Confronting Anti﷓American Grievances

Confronting Anti‑American Grievances

September 1, 2002

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

WASHINGTON ‑ Nearly a year after the start of America’s war

on terrorism, that war faces the real risk of being

hijacked by foreign governments with repressive agendas.

Instead of leading a democratic coalition, the United

States faces the risk of dangerous isolation. The Bush

administration’s definition of the challenge that America

confronts has been cast largely in semireligious terms. The

public has been told repeatedly that terrorism is “evil,”

which it undoubtedly is, and that “evildoers” are

responsible for it, which doubtless they are. But beyond

these justifiable condemnations, there is a historical

void. It is as if terrorism is suspended in outer space as

an abstract phenomenon, with ruthless terrorists acting

under some Satanic inspiration unrelated to any specific

motivation.

President Bush has wisely eschewed identifying terrorism

with Islam as a whole and been careful to stress that Islam

as such is not at fault. But some supporters of the

administration have been less careful about such

distinctions, arguing that Islamic culture in general is so

hostile to the West, and especially to democracy, that it

has created a fertile soil for terrorist hatred of America.

Missing from much of the public debate is discussion of the

simple fact that lurking behind every terroristic act is a

specific political antecedent. That does not justify either

the perpetrator or his political cause. Nonetheless, the

fact is that almost all terrorist activity originates from

some political conflict and is sustained by it as well.

That is true of the Irish Republican Army in Northern

Ireland, the Basques in Spain, the Palestinians in the West

Bank and Gaza, the Muslims in Kashmir and so forth.

In the case of Sept. 11, it does not require deep analysis

to note ‑ given the identity of the perpetrators ‑ that the

Middle East’s political history has something to do with

the hatred of Middle Eastern terrorists for America. The

specifics of the region’s political history need not be

dissected too closely because terrorists presumably do not

delve deeply into archival research before embarking on a

terrorist career. Rather, it is the emotional context of

felt, observed or historically recounted political

grievances that shapes the fanatical pathology of

terrorists and eventually triggers their murderous actions.

American involvement in the Middle East is clearly the main

impulse of the hatred that has been directed at America.

There is no escaping the fact that Arab political emotions

have been shaped by the region’s encounter with French and

British colonialism, by the defeat of the Arab effort to

prevent the existence of Israel and by the subsequent

American support for Israel and its treatment of the

Palestinians, as well as by the direct injection of

American power into the region.

This last has been perceived by the more fanatical elements

in the region as offensive to the sacred religious purity

of Saudi Arabian custodianship of Islam’s holy places and

as hurtful to the welfare of the Iraqi people. The

religious aspect adds fervor to their zeal, but it is worth

noting that some of the Sept. 11 terrorists had

non‑religious lifestyles. Their attack on the World Trade

Center had a definite political cast to it.

Yet there has been a remarkable reluctance in America to

confront the more complex historical dimensions of this

hatred. The inclination instead has been to rely on

abstract assertions like terrorists “hate freedom” or that

their religious background makes them despise Western

culture.

To win the war on terrorism, one must therefore set two

goals: first to destroy the terrorists and, second, to

begin a political effort that focuses on the conditions

that brought about their emergence. That is what the

British are doing in Ulster, the Spaniards are doing in

Basque country and the Russians are being urged to do in

Chechnya. To do so does not imply propitiation of the

terrorists, but is a necessary component of a strategy

designed to isolate and eliminate the terrorist underworld.

Analogies are not the same as identity, but with that in

mind one might consider the parallels between what the

United States faces today in regard to Middle Eastern

terrorism and the crises that America confronted

domestically in the 1960’s and 70’s. At that time, American

society was shaken by violence undertaken by groups like

the Ku Klux Klan (often in semi‑autonomous klaverns), White

Citizens’ Councils, the Black Panthers and the Symbionese

Liberation Army. Without civil‑rights legislation and the

concomitant changes in America’s social views on race

relations, the challenge that those organizations posed

might have lasted much longer and become more menacing.

The rather narrow, almost one‑dimensional definition of the

terrorist threat favored by the Bush administration poses

the special risk that foreign powers will also seize upon

the word “terrorism” to promote their own agendas, as

President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Ariel

Sharon of Israel, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of

India and President Jiang Zemin of China are doing. For

each of them the disembodied American definition of the

terrorist challenge has been both expedient and convenient.

When speaking to Americans, neither Mr. Putin nor Mr.

Sharon can hardly utter a sentence without the “T” word in

it in order to transform America’s struggle against

terrorism into a joint struggle against their particular

Muslim neighbors. Mr. Putin clearly sees an opportunity to

deflect Islamic hostility away from Russia despite Russian

crimes in Chechnya and earlier in Afghanistan. Mr. Sharon

would welcome a deterioration in United States relations

with Saudi Arabia and perhaps American military action

against Iraq while gaining a free hand to suppress the

Palestinians. Hindu fanatics in India are also quite eager

to conflate Islam in general with terrorism in Kashmir in

particular. Not to be outdone, the Chinese recently

succeeded in persuading the Bush administration to list an

obscure Uighur Muslim separatist group fighting in Xinjiang

province as a terrorist organization with ties to Al Qaeda.

áFor America, the potential risk is that its nonpolitically

defined war on terrorism may thus be hijacked and diverted

to other ends. The consequences would be dangerous. If

America comes to be viewed by its key democratic allies in

Europe and Asia as morally obtuse and politically na@ve in

failing to address terrorism in its broader and deeper

dimensions ‑ and if it is also seen by them as uncritically

embracing intolerant suppression of ethnic or national

aspirations ‑ global support for America’s policies will

surely decline. America’s ability to maintain a broadly

democratic antiterrorist coalition will suffer gravely. The

prospects of international support for an eventual military

confrontation with Iraq will also be drastically

diminished.

Such an isolated America is likely to face even more

threats from vengeful terrorists who have decided to blame

America for any outrages committed by its self‑appointed

allies. A victory in the war against terrorism can never be

registered in a formal act of surrender. Instead, it will

only be divined from the gradual waning of terrorist acts.

Any further strikes against Americans will thus be a

painful reminder that the war has not been won. Sadly, a

main reason will be America’s reluctance to focus on the

political roots of the terrorist atrocity of Sept. 11.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser in the

Carter administration.

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/01/opinion/01BRZE.html?ex=1031857030&ei=1&en=ca13912158363267