and contentedly as when they do it from religious
conviction.” Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at the RAND
Corporation, found that suicide attacks kill four times as many people
per incident as do other forms of terrorism; since September 2000, they
have taken about 750 lives—not including the 3,000 who died from the
9/11 suicide attacks. Of course, most religious people have nothing to
do with terror, and in the past many important instances of suicide
attacks, such as the Kamikaze aircraft sent by the Japanese against
American warships, had no religious impulse. Terrorists among the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka were not driven by religion. Today, however,
religious belief, and especially a certain interpretation of the Muslim
religion, has come to dominate the motives of suicide terrorists, even
when religious aspirations do not govern the organizations that recruit
them. Some Middle Eastern terrorist groups, such as Fatah, are secular,
and some people join even fundamentalist terrorist organizations for
non-religious reasons.
Terrorism, however motivated, baffles
people, because they cannot imagine doing these things themselves. This
bafflement often leads us to assume that terrorists are either mentally
deranged or products of a hostile environment.
In a powerful essay, Cynthia Ozick describes “the barbarous
Palestinian societal invention”: recruiting children to blow
themselves up. She argues that these are acts of “anti-instinct,”
because they are contrary to the drive to live, the product of a
grotesque cultural ideal. She is correct to say that this recruitment is
not psychopathological, but not quite right to say that it defies
instinct. It defies some instincts but is in accord with others.
To explain why people join these different groups, let me make some
distinctions. One, suggested by Professor Jerrold Post at George
Washington University, is between anarchic ideologues and nationalists.
Anarchist or ideological groups include the Red Army Faction in
Germany (popularly known as the Baader-Meinhof gang), the Red Brigades
in Italy, and the Weathermen in America. The German government carried
out a massive inquiry into the Red Army Faction and some right-wing
terrorist groups in the early 1980s. (Since it was done in Germany, you
will not be surprised to learn that it was published in four volumes.)
The Red Army members were middle-class people, who came, in about 25
percent of the cases, from broken families. Over three-fourths said they
had severe conflicts with their parents. About one-third had been
convicted in juvenile court. They wanted to denounce “the
establishment” and bourgeois society generally, and joined peer groups
that led them steadily into more radical actions that in time took over
their lives. Italians in the Red Brigades had comparable backgrounds.
Ideological terrorists offer up no clear view of the world they are
trying to create. They speak vaguely about bringing people into some new
relationship with one another but never tell us what that relationship
might be. Their goal is destruction, not creation. To the extent they
are Marxists, this vagueness is hardly surprising, since Marx himself
never described the world he hoped to create, except with a few
glittering but empty generalities.
A further distinction: in Germany, left-wing terrorists, such as the
Red Army Faction, were much better educated, had a larger fraction of
women as members, and were better organized than were right-wing
terrorists. Similar differences have existed in the United States
between, say, the Weather Underground and the Aryan Nation. Left-wing
terrorists often have a well-rehearsed ideology; right-wing ones are
more likely to be pathological.
I am not entirely certain why this difference should exist. One
possibility is that right-wing terrorist organizations are looking
backward at a world they think has been lost, whereas left-wing ones are
looking ahead at a world they hope will arrive. Higher education is
useful to those who wish to imagine a future but of little value to
those who think they know the past. Leftists get from books and
professors a glimpse of the future, and they struggle to create it.
Right-wingers base their discontent on a sense of the past, and they
work to restore it. To join the Ku Klux Klan or the Aryan Nation, it is
only necessary that members suppose that it is good to oppress blacks or
Catholics or Jews; to join the Weather Underground, somebody had to
teach recruits that bourgeois society is decadent and oppressive.
By contrast, nationalistic and religious
terrorists are a very different matter. The fragmentary research that
has been done on them makes clear that they are rarely in conflict with
their parents; on the contrary, they seek to carry out in extreme ways
ideas learned at home. Moreover, they usually have a very good idea of
the kind of world they wish to create: it is the world given to them by
their religious or nationalistic leaders. These leaders, of course, may
completely misrepresent the doctrines they espouse, but the
misrepresentation acquires a commanding power.
