Let’s Get a Second Opinion:

International Institutions and American Public Support for War

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Abstract

Recent scholarship on international institutions has begun to explore potentially powerful indirect pathways by which international institutions may influence states’ domestic politics of countries, and thereby influence the foreign policy preferences and strategies of state leaders. In this paper we provide evidence documenting the indirect impact of institutional cues on public support for the use of force through an analysis of individual level survey data and a survey-based experiment that examines support for a hypothetical American intervention in East Timor. We find that institutional endorsements increase support for the use of force among members of the American public who value the institution making the endorsement and among those who do not have confidence in the President. These individual-level analyses show international institutions can affect domestic support for military action by serving providing a valuable “second opinion” on the proposed use of force.
Introduction

Recent scholarship on international institutions has begun to explore potentially powerful indirect pathways by which international institutions may influence states’ domestic politics of countries, and thereby influence the foreign policy preferences and strategies of state leaders. This new research program marks a significant departure from the debate on international institutions that was carried out during the 1980s and much of the 1990s. Scholars then heavily focused on a proposed direct pathway by which international institutions might affect international outcomes. This work focused on the role that international organizations (IOs) play in providing information to state leaders about the behavior and intentions of other state actors (Keohane 1982, 1984; Stein 1982, 1990; Keohane and Axelrod 1985). This research program generated lines of criticism regarding relative gains issues (XXX; Krasner 1991) and the substantive importance of the impact of IOs (Mearsheimer 1994). Perhaps most importantly, scholars have noted that both the construction of IOs and compliance with their rules may be endogenous to state preferences. Thus the direct causal impact of IOs on state behavior has been drawn into question (Downes, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). Institutionalist scholars have sought to respond to these critiques (Powell 1994) and the debate about the direct effects of international organizations goes on to this day. In particular, recent work in this area has paid closer attention to identifying the direct causal effects of international organizations on state behavior in such areas as international finance (Simmons 2000; von Stein 2005; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; XXX).

However, as noted above, a new research program on international institutions has emerged alongside this older research trajectory. Building on the path-finding work by Putnam (1988), this new research looks not at how international institutions might directly influence the calculations of state leaders, but at how they might do so indirectly, or more precisely, how they might influence national leaders by affecting the domestic conditions in
which they must operate (Simmons and Martin 1997; Drezner 2003; Vreeland 2003). For example, several studies in this new research program have examined the manner in which international arrangements can influence the domestic legal conditions in which judicial and political leaders frame policy choices (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter, 2001). Other work has suggested that international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide information to voters in democracies on whether their leaders are pursuing appropriate commercial policies, and this information in turn can constrain the trade policy behavior of those leaders (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). Finally, and most pertinent to the current discussion, the success or failure of national leaders to obtain international authorization or support for the use of force may have an important impact on public support for such use of military force, and obtaining or failing to enjoy public support in turn may enhance or constrain the ability and efficacy of national leaders when they consider the option of using force abroad (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Chapman 2007; Voeten 2005; Thompson 2006; Fang 2008).

This new line of research provides an important rebuttal to those who remain skeptical of the impact of international institutions. By looking at indirect causal pathways, we see that IOs are important. Moreover, these indirect effects of IOs may be important in security affairs, where skeptics suggest their impact is minimal (Mearsheimer 1994). Chapman and Reiter (2004), for example, argue that the United Nations Security Council can provide an important signal to a state’s citizens about whether or not they should support their leader’s desire to use military force. Chapman and Reiter demonstrate that American presidents have enjoyed larger “rally ‘round the flag” effects when the United Nations endorses the use of force than when it does not endorse. They speculate that the preferences of citizens may be closer to those of the IO than their state leader, allowing the IO to provide
an informative signal to the public. Chapman (2007) and Fang (2008) present game-theoretic analyses that formalize and generalize this argument. Their models demonstrate that a “rational public” could use signals from IOs to determine whether they should reward or punish their leaders for the use of force.

To show that the intuitions of Chapman (2007), Fang (2008), and Chapman and Reiter (2004) are correct about this indirect causal pathway requires empirical evidence at the micro-level. Formal work demonstrating that rational members of the public could use IOs as informative signals does not mean that they actually do so. A substantial literature on public opinion directly address this question—under what conditions will poorly informed individuals be able to behave as if they are fully informed. The aggregate correlation between UN endorsement and rally size could be due to a variety of selection effects regarding the decisions of leader to seek endorsements and the willingness of the UN to grant them. Individual level data is necessary to show that actual behavior matches the theorized behavior.

In this paper we extend the signaling logic described by Chapman and Fang by connecting their argument to the literature on cues and public opinion. In doing so, we complete the theoretical causal chain linking IOs to state behavior through the mechanism of domestic politics. Specifically, we find that IO endorsements increase support for the use of force among members of the American public who value the institution making the endorsement and among those who do not have confidence in the President. We reach these conclusions about the indirect impact of IO cues on public support for the use of force through an analysis of individual level survey data and a survey-based experiment that examines support for a hypothetical American intervention in East Timor. By examining the responses to IO cues at the individual level, we are able to determine which members of the

\[1 \text{ Thompson (2006) makes a similar argument about the impact of UN endorsement on the attitudes of citizens.}\]
public do and do not respond to such cues and why they do so. This individual-level analysis allows us to document the mechanism by which IOs impose costs and benefits on state leaders regarding the use of force and it allows us to determine the circumstances under which it will be more or less important for the President considering the use of force to obtain a “second opinion” from an IO. In doing so, our results also shed further light on the longstanding question of whether or not the American public is multilateralist.

**Explaining the Public’s Preference for International Authorization for War**

Since the advent of modern survey methods, scholars have debated the question of whether the American public is “internationalist” or “isolationist” (Almond 1950, Caspary 1970). This debate has concerned two separate but related attitudes: the relative willingness to get involved in foreign matters (“internationalism”) and the relative willingness to partner with others (“multilateralism”) as opposed to acting alone. Over the past two decades, a growing number of studies have shown that majorities of the U.S. public are internationalist in general, and in particular are more likely to support U.S. foreign policies that may end in war if the American government first obtains international authorization or support for the use of force (see, for example, Wittkopf 1990; Page and Shapiro 1992, and Page and Bouton 2006; Kull and Ramsay 1994, Kull 1995, Kull, Destler, and Ramsay 1997, and Kull and Destler 1999; Holsti 1996 and 2004; Page and Bouton 2006). At the same time, the UN came under considerable criticism within some U.S. circles during the run-up to the Iraq War precisely for the way it was perceived to be used to limit and constrain U.S. freedom of action. More importantly, some studies continue to find a more muted, ambivalent or conditional support for military multilateralism (Jentleson and Britton 1998; Jentleson (2003-2004; and Eichenberg 2005). That is, the public generally tends to support multilateralist
policies, but varies significantly in the strength of this preference. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about what causes variation in preferences for multilateralism across issues, and we lack an understanding of how differing segments of the public may vary in their preference for multilateralism from one military mission to another.

