Arrow's Conditions for Ordinal Social Welfare Functions:

U Unrestricted Domain: The SWF must assign a social preference ordering for any possible preference profile.
This condition is violated by majority rules.
I
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If each citizen's pairwise ranking of alternatives x and y in profile P2 is the same as it is in profile P1, then x and y must be in the same order in the social preference orderings that the SWF yields for P1 and P2.
PA
Positive Association: If a SWF ranks an alternative x above an alternative y for a given profile, it must also rank x above y in any profile that is exactly like the original one except that one or more citizens have moved x up in their own rankings.
D Nondictatorship: For each citizen there must exist at least one profile whose social preference order does not match that citizen's.
In other words, anyone may be outvoted.
CS Citizens' Sovereignty: For each pair of distinct alternatives x and y there is at least one profile for which the SWF ranks x above y. 
For example, if everyone ranks x first & y last.
P Pareto: The SWF must rank x above y for a given profile if every citizen ranks x above y in that profile.
Also called Unanimity rule.

Click here for an example of the failure of a runoff

Click here for an example of the failure of plurality

Click here for an outline of the proof of Arrow's Theorem