Marc Sageman at the University of Pennsylvania has analyzed what we
know so far about members of al-Qaida. Unlike ideological terrorists,
they felt close to their families and described them as intact and
caring. They rarely had criminal records; indeed, most were devout
Muslims. The great majority were married; many had children. None had
any obvious signs of mental disorder. The appeal of al-Qaida was that
the group provided a social community that helped them define and resist
the decadent values of the West. The appeal of that community seems to
have been especially strong to the men who had been sent abroad to study
and found themselves alone and underemployed.
A preeminent nationalistic terrorist, Sabri al-Bana (otherwise known
as Abu Nidal), was born to a wealthy father in Jaffa, and through his
organization, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, also known as the Abu
Nidal Organization, sought to destroy Israel and to attack Palestinian
leaders who showed any inclination to engage in diplomacy. He was hardly
a member of the wretched poor.
Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova have come to similar conclusions
from their analysis of what we know about deceased soldiers in Hezbollah,
the Iran-sponsored Shiite fighting group in Lebanon. Compared with the
Lebanese population generally, the Hezbollah soldiers were relatively
well-to-do and well-educated young males. Neither poor nor uneducated,
they were much like Israeli Jews who were members of the “bloc of the
faithful” group that tried to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque in
Jerusalem: well paid, well educated, and of course deeply religious.
In Singapore a major terrorist organization is Jemaah Islamiyah.
Singaporean psychologists studied 31 of its members and found them
normal in most respects. All were male, had average to above-average
intelligence, and held jobs ranging from taxi driver to engineer. As
with al-Qaida and Hezbollah members, they did not come from unstable
families, nor did they display any peculiar desire toward suicidal
behavior. Though graduates of secular schools, they attached great
importance to religion.
Of late, women have been recruited for terrorist acts—a remarkable
development in the Islamic world, where custom keeps women in
subordinate roles. Precisely because of their traditional attire, female
suicide bombers can easily hide their identities and disguise themselves
as Israelis by wearing tight, Western clothing. Security sources in
Israel have suggested that some of these women became suicide bombers to
expunge some personal dishonor. Death in a holy cause could wash away
the shame of divorce, infertility, or promiscuity. According to some
accounts, a few women have deliberately been seduced and then
emotionally blackmailed into becoming bombers.
That terrorists themselves are reasonably
well-off does not by itself disprove the argument that terrorism springs
from poverty and ignorance. Terrorists might simply be a self-selected
elite, who hope to serve the needs of an impoverished and despondent
populace—in which case, providing money and education to the masses
would be the best way to prevent terrorism.
From what we know now, this theory appears to be false. Krueger and
Maleckova compared terrorist incidents in the Middle East with changes
in the gross domestic product of the region and found that the number of
such incidents per year increased as economic conditions improved. On
the eve of the intifada that began in 2000, the unemployment rate among
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was falling, and the
Palestinians thought that economic conditions were improving. The same
economic conditions existed at the time of the 1988 intifada. Terror did
not spread as the economy got worse but as it got better.
This study agrees with the view of Franklin L. Ford, whose book Political
Murder covers terrorist acts from ancient times down to the 1980s.
Assassinations, he finds, were least common in fifth-century Athens,
during the Roman republic, and in eighteenth-century Europe—periods in
which “a certain quality of balance, as between authority and
forbearance” was reinforced by a commitment to “customary rights.”
Terrorism has not corresponded to high levels of repression or social
injustice or high rates of ordinary crime. It seems to occur, Ford
suggests, in periods of partial reform, popular excitement, high
expectations, and impatient demands for still more rapid change.
But if terrorists—suicide bombers and other murderers of innocent
people—are not desperate, perhaps they are psychologically disturbed.