Answering these questions requires that we develop a more nuanced understanding of why the American public might prefer to use military force as part of a multilateral operation with the endorsement of an international organization. For example, Americans may assign importance to multilateralism because they believe that it improves the ability of the United States to negotiate with an adversary and fight successfully if necessary. Similarly, the public might believe that multilateralism helps the United States share the costs of using military force more equitably with its partners against a common foe. And finally, as Chapman (2007) and Fang (2008) argue, multilateralism may give the public a second opinion about the wisdom and merits of their leaders’ desire to use military force.²

The support of allies and the attainment of international authorization to use force if necessary can help a country in dealing with an adversary. Such external support may enhance the credibility of the country’s signals of peaceful intent to end the crisis through diplomacy, as well as the credibility of its threats to use force if the adversary does not meet the country’s demands (Voeten 2001; Schultz 2003; Thompson 2006). In addition, if bargaining fails and war ensues, allies can provide help: recent scholarship indicates that countries that have allies (and especially democratic allies) are much more likely to win the wars in which they participate than countries that fight without allies (Stam 1996; Choi 2001, 2003).

While the strategic benefits of allies are (mostly) well known to policymakers and scholars, the literature on attitude formation suggests that the public may be looking for
relatively simple heuristics to tell them whether using military force is the “right thing to do” in a particular instance. Members of the American public face a serious problem of asymmetric information when a president argues for military operations abroad (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Chapman 2007; Fang 2008). In making the case for war, the president can claim to base the choice on top secret information that (allegedly) validates that the use of force is both just and necessary. Even in the absence of such appeals to secret information, Americans rarely have the opportunity or resources to verify arguments made by the administration on behalf of the possible use of force.

Despite this lack of information, numerous studies of public opinion still indicate that the public is reasonably capable of expressing policy preferences and making voting choices that are consistent with their “interests” construed in a material sense (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). According to these studies, the public is capable of making these choices because of their ability to interpret cues from elite sources. Individuals know which elites they generally agree with and adopt positions from these cues.

In matters of war, it is argued that the public attends to cues from party leaders (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996; Berinsky 2007). Yet there is no reason to believe that the public could not also be influenced by cues from international elites. International organizations like the UN Security Council and NATO meet the minimum criteria for credible cue givers. For a cue to be informative, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) emphasize that the cue giver needs to be perceived by the receiver to be more informed about the “true” state of the world than the receiver. International institutions clearly appear to meet this necessary condition for giving informative cues. For instance, while the public generally does not see the classified information that drives decisions about war, foreign leaders being asked to join a military operation are likely to see at least some of that information. Moreover, foreign governments

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2 A related claim that - consistent with our argument - is that members of the public believes that institutions
will have their own intelligence, diplomatic, and military assessment capabilities and presumably will be relying on them to second-guess and validate what the U.S. government advocates. By extension, the voting representatives of these governments in international institutions are likely to be acting on information about the military operation that is not available to the American public.

Next, Lupia and McCubbins emphasize that informative elite cues must satisfy one of the following two criteria: 1) the cue giver and receiver share common interests, or 2) the cue giver faces external constraints (such as costly action). For many Americans, international institutions are likely to be perceived as meeting one or both of these criteria. Americans with strong internationalist sentiments probably see common interests with international organizations. However, the costs that member states of an IO may face for supporting the use of force may be just as persuasive. In supporting force, these states face at least one of three potential costs: a) a domestic political cost for supporting an action if it is disfavored by the public, b) a human and financial cost in joining a coalition, or c) the legitimization of American military force (this is likely to be especially true for traditional rivals like Russia and China).

However our primary interest is not whether international organizations are capable of being informative cues, but rather why some people choose to turn to these international organizations for cues. When a president requests the nation (and the Congress) to support a military action citizens can support, oppose, or feel they need additional information. For those who are confident in the President and who place little value on international organizations, additional information is unnecessary. Similarly, pacifists who are always opposed to the use of force likely require no additional information in making a choice. Yet for everyone else (or the majority of the population), a “second opinion” is likely such as the United Nations Security Council have been invested with moral legitimacy (Hurd 2002, 2005),
to aid in decision making. This expectation is consistent with Boudreau (2006) who finds that when individuals are presented with a cue that they believe is only weakly reliable, they attend to subsequent cues - even only weakly reliable ones - and use this information to verify the accuracy of the unreliable cues against one another. In our situation, subjects are presented with two cues about the use of force simultaneously - one from the President and one from an IO. Thus we expect that they will attend to the IO cue unless two conditions are satisfied: 1) they do not find the IO cue reliable, and 2) they find the President's cue reliable and thus do not require the IO cue to verify his cue.

Let us elaborate on these paths to a second opinion using a somewhat crude, but we hope helpful, analogy. Suppose a loved one comes to you asking for your support for a rhinoplasty procedure (nose job). This loved one has at different times complained both of difficulty with breathing and displeasure with the aesthetics of the nose. You are willing to support the procedure for medical reasons (difficulty breathing due to deviated septum), but not for vanity (concerned with how the nose looks). If you are confident in your loved one’s ability to diagnose the problem and hold little regard for the diagnostic abilities of doctors, then you may proceed directly to scheduling the procedure. However, if you are not confident in your loved one’s ability to diagnose a deviated septum, you would want to seek the guidance of a doctor. Or you may be confident in your loved one’s self-diagnosis, but simply hold high esteem for doctors and want to hear their opinion before agreeing to surgery. Thus, there are two paths to seeking a second opinion—lack of confidence in the ability to diagnose, and general esteem and respect for other’s ability to correctly diagnose a problem.

