The Domestic Paradigm:
Internal Sources of International Politics

Introduction


I. Why Another Paradigm? More Puzzles for Realism

A. (Mis)Interpretation of Material Circumstances
    Military Technology: Offensive or Defensive?
    Is Bipolarity or Multipolarity More Stable?

B. Variation in Security Seeking Behavior: Status Quo vs Revisionist States
    Example: Interwar Years

C. Diversity of Actual Goals Pursued by States: Not Just Security

1. Alternative Goals
    Economic welfare: United States?
    Status/prestige: France after WWII
    Ideology and values
       Morality, justice, human rights
       Promotion of democracy, communism, religion, etc.

2. Subordination of Security to Other Goals
    Wealth vs security: US trade with China
    Status vs security: Imperial Germany, 1897-1914
 

II. Overview of the Domestic Paradigm

A. Key Features of the Domestic Paradigm
    Actors: Individuals and Groups
    Goals: Greater Diversity
    Influences: Domestic Power Structures and Institutions
    Decision Making: Not Always Rational

B. Variants of the Domestic Paradigm
    State Governments
    Societies
    State (Government) - Society Relations

C. Limiting Complexity: Basic Dimensions of Variation
    De/centralization of the government
    Fragmentation/homogeneity of society
    Autonomy of the government from society

 

III. The Role of Individuals and Human Characteristics

A. When Individuals Matter
    Nature of the Political System
    Nature of the Issue
    Time Urgency

B. How Individual Characteristics Can Matter

1. Human Nature:Inherent aggressiveness?
    Problem: Can't account for variation
    Problem: Are humans so similar?

2. Individual Personality and Character: Hitler vs Stalin vs Roosevelt vs Churchill
    Values
    Attitude towards risk
    Intellectual and physical capacity
    Problem: Not generalizable

<>3. Psychological Factors
    Cognitive biases: "we see what we expect to see"
        British views of Hitler (Germany)
        (Rigid) U.S. views of USSR in late 1980s (Gorbachev)
    Emotional biases: "we see what we want to see"
        Decisions to go to war in 1914: "the necessary as possible"
    Stress/cognitive failure in crises
        Stalin in 1941