But I cannot think of a single major scholar who has studied this matter
who has found any psychosis. Terrorists are likely to be different from
non-terrorists, but not because of any obvious disease.
In short, recruiting religiously inspired or nationalistically
oriented terrorists seems to have little to do with personal psychosis,
material deprivation, or family rejection. It may not even have much to
do with well-known, high-status leaders. Among West Bank and Gaza
Palestinians, for example, there is broad support for suicide bombings
and a widespread belief that violence has helped the Palestinian cause,
even though as late as June 2003 only about one-third of all
Palestinians thought Yasser Arafat was doing a good job. Indeed, his
popularity has declined since the intifada began.
The key to terrorist recruitment, obviously,
is the group that does the recruitment. Jerrold Post interviewed for
eight hours an Abu Nidal terrorist named Omar Rezaq, who skyjacked an
airliner and killed five passengers, two of them women, before an
Egyptian rescue team captured him. The interviews sought to test the
defense counsel’s claim that Rezaq suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder and so did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Post
found no such disease.
He met instead a thoroughly calm, professional man, who, after a
happy childhood devoid of poverty, had moved with his mother to a
refugee camp following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. At school he
encountered a radical Palestinian teacher (and PLO member) who imbued
him with a hatred of Israel and helped him join a camp where, at age 12,
he began receiving military training. From there he went to a technical
school sponsored by the United Nations. After being drafted into the
Jordanian army, Rezaq deserted and joined Fatah, where he learned about
Zionism and got more military training. He was sent on military missions
against Israel, but periods of inactivity made him discontented. In
time, searching for a stronger commitment, he joined Abu Nidal.
Abu Nidal ordered him to seize an airliner and hold it until Egypt
released certain activists from prison. After the plane he seized landed
in Malta, Rezaq began executing passengers, beginning with two Israelis
(they were the enemy) and three Americans (they supported the enemy).
Before he could kill more, a rescue team stormed the plane and captured
him.
Rezaq spoke to Professor Post in a calm, orderly, unemotional way. He
thought of himself as a soldier and of the people he shot as enemies. He
realized that his actions were crimes—that was why he wore a ski
mask—but he did not think they were wrong: he was, after all, fighting
Zionism. The notion that he was mentally ill was absurd: Abu Nidal, a
highly professional group, would have long since weeded him out. Abu
Nidal had killed or injured many people in massacres at the Rome and
Vienna airports and gravely wounded the Israeli ambassador to Great
Britain: you do not accomplish these things by relying on psychotics.
While some suicide bombers have been the
victims of blackmail, and some have been led to believe, wrongly, that
the bombs in their trucks would go off after they had left them, my
sense is that most recruitment today relies on small-group pressure and
authoritative leaders. Anyone who took social-science courses in college
will surely remember the famous experiments by Stanley Milgram. In the
1960s, Milgram, then a professor at Yale, recruited ordinary people
through a newspaper ad offering them money to help in a project
purporting to improve human memory. The improvement was to come from
punishing a man who seemed unable to remember words read aloud to him.
The man, a confederate of Milgram’s, was strapped in a chair with an
electrode attached to his wrist. The punishment took the form of
electric shocks administered by the experimental subjects from a control
panel, showing a scale of shocks, from 15 to 450 volts. At the high end
of the scale, clearly marked labels warned: “Danger—Severe Shock.”
As the subject increased the imaginary voltage, the man who was supposed
to have his memory improved screamed in pretended pain.
About two-thirds of the subjects Milgram had recruited went all the
way to 450 volts. Only two things made a difference: the absence of a
clear authority figure and the presence of rebellious peers. Without
these modifications, almost everybody decided to “follow orders.”
This study suggests to me that, rightly managed, a cohesive group with
an authoritative leader can find people who will do almost anything.
