Chaos and carnage ensue. Infrastructure is destroyed. Food production and delivery are disrupted. Thousands are dislocated and flee, becoming internal refugees and placing severe strains on the social systems of the resident population. Food supplies run out. Starvation looms.

The Western media bombards the international community with horrific pictures of rail-thin famine victims. Unable to bear the horror, the international community is stirred to mount eleventh-hour humanitarian rescue missions. Food, tents, blankets, portable toilets, high-protein biscuits, and other relief supplies are airlifted to the refugees.

Factional leaders, who initially welcomed the humanitarian mission to feed refugees, turn against the mission and refuse to cooperate with it because its presence accords some legitimacy and recognition to the hated regime. Factional leaders then demand that relief organizations deal with them and not the regime. The demands soon turn into extortion. At some point, relief supplies are attacked and aid workers are taken hostage or killed. The mission loses public support and is terminated; relief workers are pulled out and the starving refugees are left to fend for themselves. That is, until another African country blows up and the whole macabre ritual is repeated. Nothing -- absolutely nothing, it seems -- have been learned.

More maddening, the solution to all these crises lies domestically -- in each African country. It entails the modernization of an indigenous African political tradition -- the village assembly. When a crisis erupts in an African village, the chief and his council of elders would summon a village meeting -- similar to New England's town hall meetings. There, the issue is debated by the people until a consensus is reached. Once a decision is taken, everyone in the village, including the chief, is required to abide by it.

This indigenous tradition was revived, modernized as a "sovereign national conference" and used to resolve political crises and make peaceful transition to democratic rule in Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Malawi, Mali, Zambia, and South Africa. By contrast, the national conference convened by Mobutu in 1992 was not sovereign. The conference was packed with delegates from the more than 200 political parties Mobutu created himself, leading Zaireans to scorn multi-partyism as "multi-Mobutuism." Nor were the decisions of the conference binding upon Mobutu. In fact, he repeatedly sabotaged the conference.

Kabila was expected to rectify this but failed to do so, plunging the country yet again into another civil conflict. He finally fixed September 1999 as the date for multiparty elections. It is not Kabila nor Mobutu who must fix the date for multiparty elections, as Mobutu did in 1996, but rather a sovereign national conference. The destiny of an African nation does not lie in the hands of one person.

Two factors underlie Africa's never-ending political violence and civil wars: the absence of mechanisms for peaceful transfer of political power and for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As we argued carnage and chaos often result from a mad grab for power centralized at the capital. Long-term solutions would involve decentralization or diffusion of power, and the adoption of power-sharing arrangements; namely, democratic pluralism. There are far too many oppressive dictatorships in Africa. The democratic reform process, which gathered momentum after the collapse of communism in 1989, has stalled. In 1990, only 4 of the 54 African countries were democratic. Although this number grew to 14 in 1998 (Botswana, Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zambia), there reversals to thie process when the civilian governments of Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Pascal Lissouba of Congo (Brazzaville) were overthrown in 1997.

Admittedly, some countries listed above would not meet a rigorous definition of a "democracy." Senegal is an example. One of Africa's oldest experiments in democracy, it has been a disappointing de facto one-party state. Technically, it is a multi-party system but the opposition parties are too small and numerous to challenge the dominant party's lock on power. For example, in the May 24, 1998 elections, 18 major political parties vied to end 38 years of domination by President Abdou Diouf's ruling Socialist Party. In addition, fraud and the rewards system ensure that the ruling party never loses: "People are rewarded with bags of rice; workers in pro-government trade unions get the best pay and conditions; student party members are first in line for scholarships. All this binds people into a blurred entity consisting of the state, the government and the ruling party" (The Economist, 18 April 1998, 44).

Though Senegal is not too oppressive, political tyranny is still the order of the day in most other parts of Africa. Wily autocrats quickly learned new tricks to beat back the democratic challenge by inflating voter rolls, manipulating the electoral rules, and holding fraudulent elections to keep themselves in power, as in Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Nigeria, for example, is in a perpetual state of transition to democratic rule under the watchful eyes of its ever-competent military bandits. Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Malawi, Mali, South Africa, and Zambia held democratic elections and peacefully changed governments. There were no refugee crises in these countries. In the rest, the only way to remove an incompetent, corrupt, and oppressive regime from power, is by waging a destructive civil war.