Some individuals may attend to cues from IOs because they are not confident in the President’s ability to “diagnose” international problems and “prescribe” the appropriate giving the UN an ability to send persuasive cues.
treatment. For individuals skeptical about the President’s case, the fact that the international institutions are comprised of the representatives of many different states – some of whom may not view the United States favorably – means that the institution can serve as something of a check on reckless American behavior. Thus if an international institution endorses the use of force, then a variety of non-U.S. officials who do not necessarily share common interests with the President nevertheless agree that military force is justified in this instance. Thus, the IO can act as verification even for Americans who do not value the institution intrinsically but do not trust the President.

Other individuals may simply place intrinsic value on the endorsement of international institutions (Cf. esteem for doctors). These individuals value the procedures involved in obtaining international sanction for the use of force and so are likely to view themselves as sharing "common interests" with international institutions when it comes to questions of the use of force. If an international institution sanctions the use of force, then these individuals should attend to that cue and judge the mission to be in their interest as well.

This perspective on IO endorsements as cues suggests that multilateralism will be important to two categories of individuals: 1) those who do not have confidence in the President and require some verification of his statements, and 2) those who value IOs intrinsically. Those who do not value IOs and who already have confidence in the President, however, would see little value in such a “second opinion” role and should have no reason to prefer multilateral missions to unilateral ones. Indeed, such individuals may even prefer unilateralism either for normative reasons or because of the logistical problems that many believe come along with multilateral action (Kull and Destler 1999).

Measuring the Public's Preference for Multilateralism
We begin our analysis by evaluating the extent to which the public has a generalized preference for multilateralism. We agree with Eichenberg (2005) that much of the existing data may bias respondents toward "preferring" multilateralism because the questions often do not force respondents to face up to the potential tradeoffs in following a multilateral path. We are not surprised, for example, that a large majority of the public prefers that the U.S. use force with U.N. approval rather than without. Only those who actively think that multilateralism is bad would disagree with this position. The central question, however, is what the president should do after attempting, but failing, to obtain U.N. support? Should the president wait until the Security Council can be persuaded or proceed without U.N. support? Answers to this kind of question provide a better measure of public attitudes toward multilateralism because they capture the extent to which the public is willing to pay costs (or accept constraints) in order to obtain international support.

In a survey fielded in October 2004 through Knowledge Networks, we asked a sample of the public, “Before deciding to take military action, the president often seeks the approval of international organizations like the United Nations. What should the president do if he is not able to gain that approval?” Of course, some people will never support the use of force, even with U.N approval, while others believe that UN approval is not even desirable, so we allowed respondents to offer these opinions as well. Table 1 reports the answer categories and the distribution of responses to this question. We see clearly that the vast majority of the public believes that the US ought to attempt to obtain U.N support before using force, with only very small minorities believing either that the US should not even seek UN approval or that the US should not use force regardless of UN authorization. That is, we find that the public overwhelmingly prefers multilateralism when it is not costly.
When obtaining multilateral support might require altering US behavior, however, the public is quite divided about how to proceed. Just over 40% of the public prefers to proceed unilaterally, but an almost identical proportion of the public prefers multilateralism even if it requires altering US policy. Who are these respondents, and why do they prefer to see costly (in)action if it is necessary to gain IO sanction for the use of force?

The second opinion hypothesis suggests that those who are less confident in the President will be more likely to look to international organizations for a cue when deciding whether to support the use of military force. Dividing the responses in Table 1 by party identification gives some preliminary support to this view. Here we can see that Democrats – who were less likely to be confident in the sitting republican President – had a much stronger preference for multilateralism. To investigate this result further, we analyze respondents in the two middle categories of Table 1. Specifically, we take the two middle categories of the question in Table 1 to form a dependent variable. We code “[The President] should take military action even without international approval if he thinks it is necessary” equal to 0, and set “He should delay military action until he receives international approval” equal to 1.

Our independent variables include sex, education, age, and two variables concerning our second opinion hypothesis: party identification and confidence in the White House. Partisan identification is coded -1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, and 1 for Republicans. For “confidence in the White House” our survey asked respondents to state whether they are very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, or not at all confident “in the people running the White House.” This variable is measured as a 4-point likert scale with higher values indicating greater confidence in the White House.

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3 We set aside those who oppose force no matter what and those who think a president should be free to use force regardless of IO approval because we expect that those responses will be driven by other factors. We tested this assumption by analyzing all the responses with a multinomial logit model which allows for categorical rather than ordinal responses. This analysis indicated that variation into the extreme categories was driven by different factors than within the central two categories. The multinomial logit also yielded similar results to the probit model we report regarding variation between the two central categories.
We expect a negative coefficient for party ID because Republicans should be less likely to rely on the cue from the UN. As we noted above, however, this partisan difference could be due to a difference in party preferences regarding the intrinsic value of the UN or it could be due to a lack of confidence in the President. Thus, when we include “confidence in the White House” in our analysis, we expect that variable to have a negative coefficient and we expect the substantive size of the coefficient for party ID to be reduced. This coefficient should now reflect the impact of partisanship after controlling for its “second opinion” effect. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 About Here

Both of these expectations are strongly supported. Party identification is significant and negative in both analyses, but the effect is greatly attenuated after we control for confidence in the White House. In addition to dampening the effect of party identification, confidence in the White House also has a significant and negative impact on preference for UN endorsement. This is consistent with the “second opinion” hypothesis. Respondents who report less confidence in the White House prefer waiting for UN approval to unilateral action. As for demographic controls, those with more education are less inclined to require the approval of an international organization in order to use military force. Women, on the other hand, prefer to have international assent for the use of force. Age, however, has no impact on support for multilateralism.

Finally, we perform a third analysis to investigate the relative importance of confidence in the President and intrinsic preferences for IO endorsement. If Democrats, on average, exhibit stronger support for multilateral policies, we would expect that confidence in the White House will play a smaller role in determining the opinion of Democrats about the need for UN approval because they will value such endorsements regardless of their views of the President. For Republicans, who generally care less about getting international approval,
on the other hand, confidence in the White House should be a more powerful predictor of whether international approval is required for the use of force. Our third analysis therefore adds an interaction term between Party ID and Confidence in White House to the previous model. We see in this case that the coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant at the $p < .1$ level. Thus, the effect of Confidence in White House is greater for Republicans than it is for Democrats.