Terrorist cells, whether they have heard of Stanley Milgram’s Obedience
to Authority or not, understand these rules. They expose members to
unchallenged authority figures and quickly weed out anyone who might be
rebellious. They get rid of doubts by getting rid of the doubters.
This is not very different from how the
military maintains morale under desperate conditions. Soldiers fight
because their buddies fight. Heroism usually derives not from some deep
heroic “urge” or from thoughts of Mom, apple pie, and national
ideology, but from the example of others who are fighting.
Milgram did not train terrorists; he showed that one instinct Cynthia
Ozick neglected—the instinct to be part of a team—can be as powerful
as the one that tells us to be decent to other people. But suppose
Milgram had been the leader of a terrorist sect and had recruited his
obedient followers into his group; suppose teachings in the schools and
mass propaganda supported his group. There is almost no limit to what he
could have accomplished using such people. They might not have been
clinically ill, but they would have been incorporated into a
psychopathological movement.
The central fact about terrorists is not that they are deranged, but
that they are not alone. Among Palestinians, they are recruited by Hamas,
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, among
others. In Singapore, their recruitment begins with attendance at
religious schools. If ardent and compliant, they are drawn into Jemaah
Islamiyah, where they associate with others like themselves. Being in
the group gives each member a sense of special esteem and exclusivity,
reinforced by the use of secrecy, code names, and specialized training.
Then they are offered the chance to be martyrs if they die in a jihad.
Everywhere, leaders strengthen the bombers’ commitment by isolating
them in safe houses and by asking them to draft last testaments and make
videotapes for their families, in which they say farewell.
Given its long history, one must wonder
whether terrorism accomplishes its goals. For some ideological
terrorists, of course, there are scarcely any clear goals that can be
accomplished. But for many assassins and religious terrorists, there are
important goals, such as ending tyranny, spreading a religious doctrine,
or defeating a national enemy.
By these standards, terrorism does not work. Franklin Ford concluded
his long history of political murders by saying that, with one or two
possible exceptions, assassinations have not produced results consonant
with the aims of the doer. Walter Laqueur, in his shorter review of the
matter, comes to the same conclusion: of the 50 prime ministers and
heads of state killed between 1945 and 1985, it is hard to think of one
whose death changed a state’s policies.
Bernard Lewis argues that the original Assassins failed: they never
succeeded in overthrowing the social order or replacing Sunnis with
Shiites. The most recent study of suicide terrorism from 1983 through
2001 found that, while it “has achieved modest or very limited goals,
it has so far failed to compel target democracies to abandon goals
central to national wealth or security.”
One reason it does not work can be found in studies of Israeli public
opinion. During 1979, there were 271 terrorist incidents in Israel and
the territories it administers, resulting in the deaths of 23 people and
the injuring of 344 more. Public-opinion surveys clearly showed that
these attacks deeply worried Israelis, but their fear, instead of
leading them to endorse efforts at reconciliation, produced a toughening
of attitudes and a desire to see the perpetrators dealt with harshly.
The current intifada has produced exactly the same result in Israel.
But if terrorism does not change the views
of the victims and their friends, then it is possible that campaigns
against terrorism will not change the views of people who support it.
Many social scientists have come to just this conclusion.
In the 1970s, I attended meetings at a learned academy where people
wondered what could be done to stop the terrorism of the German Red Army
Faction and the Italian Red Brigades. The general conclusion was that no
counterattacks would work. To cope with terrorism, my colleagues felt,
one must deal with its root causes.
I was not convinced. My doubts stemmed, I suppose, from my own sense
that dealing with the alleged root causes of crime would not work as
well as simply arresting criminals. After all, we do not know much about
the root causes, and most of the root causes we can identify cannot be
changed in a free society—or possibly in any society.
The German and Italian authorities, faced with a grave political
problem, decided not to change root causes but to arrest the terrorists.
That, accompanied by the collapse of East Germany and its support for
terrorists, worked. Within a few years the Red Army Faction and the Red
Brigades were extinct. In the United States, the Weather Underground
died after its leaders were arrested.