Second, there has been a near-total absence of mechanisms or institutions for peaceful resolution of conflicts, internally and continentally. Disputes arise in all societies. Two people may claim the same plot of land. Five political parties may claim the presidency of a country. A society that does not have the means or structures for resolving disputes simply self-destructs. In prehistoric times, Neanderthals resolved their disputes with clubs. Naturally, the one wielding the biggest club always won. The modern equivalent of this barbaric form of dispute resolution is resort to the bazooka. The one with the largest arsenal, of course, wins the dispute, with the country thoroughly destroyed.

There are civilized ways of resolving social, economic, and political disputes. Society establishes a structure, forum, mechanism or institution to settle them. These mechanisms are of two general types. The first is the direct, face-to-face dialogue, or negotiation, which may be formal or informal. The informal kind occurs when a disputant invites the other over, say, to his home for dinner, to talk over their disagreement. No third parties are involved and the deliberations are strictly private. However, when two parties enter into formal dialogue, third parties or the press may be present.

Of course, African leaders are aware of dialogue and are quick to recommend it to others. When the Liberian crisis flared up, members of the Economic Community of West Africa, led by Nigeria and Ghana, urged the warlords to dialogue. Ghana even held at least four peace conferences in Accra for the warlords. But the military regimes in Ghana and Nigeria refused to sit down to dialogue with their opponents. Nigeria's military ruler, General Sani Abachaa for example, decided that the best way to dialogue with Chief Moshood Abiola was to keep him in jail.

Dialogue or negotiation is not possible if one or both parties is not interested in talking. A dialogue can redress a grievance only if both parties are willing to sit down to talk, both show good faith in the deliberations, and both are willing to abide by the results. If any of these conditions cannot be satisfied, then the alternative is to present the dispute to some other body to adjudicate.

Thus, the second general type of dispute settlement technique is to engage the services of a third party. The parties may take their dispute to a court or submit it to arbitration by a panel or commission. But for any of these modalities to work, the independence and impartiality of the third party must be assured and the disputants must agree to abide by the rulings.

For the court system to work in resolving disputes, it must not only act impartially but also be seen as impartial and independent; that is, free from intimidation or control from any quarter. A supreme or district court that is packed with government lackeys, as in Kenya, Ghana, or Togo, is not impartial. Establishing an impartial court is only half the story. A court ruling must be accepted by both parties; if one side is not willing to accept the ruling, then the whole exercise would be a monumental waste of time and resources. This can be overcome by empowering the court to enforce its ruling. For example, if one party disregards the court's ruling, he could be arrested, fined, or jailed for being in contempt of court. If the erring party is the president of the country, he could be impeached for the same offense.

Binding arbitration is another form of third-party dispute resolution. A panel or commission of respected personalities, such as retired judges, professors, army generals, or traditional leaders, deliberate on the dispute and render a judgement, which is binding on both parties. Both must agree to the constitution of the panel and its terms before it begins deliberation.

Each modality has its own advantages and demerits. Face-to-face dialogue can be quicker since the disputants face each other and each can adjust or modulate his position as the horse-trading proceeds. But the two parties must have the capacity to be flexible. Dialogue is not likely to succeed when bitter enmity exists between the two parties or when disputants enter with hardened positions. The court system has the advantages of legal backing and the possibility of appeal. A district magistrate court's ruling can be appealed to a higher court, but that can take time and cost money. Binding arbitration can be quicker but it allows no appeals.

Whatever the modality, successful resolution of disputes must have three key features. First, the forum must be recognized by all as the place to take disputes to. Second, the adjudication process must be transparent; that is, judges must be impartial and the process open with no backroom deals struck. Third, the rulings must be accepted by all. If not, an appeal must be allowed, but a limit should be placed by establishing a final court of appeal.

In much of Africa, these structures are woefully lacking. Thus, a trivial political dispute can easily escalate into a full-blown civil war that sends refugees streaming in all directions. A typical example was the February 1994 deadly ethnic conflict in northern Ghana between the Konkomba, the Nanumba, the Dagomba, and the Gonja, which claimed over 2,000 lives. The conflict was started by a simple dispute over the price of a fowl. This dispute flared up into a general conflict because there was no local institution for resolving disputes.