Figure 1 depicts the predicted probabilities that respondents will prefer waiting for the UN when approval is not forthcoming by party ID. Slightly over a half (53%) of Democrats who are “very confident” in the White House (while controlling for other factors) would still like to see approval from an international organization, which again demonstrates the strong preference Democrats have for multilateral institutions. For Republicans, only 13% of those who are “very confident” in the White House (again, controlling for other factors) see the need to have the approval of an international organization before the President uses force. Among those who are not confident in the White House, however, the partisan gap narrows substantially with large majorities of Democrats and Republicans preferring multilateralism.

These data lead us to several important conclusions about public preferences for multilateralism. On the one hand, consistent with Kull and Destler as well as with Holsti, we find that, in the abstract, the public overwhelmingly prefers that military force be used multilaterally rather than unilaterally. At the same time, consistent with Jentleson and Britton as well as with Eichenberg, we find that much of this generalized preferences falls away when respondents are faced with the potential costs and constraints of working with international institutions such as the UN. Finally, the assent of international organizations is most important for those who lack confidence in the President and therefore need a “second opinion.”
Nevertheless, a number of important questions remain unanswered by these data. Will the public actually attend to cues from IOs when deciding whether to support the use of force in concrete cases, or is the preference for multilateralism restricted to abstract questions about how the US ought to behave? Will the American public attend to cues from IOs when they are also presented with cues from domestic elites, or will domestic politics dominate their opinions? If the public continues to attend to cues from IOs in these circumstances, will their attention be mediated by their attitudes toward IOs and their confidence in the President, or will concerns over burden-sharing have a greater impact?

**Experiments on the “Second Opinion” Hypothesis**

In order to address these critical issues, we examine data from a survey experiment that measures support for a specific military mission while manipulating the cues that subjects receive about elite support – both domestically and internationally – for the mission. Our experiment asks subjects about sending American troops to East Timor in response to a hypothetical Indonesian attack against the newly independent state.\(^4\) Because we are measuring the effect of elite cues, we wanted to choose a mission that would not overpower the elite cues in the experimental conditions. We chose East Timor because it is obscure enough that respondents probably have few well-entrenched predispositions regarding that country, yet the plausibility of an actual incident of this type would prevent respondents with greater political information from dismissing the scenario as impossible.\(^5\) The data for this

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\(^4\) Focus on a specific scenario for using force limits our ability to test the impact of the primary policy objective (PPO). Future research should investigate the variation in IO impact across different kinds of military missions.

\(^5\) Of course, the United States does have a history of interaction with East Timor (see, for example Nevins, 2005). However, the available polling data from the late 1990’s when the East Timor issue was relatively prominent on the international security agenda suggests that the public never followed it especially closely. For instance, a Gallup report from October 1999 showed that only 30% of Americans said they were following the conflict closely – putting this issue among the least-followed International issues about which Gallup was polling at the time (Gallup 1999). Pew had similar results on attention, but a PIPA study did report a survey result showing that 70% of Americans reported approving the U.S. decision to contribute 200 troops to the UN peacekeeping mission (Pew 1999, PIPA 2000). A large body of research suggests that the public’s level of factual knowledge of such events is minimal. For example, less than half of the respondents in our sample could correctly identify
experiment were gathered in a survey we designed that was conducted via telephone by the Parker Group, between September 22 and October 12, 2003. The experiment yielded a total of 1,203 respondents, and the complete text of the survey instrument is available from the authors.

Our experimental treatment provided respondents with information about the views of two major elite groups regarding a potential intervention in East Timor: 1) the views of the UN Security Council and our NATO allies, and 2) the views of Democratic and Republican leaders of Congress.\(^6\) We chose to rely on both the UN and NATO for our cue from international organizations because these are the two most salient institutions pertaining to American foreign military policy. We pool these two institutions into a single treatment since we lack \textit{ex ante} expectations about which institution should be more influential and resource limitations prevented us from testing each institution separately.\(^7\) Although our focus is on cues from international institutions, we chose to cue both domestic and international elite messages because the public opinion literature has emphasized domestic elite cues and we hope to compare the impact of domestics and international cues. For our domestic cue we included both Democratic and Republican Congressional support because scholars such as Zaller (1992), Larson (1996), and Berinsky (2007) emphasize domestic partisan elite consensus as the critical cue for generating broad public support for the use of force (however see Howell and Kriner [2008] for a study examining how citizens respond to cues from different parties).

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\(^6\) In real-world cases such cues, are of course delivered through the news media. Thus media outlets have the opportunity to frame the cues given by IOs (see, for example, Entman 2004). We hope that future research in this area will investigate the media’s ability to frame IO cues, but we focus here on establishing whether unmediated cues can influence opinion.

\(^7\) Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that the endorsement of the UN Security Council mattered more than other IO endorsements. Our argument suggests that institutions with preferences that are closer to those of the public and farther from the preferences of the President should be more influential. Given that France is among the key actors in both the Security Council and NATO with preferences that are likely to be distant from the preferences...
Our experiment includes random assignment to one of four treatments. Our design is in-effect a 2 x 2 factorial design, with the first manipulation being the presence of absence of Congressional support and the second manipulation being the presence of absence of IO support. In the first treatment only the President supports the mission, while “Congressional leadership of both parties the UN Security Council, and NATO allies” oppose sending force. The president’s views are constant across all the categories, since US intervention is impossible without presidential support. In the second treatment “the UN Security Council, and NATO allies” support the use of force while Congress opposes (International). In the third treatment “Democrats and Republicans in Congress support, but the UN Security Council and NATO allies oppose” (Domestic). And in the final treatment both the UN Security Council and NATO as well as Democrats and Republicans in Congress endorse the mission (All).

We expect that All will have the strongest support, while at the other end of the spectrum, we would expect President to have the lowest support. We are agnostic as to whether International or Domestic should have more support. The majority of the literature on elite cues has focused on domestic elites as the central sources of these cues (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996, 2000; Berinsky 2007; Howell & Kriner, nd). Thus, the conventional wisdom might expect to find such domestic cues to be more salient and influential than those provided by the UN and NATO.

Table 3 About Here

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of US presidents, it is not clear ex ante which of these institutions should matter more in the aggregate. We hope that future research in this area will explore the impact of different institutions.