But Islamic terrorism poses a much more
difficult challenge. These terrorists live and work among people
sympathetic to their cause. Those arrested will be replaced; those
killed will be honored. Opinion polls in many Islamic nations show great
support for anti-Israeli and anti-American terrorists. Terrorists live
in a hospitable river. We may have to cope with the river.
The relentless vilification of Jews, Israel, and Zionism by much of
the Muslim press and in many Muslim schools has produced a level of
support for terrorism that vastly exceeds the backing that American or
European terrorists ever enjoyed. Over 75 percent of all Palestinians
support the current intifada and endorse the 2003 bombing of Maxim, a
restaurant in Haifa. With suicide bombers regarded as martyrs, the
number of new recruits has apparently increased. The river of support
for anti-Israel terror is much wider and deeper than what the
Baader-Meinhof gang received.
Imagine what it would have been like to eliminate the Baader-Meinhof
gang if most West Germans believed that democracy was evil and that
Marxism was the wave of the future, if the Soviet Union paid a large sum
to the family of every killed or captured gang member, if West German
students attended schools that taught the evils of democracy and
regarded terrorists as heroes, if several West German states were
governed by the equivalent of al Fatah, and if there were a German
version of Gaza, housing thousands of angry Germans who believed they
had a right of return to some homeland.
But support for resistance is not the same as support for an endless
war. An opinion survey done in November 2002 by the Palestinian Center
for Policy and Survey Research showed that over three-fourths of the
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank supported a mutual cessation of
violence between Israel and Palestinians and backed reconciliation
between Israelis and a newly created Palestinian state. A majority
favored the Palestinian Authority taking measures to prevent armed
attacks against Israeli civilians. Another poll found that about half of
all Palestinians wanted both the intifada and negotiations with Israel
to go forward simultaneously, while 15 percent favored negotiations
alone.
These facts, rarely mentioned in the American press, suggest how
empty are the statements of many Middle Eastern and European leaders,
who incessantly tell us that ending terrorism generally requires
“solving” the Palestinian question by dealing with Arafat. These
claims, often made to satisfy internal political needs, fail to
recognize how disliked Arafat is by his own people and how eager they
are for a democratic government that respects the governed and avoids
corruption.
Matters are worse when one state sponsors or
accommodates terrorism in another state. In this case, the problem is to
end that state support. To do that means making clear that the leaders
of such a state will suffer serious pain as a consequence of that
accommodation. Though many people take exception to it, I think
President Bush was right to condemn certain nations as being part of an
“axis of evil,” putting leaders on notice that they cannot fund or
encourage Hamas, al-Qaida, or Hezbollah without paying a heavy price for
it. Iraq has learned how high that price can be.
The Israeli government is trying to impose a high price on the
Palestinian Authority because of its tolerance of and support for
terrorist acts in Israel. It is too early to tell whether this effort
will succeed. Arrests or deterrence, after all, cannot readily prevent
suicide bombings, though good intelligence can reduce them, and seizing
leaders can perhaps hamper them. The presence of the Israeli Defense
Forces in Palestinian areas almost surely explains the recent reduction
in suicide attacks, but no such presence, costly as it is, can reduce
the number to zero. As Palestinian hostility toward Israel grows,
reinforced by what is taught in Palestinian schools, recruiting suicide
bombers becomes much easier.
The larger question, of course, is whether ending terrorism requires
a new political arrangement. Ideally, the Palestinian people must grant
Israel the right to a secure existence in exchange for being given their
own country. There may be popular support among both Israelis and
Palestinians for such an arrangement, but it is not obvious that
political leaders of either side can endorse such a strategy. As the
level of terrorism and state action grows, the opportunities for
dialogue diminish, and public confidence that any new dialogue will
produce meaningful results declines. No one has yet found a way to
manage this difficulty.