Tension had long been simmering among the ethnic groups. At issue was the Konkomba claim to paramountcy and a traditional council. They contended that they had their own land, their own political district, and their own culture and language. Their "land" comprised the entire Oti Basin, stretching from the northern tip of the Northern Region to the northern part of the Volta Region, which they claimed to have inhabited as far back as the seventeenth century. As such, they claimed to be entitled to a paramountcy to be sited at Saboba.

According to the Ya-Na, king of the Dagbon, "the Konkombas do not own any land in Dagbon. Rather they cohabit on Dagbon land with Dagbamba and will never be given the land they were seeking." "I can assure you that much as I am resolved never to cede a square inch of of Dagbon land, I am equally determined that all persons on Dagbon land should enjoy the protection of the law and should be free to pursue their legitimate business unhindered by any person or authority" (Ghana Drum, April 1994, 21).

Since the dispute could not be solved at the local level, the case had to be referred to Accra, the seat of government. But it took time to get the facts of the case to Accra. Even then, Accra was notoriously slow in responding. It might send government delegations or promise a commission of inquiry while people were being killed. Worse, Accra took sides in the dispute.

As many as 18 National Democratic Congress members of parliament from the Northern Region sided with the Nanumba-Dagbon. Most reprehensible were allegations by Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, MP for Bimbilla in the Nanumba District, that the Konkombas started the violence, with the backing of the government of Togo. An NDC minister without portfolio added fuel to the fire by calling upon the government to "teach the Konkombas a lesson they deserve." In cases such as this, African governments fail to act with scrupulous neutrality and thereby aggravate the conflict.

If impartial and formal mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes do not exist or are not supported by the government, then people with grievances will seek alternative, unorthodox means, such as protest marches (peaceful or violent), civil disobedience, strikes (work stoppage and obstruction), sabotage of government machinery, riots, coups d'etat, a revolution (to overthrow a tyrannical government), terror or intimidation campaigns and civil strife or war. None of these, of course, is palatable. Each is disruptive, costly, and destructive. African governments are right in disapproving of such courses of action. But then, most of them refuse to open up legal channels for redress of grievances or peaceful resolution of disputes and claims. And if a dispute cannot be solved within a country, then recourse must be made to regional or continental bodies. Here the prospect is even more hopeless because that scandalous Organization of African Unity, whose mandate is conflict resolution, is yet to resolve one.

Back in 1993, Ghana's state-owned paper, The Mirror (June 26, 1993), wrote a scathing editorial on the OAU Summit of that year: The socio-political situation of Africa continues to grow from bad to worse as millions of lives are being lost with the passage of each day. The OAU seems to have lost its grip on affairs on the continent. Looking at the number of hot spots, one wonders if the wishes and aspirations of the founding fathers of the organization, still continue to be a dream. Although other speakers at the meeting criticized the industrialized countries for tending to regard Africa as a hopeless disaster continent, they did not fail to admit that many of the continent's problems were due to mismanagement by the leaders.

The time has come for African leaders to re-examine themselves and find out whether they are prepared to face and overcome the challenges facing the continent to make it what the founding fathers had meant it to be. The future of Africa lies in the hands of her sons and daughters and we must do everything in our power to save our continent. The time is now or never! (p.2). (Italics added).

All these, however, fell on deaf ears. Commenting on 1996 OAU Summit held in Cameroon, even the state-owned daily, The Cameroon Tribune (5 July 1996) could not resist taking a swipe: "At 32, neither the OAU nor most of its members actually behave at that age, in terms of conflict resolution, democratic practices and acceptable governance." (4) African children, holding their own parallel mini-summit in Cameroon, were also bitter. Said 17-year-old Christopher Kello of Uganda that has been ravaged by civil war for most of its post-colonial history: "You are the leaders, you are the adults creating problems for us." He said the children noted with regret that African leaders spend vast sums of money on arms. "We wish that money to be used for economic activities, education, peace and more children's summit. Africa is full of mess," he admonished (The African Observer, 7-15 July 1996, 3).