At a theoretical level, however, the issue of presidential support is not moot. It is possible that the public or Congress, or portions of the public or Congress, will press a reluctant President to consider the use of force. Certainly, a segment of the American public has argued that President Bush has been too slow to consider military options to address the genocide in Darfur. Likewise, there is a debate over how much US military action is appropriate in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where Bin Laden and senior Al Qaeda leaders are presumed to be hiding. It is at least possible that the public considers second opinions valuable checks on a President that it worries is unduly reluctant to use force. We do not have survey data to address this issue.
Table 3 presents the level of support for intervention by treatment category, and these results strongly indicate that elite messages can influence support for intervention. As expected, the public has the most support for an East Timor mission when there is a unified message from elites and shows the least support when the President supports a mission, but all other elites are opposed. The effects, however, are strikingly large. That is, nearly 75% of respondents support intervention in East Timor if the UN and NATO and Congress join in support, while only 25% support intervention if the president stands alone against the views of these other elites. Interestingly, the net impact of disapproval by Congress or by the UN and NATO appears to be about equal, with about 48% approving when only the UN and NATO endorse and about 42% when only Democrats and Republicans in Congress do so.

We would not, of course, infer that such elite cues will always be so influential. The hypothetical intervention in East Timor is clearly an “elective” mission in which the security and economic interests of the United States are not directly threatened. This would seem to be the ideal circumstance for elite cues to influence public opinion. Nonetheless, we believe that such missions have become a very prominent part of American foreign policy and are arguably the most common kind of scenario for considering the use of force over the past couple of decades. Thus responses to this kind of intervention represent a plausible testing ground for understanding the potential impact of domestic and international elite cues on public support for using force. At the same time, we recognize that the East Timor mission is a specific type of mission – a humanitarian intervention for which the the U.S. national interest stakes are likely to be perceived as low even by those who support intervention. Further research should extend the tests we do here to other hypothetical cases that reflect a range of missions including those that might involve a different sort of national security calculus on the part of the public. We believe the East Timor mission is a reasonable test, however, and is not biased one way or the other in terms of the secondary argument.
concerning burden-sharing. On the one hand, the East Timor mission would not appear to be exceptionally demanding (compared, for example, to a war against Iran); thus one could argue that the need for burden-sharing is less. On the other hand, East Timor is far removed from where the United States normally deploys ground forces and is, moreover, within the sphere of influence of an able ally, Australia, who can and has shouldered the heaviest military burden for this mission.

The striking size of these treatment effects, however, does not identify the mechanism by which these cues matter. Does the endorsement of NATO and the UN increase support because respondents value those organizations *per se*, or does their endorsement matter because it provides a “second opinion” that supports a President whose judgment regarding the use of force our respondents might not otherwise trust?

We attempt to answer this question by exploiting the 2 x 2 factorial design of Domestic and International cues. Our analysis begins with three variables: *IO Cue* (whether or not IOs support the East Timor mission), *Congress Cue* (whether or not Congress support the East Timor mission), and *IO Cue * *Congress Cue* (the interaction between domestic and international treatments). As Table 3 indicates, there is greater support for the mission when respondents received either the domestic or international cues of support (as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients). But what about when respondents receive both cues? The interaction term tells us whether the effect of both cues is less than the sum of the two cues individually (a significant and negative coefficient), whether the effect of the two cues together is additive (a non-significant coefficient), or whether the effect of both cues together is greater than the sum of the two cues individually (a significant and positive coefficient).
Because there is a non-significant coefficient, the effect of the two cues together is simply additive.\(^9\)

In addition to the variables for our treatment effects, we control for the same demographic factors as in our previous analysis: gender, age, and education. In addition, we include measures for respondents’ specific beliefs about two aspects of the interventions: their expectations about the likely number of US casualties,\(^{10}\) and their expectations that the mission will succeed.\(^{11}\) In addition to their prominence in the literature on public support for the use of force (Mueller 1971, 1973, 2005; Larson 1996; Gartner and Segura 1998; Klarevas 2000; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2009), these beliefs are also important for evaluating the impact of IO endorsements on respondent’s expectations of burden sharing. As we noted above, burden sharing is an additional reason that respondents might prefer multilateralism, so we control for this potential impact in order to ensure that we isolate the “second opinion” function of the IO cues. Finally, we include a measure of party identification. The results of these ordered probit models are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 About Here

Consistent with the data described in Table 3, the first analysis in Table 4 indicates that cues from the UN and NATO as well as Republican and Democratic Congressional leaders have significant positive influence on support for the East Timor intervention even after accounting for the impact of our various controls. The substantive impact of these two cues

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\(^9\) We could have estimated the exact same model using three mutually exclusive dummy variables instead of an interaction term. If we were to do so, the only coefficient that would be different would be the for the “Both” dummy variable, which would be the sum of the IO Cue, Congress Cue, and the interaction (1.226, \(p < .01\)).

\(^{10}\) This variable is a 6-point ordinal scale. Respondents could state that they expected 0 casualties, 1-50 casualties, 50-500 casualties, 500-5,000 casualties, 5,000 to 50,000 casualties or more than 50,000 casualties. The modal response was 50-500 casualties (37% of respondents), with 17% and 22% choosing the categories above and below that level respectively. Thus the responses showed some variation but generally appeared to be reasonable estimates of what the US might experience in such a mission.

\(^{11}\) This variable is a 4-point ordinal scale. The response categories were “very likely” to succeed, “somewhat likely” to succeed, “not very likely” to succeed, and “not at all likely” to succeed. Respondents were quite
continues to be quite similar in size, since the coefficients for these two treatments do not
differ significantly from one another (chi-squared = 0.65, p< 0.43). Extending beyond the
results in Table 3, however, this new analysis indicates that the very high level of support
when both IOs and Congress endorse the mission is due to the combined linear effects of
these cues, not an interaction between them, since the coefficient for Both Cues does not
approach statistical significance. For ease of interpretation, this means the endorsement from
IOs has the same effect whether or not Congress supports the mission, and vice-versa. If the
interaction were significant, it would mean the size of the effect of an endorsement from
Congress or IOs changes based on whether or not the other endorses.

The respondent’s expectations regarding the number of casualties that would result
from the conflict have a statistically significant but substantively modest impact on support
for intervention. Unfortunately, the coefficient for this variable seems to be in the wrong
direction! Contrary to our expectations, the positive coefficient indicated that respondents
who stated that they expected a larger number of casualties tended to be more supportive of
intervention. The mention of casualties within a survey question generally decreases support
for the use of military force (Mueller 1994; Larson 1996; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi,
Feaver, and Reifler 2009). In this instance, however, our question about expected casualties
was asked after the question about support for intervention. By asking the questions in this
order we sought to measure respondents’ support for the mission without cuing casualties.
Then we asked about their expectations of casualties to see if those expectations matched up
with their policy preference regarding intervention. We had some concern that those having
expressed a preference for intervention might feel pressure to state that they did not expect
casualties – creating a potential endogeneity problem. However, this concern turned out to be
unfounded. Those who supported the mission expected more casualties.

{
confident in America’s ability to accomplish this mission with almost 80% of the respondents stating that the
Expectations of success, on the other hand, has its anticipated impact on support for interventions (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009, Feaver and Gelpi 2004). Subjects’ expectations of the likely success of the mission have an impact on support that is comparable to the impact of elite cues in this instance. For example, increasing a respondent’s expectations of success from “not at all likely to succeed” to “very likely to succeed” increases the probability that they will support the intervention by more that 32 percentage points. Neither age nor education level has a significant impact on support, but we do find that women tend to be less supportive than men.

Finally, party identification also has its expected impact on support. The variable scores respondents from 1 to 5 with a value of 1 representing strong Republicans and 5 representing strong Democrats. Thus the negative coefficient indicates that Democratic respondents are – on average – less supportive of the mission than Republicans.

Our belief is that significant effect for partisan identification is simply capturing our variables of theoretical interest—confidence in the President and belief in the importance of IOs. To investigate this possibility, we create one variable for confidence in the security and military components of the Executive branch and another for value ascribed to IO opinion.

The next step in our analysis is to try to understand why Democrats are less supportive of the mission. To do so, we attempt to separate the impact of partisanship into what we believe are its two major components: confidence in the President and intrinsic value placed on IO’s. Our measure of confidence is similar to the one used in the analyses in Table 2, but in this case we asked specifically about confidence in the President rather than “the people running the White House.” We also asked about respondents’ confidence in other elements of the executive branch that are related to security and military conflict: the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State, the Department of Homeland US was “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to succeed.
Security (DHS), and the US Military. Responses to these questions fit together closely into a scale of confidence in the executive branch (alpha score = 0.84). When we refer to confidence in the executive, we are referring to this scale.

With regard to IO’s, we asked our respondents a set of more general questions about the importance that they felt the opinions of various groups should play in determining whether the United States should use military force. These questions did not specify any particular scenario for the use of force, nor did they mention the President by name, nor the office of the presidency. Instead the question asked respondents whether statements of opinions by differing groups would make them more or less likely to support the use of force. Two of the groups that we asked about were the endorsement of the United Nations and NATO. Not surprisingly, respondents on average said that NATO and UN endorsements would – in the abstract – increase their support for the use of force. For example, 41% of respondents stated the refusal of the UN Security Council to endorse the use of force would reduce their support for doing so, while 22% said that the UN refusal would increase their support. Similarly, 47% of respondents stated that the lack of NATO endorsement would reduce their support for using force, while 21% stated that it would increase their support. We measured these variables on 5-point scales, coded from -2 to 2. A value of -2 indicated that the respondent felt that the failure of the relevant IO to endorse the use of force would make them “much more likely” to support using force, while a value of 2 indicated that the respondent felt that a lack of endorsement would make them “much less” supportive. A value of 0 indicated that the respondent felt the cue from the IO made no difference. We averaged the response to these two questions as a measure of the importance that respondents place on the opinions of the UN and NATO in the abstract – absent any specific scenario for the use of force or any specific cues from the President (Alpha score = 0.63).12

12 The correlation between respondents’ valuations of the UN and NATO was 0.46 (p< .01).
As we suspected, these two new variables are for confidence in the executive and value of IO opinion are correlated with partisanship, though not nearly as strongly as one might expect. The correlation between party identification and our scale for the value of the UN and NATO was 0.20 (p< .01). Just over half (55%) of Democrats stated that UN endorsement would increase their support for the use of force, while only about a third (30%) of Republicans expressed this view. Respondents said that an endorsement from NATO would be slightly more persuasive—60% of Democrats and 40% of Republicans say NATO endorsement would increase their support for using force. The correlation between partisanship and confidence in the President was higher at 0.52. For example, more than 90% of Republican respondents indicated that they were “somewhat confident” or “very confident” in the President. But responses among independents and Democrats were more divided. About 60% of independents expressed confidence in the President at the time of our survey, and even 37% of Democrats shared this view.

In the second analysis in Table 4 we add confidence in the executive and valuation of IOs as additional predictors. These results clearly indicate that the partisan differences over the use of force are comprised of two distinct effects. As expected, confidence in the executive branch increases support for the mission. Valuation of IO endorsement, on the other hand has a negative impact. As we shall see below, we observe this effect because the UN and NATO do not sanction force in two of our four treatment categories. Most importantly, this analysis shows that the impact of party identification disappears when we control for confidence in the executive and valuation of IOs.13

Finally, the third model in Table 4 allows for interactions between the IO cue and the impact of confidence in the executive branch and valuation of IOs. The direct impact of party identification remains insignificant and substantively small. However, the results
clearly indicate an interaction between IO cues and our key variables. Both of the interaction
terms are statistically significant and a log-likelihood ratio test clearly indicates that the
model including the interaction terms is a significantly better fit (chi-squared 40.5, 2 d.f., p <
.01). Because of the interactive nature of the model, however, simply looking at the
coefficients in Table 4 cannot tell us the impact of confidence and valuation of IO’s
depending on the IO cue. When the UN and NATO do not endorse the mission, then the
impact of these variables is captured by their coefficients. When the UN and NATO endorse,
on the other hand, the impact of confidence in the executive branch and valuation of IOs is
calculated by adding their coefficients to the coefficients for their respective interaction
terms. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficient and statistical significance for confidence in
the executive branch and valuation of IOs depending on the cue from the UN and NATO.

Table 5 About Here

The first row of Table 5 indicates that neither confidence in the executive branch nor
support for the UN and NATO has any impact on support for using military force when the
UN and NATO endorse the mission. At first, this finding may seem the exact opposite of our
argument. What this result really shows (and why it supports our argument) is that once UN
and NATO provide their affirmative “second opinion”, then confidence in the executive and
value in IOs do not help explain support for the mission. That is, when the President and
international elites are sending the same message regarding the mission, then differences over
confidence in elite cues or multilateralist values do not influence support for the hypothetical
mission in East Timor. Under these conditions, the coefficient for both confidence in the
executive branch and valuation of IOs are essentially zero.