The absence of mechanisms for conflict resolution means that a minor political dispute can escalate into a full-blown civil conflagration and rage for years until foreign powers intervene to impose a settlement or mediation, as in Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Unfortunately, foreign intervention does not always work, as recent experience in Somalia attests. It must be stated categorically that it is not the responsibility of the international community to feed Africa or solve every African crisis. The international community can help, but the initiative has to come from Africa itself. Ultimately, it is Africans who must craft their own durable African (home-grown) solutions to their African problems. Additionally, apart from upholding the principle of self-reliance, African solutions are far less expensive than foreign ones. The international rescue misison into Somalia, for example, cost the international community $3.5 billion without even ending the carnage and the collapse of the country.

Home-grown solutions can be found in Africa's own indigenous systems, almost everywhere castigated as backward and primitive. A hierarchical system of jurisprudence existed in most traditional African societies. Back in 1911, Casely Hayford (1911) wrote this about Ashanti courts: At a "palaver," which is the word for a suit before the Court, the King sits with his Councillors; and the Court is an open one, which any member of the community may attend. There is no secrecy about the proceedings. The complainant states his case as fully as he can, and he is given a patient hearing. In the course of his statement questions are freely asked him by the Councillors, and doubtful points elucidated. The same process is gone through with the defendant, and with the witnesses called by either party. The Council then retires to deliberate upon the facts, and its verdict is given by the King's Linguist (p.256).

For the Fanti of Ghana, James Christensen wrote in 1952: [Since time immemorial] the Fanti have had a rather complex system of courts and hearings. Presiding at any dispute or trial may be a group of elders, a chief and elders, or a panel of chiefs, depending on the nature of the case. A dispute, after submission to a group of elders for arbitration, may be further referred to a higher authority, such as a sub-chief or the paramount chief of a state. The latter, known as the omanhene, was the ultimate authority. The plaintiff and defendant generally present their own case to the court, call witnesses and cross-examine those who give testimony for the opposition. During a hearing, proverbs are quoted by the litigants. Proverbs may be regarded as the verbalization of social norms or "laws" which govern interpersonal relations.

Many proverbs may be regarded as legal maxims since they are utilized most frequently in disputes. For example, a request for the postponement of a case may be supported by the statement, "it takes time to make a dress for the hunchback." Another proverb often quoted to indicate prior ownership in a land dispute is, "The bathroom was wet before the rain fell" (p.236).

Kwame Arhin (1985) of the University of Ghana studied the hierarchy of Akan courts. The first was the extended family court known as badwa, with its members known as badwafo, which consisted of heads of the households of the family groups, heads of other family groups with certain relationships from intermarriage or occupying the same brono (ward), and respected heads of other family groups. The badwa, an arbitration gathering, settled internal disputes between members of the family groups. These included, for example, theft; certain kinds of abuse, such as slander and tale bearing; cases regarding property and pawning; loans, surety, and recovery of debt; rights to land and inheritance of property; quarrels between married couples and adultery; and petty squabbles that did not affect the village as a whole. These disputes were referred to as afisem. "The settlement of a household case aimed at reconciling the parties and ensuring good relations within and between the family groups. Mpata, a reconciliation fee, normally in the form of a drink, accompanied by an apology, was given to the offended. Both parties then swore by the elders present that they would thereafter live at peace with each other" (Arhin, 1985, 18)

The badwafo relied on the respect due to the family elders and other elders and the force of public opinion for compliance of any judgment reached. Those who refused to comply with decisions would be disowned by their close relatives. Disputes between members of different family groups that could not be settled by a joint badwa of the family groups concerned were referred to the Odikro's nhyiamu (village chief's court). This court also settled cases that involved rules made by the council. There were village afisem, which concerned such issues as clearing paths leading to the main farming areas and the performance of ceremonies in connection with village shrines.

The settlement of disputes at the odikro's court differed from that at the family group level in that the former was supported by the physical force at the disposal of the village as a whole. Offenders found at fault could be compelled to comply with the decisions of the court. In cases of refusal to comply, or if a party was dissatisfied with the court's decision, the oath of the ohene (king) was sworn, and the case transferred to the divisional court. The case then ceased to be an afisem of the village and became a matter for the division (Arhin, 1985, 22).

The divisional or ohene's court, was a court of original jurisdiction as well as an appeal court; it could hear cases which originated in the division and appeal cases brought up from the odikro's court. At the apex of the hierarchy was the omanhene's court, the final court of appeal. Public offenses, some of which carried the death penalty, were tried at any level of jurisdiction and decisions could be appealed. Such offenses, called akyiwadee (taboos) by the Akan, included murder (awudie), homicide, and suicide; certain sexual offenses, such as incest, sexual intercourse with a woman in her menstrual period, with a half sister by one father, and with a woman in the bush; assaults on the ruler; theft of royal regalia or material symbols of the state and the property of the state shrine, such as a sword, a stool, a quantity of gold dust or nuggets; and treason, which included breaking the oath of allegiance to a ruler or the cowardice of a warleader in battle.

The trial of public offenders in Akan courts proceeded as follows: The parties made preliminary payments, dwomtadie, a kind of earnest money. Witnesses were named and sent into concealment, and, after the parties had made full statements in court and been questioned by the court, were brought to testify under oath. They were then questioned by the parties to the dispute and the court panel, after which the court retired to consider its verdict, which was delivered by an okyeame, a spokesman of the ruler, who acted as interpreter. The court was concerned with reconciling the men to one another but above all with pacifying the spirits disturbed when a breach of the taboos was committed through the offense under adjudication, or through the swearing of an oath, and doing justice to the wronged party. The hearing and resolution of public offenses entailed repairing the damage done to society as a result of the alienation of the spirits due to the offense. (Arhin, 1985, 26).

Within the tribe, mechanisms and procedures existed by which disputes could be settled. Unfortunately, no such systems existed for the resolution of intertribal disputes, except a few ad hoc measures or attempts at diplomacy. This was why the Konkomba and Nanumba disputes flared up into tribal war. After independence, African nationalists and eal of the village as a whole. Offenders found at fault could be compelled to comply with the decisions of the court. In cases of refusal to comply, or if a party was dissatisfied with the court's decision, the oath of the ohene (king) was sworn, and the case transferred to the divisional court. The case then ceased to be an afisem of the village and became a matter for the division (Arhin, 1985, 22).

****************************************************************************** The divisional or ohene's court, was a court of original jurisdiction as well as an appeal court; it could hear cases which originated in the division and appeal cases brought up from the odikro's court. At the apex of the hierarchy was the omanhene's court, the final court of appeal. Public offenses, some of which carried the death penalty, were tried at any level of jurisdiction and decisions could be appealed. Such offenses, called akyiwadee (taboos) by the Akan, included murder (awudie), homicide, and suicide; certain sexual offenses, such as incest, sexual intercourse with a woman in her menstrual period, with a half sister by one father, and with a woman in the bush; assaults on the ruler; theft of royal regalia or material symbols of the state and the property of the state shrine, such as a sword, a stool, a quantity of gold dust or nuggets; and treason, which included breaking the oath of allegiance to a ruler or the cowardice of a warleader in battle.

****************************************************************************** The trial of public offenders in Akan courts proceeded as follows: The parties made preliminary payments, dwomtadie, a kind of earnest money. Witnesses were named and sent into concealment, and, after the parties had made full statements in court and been questioned by the court, were brought to testify under oath. They were then questioned by the parties to the dispute and the court panel, after which the court retired to consider its verdict, which was delivered by an okyeame, a spokesman of the ruler, who acted as interpreter. The court was concerned with reconciling the men to one another but above all with pacifying the spirits disturbed when a breach of the taboos was committed through the offense under adjudication, or through the swearing of an oath, and doing justice to the wronged party. The hearing and resolution of public offenses entailed repairing the damage done to society as a result of the alienation of the spirits due to the offense. (Arhin, 1985, 26).

****************************************************************************** Within the tribe, mechanisms and procedures existed by which disputes could be settled. Unfortunately, no such systems existed for the resolution of intertribal disputes, except a few ad hoc measures or attempts at diplomacy. This was why the Konkomba and Nanumba disputes flared up into tribal war. After independence, African nationalists and elites abjured their own native institutions and rushed to blindly copy foreign systems they did not understand. Had they looked in their own backyard, they would have found the solutions to many of Africa's recurrent crises.