When the UN and NATO do not support the mission, however, confidence in the
President and an individual’s own views about the UN and NATO have a significant impact

\[13\] This result is not due to a colinearity problem. The auxiliary r-squared for the party identification variable is
on support for the hypothetical mission. Specifically, the positive coefficient for confidence in the President indicates that when the president does not obtain IO endorsement for the use of force, those who have confidence in him personally are likely to support the mission, but those who do not have confidence are significantly less likely to do so. Since the President lacks a credible “second opinion” in this context, those who do not have confidence in him do not support the mission. This holds true even when we account for attitudes toward the UN and NATO. The negative coefficient in the second row of Table 5 indicates that the more the respondent values the UN and NATO, the less likely they are to support the use of force when these institutions do not endorse the mission.

These results clearly indicate that cues given by international institutions influence American public support for the East Timor mission through two distinct mechanisms: 1) the intrinsic value that some individuals place on IO sanction for the use of force, and 2) the impact of IOs as a second opinion regarding the use of force for those who lack confidence in the Commander-in-Chief.

What does this causal pattern imply for when and how much UN and NATO endorsements will influence support for a particular mission? The interactions captured by model 3 demonstrate that the impact of the UN and NATO is varied and conditional. However, we can summarize the impact of IO endorsement with a graph that calculates the estimated impact of an IO endorsement depending upon a respondent’s confidence in the executive and his or her valuation of the UN and NATO. We present these estimated effects in Figure 2.

The vertical axis in Figure 2 describes the predicted change in the probability that a respondent will support military intervention when the UN and NATO endorse the mission.

only 0.33, and the coefficients in Table 4 indicate that including these control variables dramatically changes the
The left-right axis describes a respondent’s level of confidence in the executive branch. Those on the far left of the axis are not at all confident in the executive branch, while those on the right are very confident. Finally, the front-rear axis describes a respondent’s valuation of UN and NATO endorsements of the use of force. Respondents toward the front of the axis stated that UN and NATO endorsements would make them much less likely to support the use of force, while those at the back end of the axis stated that UN and NATO endorsements would make them much more likely to support a mission.

Several important results emerge from these estimated effects. First, UN and NATO endorsement increases support for the use of force among most – but not all – members of the public. In particular, those who state that UN and NATO endorsement would reduce their support and who already are confident in the executive branch actually become less supportive of the East Timor mission when the UN and NATO sanction it. For those at the extremes of both of these scales, an IO endorsement actually reduces their support for the mission by nearly 20 percentage points! More generally, we find that about 20% of our respondents were coded as “somewhat” or “very” confident in the executive and as stating that UN and NATO endorsements would make them “somewhat” or “much less” likely to support the use of force. Among these respondents the average impact of UN and NATO endorsement is to reduce support for the mission by about 6 percentage points.

Second, Figure 2 indicates that the substantive impact of the “second opinion” and “value of IOs” mechanisms are relatively similar. In order to judge the size of the “second opinion” mechanism, we should evaluate the impact of UN and NATO endorsement among respondents who state that they do not have confidence in the executive branch but also state that they do not value the endorsement of the UN and NATO per se. About 20% of our respondents fell into this category – which can be found in the front-left quadrant of Figure 2.

estimated coefficient for party identification but does not increase the estimated standard errors.
On average, the endorsement of the UN and NATO increased support for the East Timor mission by about 25% despite the fact that these subjects stated that they are indifferent to such endorsements or are actually opposed to them in the abstract. Why would the IO sanction increase the support of such respondents? It seems likely that these individuals are using the UN and NATO purely as a “second opinion.” That is, while these respondents do not feel positively about the UN and NATO, they also do not have confidence in the President and the executive branch. However, if the President, the UN, and NATO can all agree on undertaking this mission, then this agreement serves as verification of the President’s policy because such a wide range of constituencies seem to be in favor of it.

Third, we can observe the importance of the “value of IOs” mechanism by examining the response of those who have confidence in the executive branch but also state that they value UN and NATO endorsements. About 40% of our respondents fell into this category, which can be found in the back-right quadrant of Figure 2. In this instance the endorsement of the UN and NATO increased the probability that these respondents would support the East Timor mission by an average of about 25%, despite the fact that these respondents already expressed confidence in the executive. It seems likely that these individuals are responding to IO cues because of their intrinsic valuation of UN and NATO.

Finally, we can see that IO cues mattered most for those who stated that they valued the endorsement of the UN and NATO but did not have confidence in the President or the executive branch. About 20% of our respondents fell into this category – found in the back-left quadrant of Figure 2, and a cue from the UN and NATO endorsing the mission increased the likelihood of their support by an average of about 38%.

This result brings us back to our starting point: partisan differences in support for multilateralism. Nearly 80% of the respondents in this last category – those who lack confidence in the executive, but value IOs – identified themselves as Democrats. Thus the
very striking effect of IO cues in this context would seem to account for the broad bipartisan support for the use of force that we observed when the UN and NATO endorsed the mission as well as the dramatic partisan gap when they did not. Specifically, we found that when the UN and NATO endorsed the mission we found that about 62% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats supported the East Timor mission. Without the endorsement of these IOs, however, support among Republicans slipped to 47% while support among Democrats plummeted to 20%. IO support is important in gaining majority support for a mission among Republicans, but it is essential for Democrats.

Conclusions

Does the American public prefer multilateralism when it comes to questions of military force? Perhaps this question is better stated as: which segments of the American public need to also hear from an IO when making judgments about use of the military? Our analyses suggest that support for a military mission among individuals who value multilateral institutions and among individuals who lack confidence in the President will strongly depend on cues provided by international institutions such as the UN and NATO. However, among those individuals who do not value international institutions and who are already confident in the President’s judgment, such IO endorsements will not increase support a military mission and may even undermine it. This contingent influence of multilateralism may account for the varied previous findings regarding the public’s preference for multilateralism. Thus, our results suggest that we are better off asking which members of the public prefer multilateralism rather than asking whether “the public” is multilateralist.

In our study about 80% of our respondents expressed either support for international institutions, a lack of confidence in the President, or both. In the aggregate, by consequence, we found that IO cues had a substantial impact on support for a military intervention in East
Timor. In other circumstances, however, IO cues might be much less important. A highly popular president, for example, would reduce the importance of multilateral support (confidence in the executive would presumably be higher). Similarly, international cues about military missions that were more central to America’s core security interests might be less important (knowing what an IO thinks may be less important). Nonetheless, at any given time a substantial segment of the public is likely to lack confidence in the President simply because of partisan differences. Thus our results indicate that cues from IOs regarding the use of force in a particular mission are generally likely to influence aggregate public support for that mission.

Does this public preference for multilateralism imply that international organizations can influence state decisions to use force by altering the domestic political incentives to do so. Once again, our answer is a qualified “yes.” Consistent with Chapman and Reiter (2004), Chapman (2007) and Fang (2008), we use individual level data to validate and extend the game theoretic and aggregate level empirical findings that the public relies on cues from international institutions regarding the use of force. More specifically we show that those who have confidence in the president’s judgment will generally rally to his support in case of war, but those who lack such confidence are left looking elsewhere for cues to help them form their opinions. For these individuals we find that a cue from an international organization can provide an important source of verification on the wisdom of the President’s policy choice.

While previous research had posited such a principal-agent mechanism for the importance of U.N. sanctioning of force and had presented some aggregate public opinion data consistent with this argument, this work had not demonstrated the causal impact of IO cues on attitude formation. Previous research in American politics on the use of cues in forming foreign policy opinions, on the other hand, had emphasized the public’s reliance on
domestic partisan cues while overlooking the impact of international institutions (Zaller 1992, Larson 1996, Berinsky 2007). By bringing together the international relations and public opinion literatures on the use of force, however, we have been able to document the mechanism by which the public incorporates international institutions such as the UN and NATO into its calculations about military force.

Asymmetric information problems make it difficult for members of the public to evaluate their leaders’ claims about the wisdom of using military force. And these problems of asymmetric information are likely far worse in judgments about foreign policy than in other political decision making contexts. A motivated citizen can learn the details and nuances of different car insurance reforms. The same cannot be said when becoming fully informed involves classified intelligence and details of military planning. Yet citizens cope with their lack of information in a similar fashion—by evaluating the cues provided to them by competing elites. While some members of the public will accept the cues provided by the President and rally to his support, those who distrust his judgment will look elsewhere for cues. Our research indicates that international institutions such as the UN Security Council and NATO can be important sources of such cues for many— but not all— segments of the American population. If U.S. presidents ignore the resulting inference that publics draw from those cues, and use them as a basis to form their own opinions about the need and legitimacy of force, then they may expect public resistance to his or her claims that the use of force in a particular instance is wise for the nation. While even substantial shifts in public support such as the ones we document here cannot prevent a president from using military force, they appear substantial enough to entail significant political repercussions for a president who ignored them. We hope that future research on these indirect effects of international institutions will begin to investigate the impact of differing kinds of institutions as cue givers.
and will compare the impact of institutional cue givers to the influence of cues from less institutionalized sources – such as “coalitions of the willing.”

We do not argue that this second-opinion effect trumps all other effects. For instance, we would expect the general rally effect to operate regardless of the second-opinion cue. Yet, as Chapman and Reiter have demonstrated, the second-opinion cue could affect the amplitude of the rally. We conjecture it might even affect the speed of collapse of the rally if the war effort begins to bog down. An interesting extension of our research would compare the erosion of public support, both within the United States and within allied publics, for the Iraq and the Afghanistan missions. The stronger second-opinion cue in Afghanistan may have helped prop up support longer despite the challenges there.

Of course, in an international environment that remains anarchic at its root, states will remain capable of using military force regardless of the actions of international organizations such as the UN Security Council. The United States – as the world’s preeminent military power – is especially difficult for international organizations to constrain. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that that IOs do not matter, even for the US. As long as (some) Americans lack confidence in the executive or value the opinion of IOs, then American presidents will pay substantial costs in terms of public support for using force in the absence of international authorization.
Table 1: “Before deciding to take military action, the president often seeks the approval of international organizations like the United Nations. What should the president do if he is not able to gain that approval?” (October 2004, Column percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Independents</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He should not take military action period, regardless of whether he can get international approval</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He should delay military action until he receives international approval</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He should take military action even without international approval if he thinks it is necessary</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He should not seek international approval before deciding to take military action</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wait for UN</td>
<td>Wait for UN</td>
<td>Wait for UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>-0.713</td>
<td>-0.459</td>
<td>-0.706</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.85)**</td>
<td>(7.10)**</td>
<td>(4.65)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.42)**</td>
<td>(4.78)**</td>
<td>(4.75)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.97)*</td>
<td>(3.32)**</td>
<td>(3.02)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in White House</td>
<td>-0.448</td>
<td>-0.471</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.95)**</td>
<td>(8.13)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence x Party ID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>870</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress Approves</th>
<th>Congress Does Not Approve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN &amp; NATO Approve</strong></td>
<td><strong>UN &amp; NATO Do Not Approve</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Approve</td>
<td>98 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Approve</td>
<td>112 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disapprove</td>
<td>29 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disapprove</td>
<td>43 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: IO Cues, Confidence in the Executive and Support for Intervening in East Timor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>1.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.83)**</td>
<td>(5.95)**</td>
<td>(5.51)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Cue</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.91)**</td>
<td>(4.76)**</td>
<td>(4.71)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue * Congress Cue</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Casualties</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.46)*</td>
<td>(2.18)*</td>
<td>(2.54)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Success</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.84)**</td>
<td>(8.80)**</td>
<td>(8.58)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38)*</td>
<td>(2.32)*</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
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<td>(1.43)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.26)*</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value IO Endorsement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.75)**</td>
<td>(5.85)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Executive</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.52)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.55)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue x Value IOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.315</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.31)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue x Conf. in Exec.</td>
<td>-0.396</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.81)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1016</td>
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Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Impact of Confidence in the Executive and Value of IO Endorsements on Support for Intervention in East Timor Depending on IO Cues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Coefficients for Confidence in President</th>
<th>Coefficients for Value of IO Endorsement</th>
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<td>IOs Endorse Mission</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>IOs Do Not Endorse Mission</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.55)**</td>
<td>(5.85)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Figure 1

Predicted Probability of Wanting IO Approval

Confidence in White House

Probability

Very Confident
Somewhat Confident
Not Very Confident
Not At All Confident

Party ID
- Democrat
- Independent
- Republican
Figure 2
References


