The facts below are fictitious

(The formatting of this document was changed in the transfer from Word to the Web)

Prepared by a former student in 1999               Perry Z. Binder, J.D. - Instructor

 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CLAYTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

JONNY MAC,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRAND SLAM, INC.,

Defendant.

.............................................................................. Civil Action: 99-CV-1232-5

 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

 

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, Grand Slam, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant"), and respectfully submits this

Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant is a California corporation that sells tennis racquets over a web site. Defendant began operating in 1990 and since

then has sold one thousand (1000) racquets. Four (4) of the 1000 racquets sold were to residents of the State of Georgia.

Defendant’s business operations are located in California. Defendant has no physical presence within the State of Georgia.

Defendant is not registered to conduct business within the State of Georgia and has no registered agents, employees or sales

representatives located in Georgia.

Plaintiff Jonny Mac, (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff"), is a resident of Clayton County, Georgia. Plaintiff purchased a

Series 9000 tennis racquet from Defendant over its Internet Web site. Prior to Plaintiff’s purchase of the racquet, he viewed

the following statement: "If in the unlikely event of litigation, a law suit is filed, jurisdiction and venue shall lie in Orange

County, California State Court."

Plaintiff was given the option of agreeing or disagreeing to the clause by clicking on either a button stating "I agree" or a

button stating "I disagree." Plaintiff agreed to the forum selection clause and ordered a Series 9000 racquet.

Plaintiff claims that the product he received is defective and that he has incurred damages in the amount of Ten Thousand

Dollars ($10,000). Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant breached the terms of the contract agreement.

 

I.

STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b) states, "Every defense, in law or fact,¼shall be asserted in the responsive pleading¼except the

following defenses may, at the option of the pleader, made by motion in writing¼lack of jurisdiction over person¼" In

Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E. 2d 135 (1979) the Court states that "jurisdiction of the person is the power of the

Court to render a personal judgment, or to subject the parties in a particular case to the decisions and rulings made by

it¼.the term ‘jurisdiction of the person’ is broad enough to cover lack of jurisdiction of the person resulting from improper

venue."

In the instant case, the Plaintiff asserts the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b) and

files its pretrial motion with supporting documents.

 

II.

PURPOSEFUL ACTS MUST BE PERFORMED BY A DEFENDANT TO TIE IT TO THE STATE

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) provides that courts of the State of Georgia may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident

if that nonresident "transacts any business within this state." This has been interpreted to mean that "purposeful acts must have

been performed by the defendant to tie it to the State, and mere telephone or mail contact with an out-of-state defendant, or

even the defendant’s visits to this state, are insufficient to establish the purposeful activity with Georgia required by the Long

Arm statute." Apparel Resources Int’l. Ltd. v. Amersig Southeast, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 483, 451 S.E.2d 113.

There are no controlling cases in Georgia dealing with the Internet and jurisdiction. In the instant case, the Defendant operates

a web site advertising its product. Similar to mail order, advertisements over the Internet do not employ one-on-one human

contact to persuade potential customers to purchase products. Rather, potential customers choose to view the

advertisements and do not experience pressure techniques from salesmen to persuade them to purchase products. The

customers choose to "take it or leave it" with no pressure involved. In the instant case, the Defendant did not purposefully

contact residents of Georgia to transact business. Rather, the Defendant merely advertised its product to anyone in any state.

"In order for a court to assert general jurisdiction, the Defendant must have ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the

forum state." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868. In the present case,

the Defendant has not had continuous and systematic contacts with the State of Georgia. Over a period of nearly a decade,

the Defendant has made only four sales to residents of the State of Georgia.

"Contacts must be more than random, fortuitous, or attenuated." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174.

At most, the contacts that the Defendant had with the State of Georgia were random. Over nine years, the Defendant has

averaged less than one sale per year in Georgia. Of Defendant’s 1000 sales, less than one percent (1%) were to Georgia

residents.

In SF Hotel Co., L.P. v. Energy Investments, Inc. 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997), the Defendant operated a web site

advertising its hotel facilities in Florida. The plaintiff, a resident of Kansas filed suit against the defendant in Kansas pursuant

to the long-arm statute of Kansas. The U. S. Court for the 10th District held, on the issue of personal jurisdiction based on

Internet use, that in its "review of the available cases and materials ¼ the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be

constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over

the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles." Id.

In the present case, Defendant’s business operations are located in California. Defendant has no physical presence within the

State of Georgia. Defendant is not registered to conduct business within the State of Georgia and has no registered agents,

employees or sales representatives located in the State of Georgia. The only possible "contacts" Defendant has with Georgia

include the sale of four tennis racquets over a period of nine years to Georgia residents and the maintenance of an Internet

Web site. Defendant’s sporadic sales representing less than one percent (1%) of its total sales since 1990, are neither

substantial nor "continuous and systematic" contacts with the Georgia forum.

 

III.

ENFORCEMENT OF VENUE SELECTION PROVISIONS IN CONTRACT IS PROPER WHERE PARTIES ARE AWARE OF THOSE CONSIDERATIONS WHEN THEY AGREE TO EXCLUSIVE VENUE

In the present case, the Plaintiff initiated this suit for breach of contract fully aware of the forum selection provision in the

contract. The provision clearly provided that the sole venue for settling disputes between the parties lay in Orange County,

California. As a result of the contract provision, this Court’s jurisdiction has been waived and is limited to the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s action.

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract. Prior to Plaintiff’s purchase of the tennis racquet, the forum selection clause of

the contract was specifically pointed out to him with the choice to either agree or disagree. "‘It is clear under Georgia law that

personal jurisdiction¼may be waived. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a variety of legal arrangements as

representative of consent to personal jurisdiction. Advance consent to the jurisdiction of a particular court in a contract is one

such arrangement.’¼[Cit.]" Regency Mall Assoc. v. G.W.’s Restaurant, 213 Ga. App. 225, 444 S.E.2d 572 (1994). In the

present case, the Plaintiff agreed to the forum selection clause by clicking the "I Agree" button on his computer screen

thereby waiving personal jurisdiction to Orange County, California.

In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1913-14, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), the United States

Supreme Court determined that forum selection contract clauses "are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless

enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the circumstances." The Georgia Courts have upheld

this decision. In Brinson v. Martin, 220 Ga. App. 638, 469 S.E.2d 537 (1996), the Georgia Appeals Court held that forum

selection clauses are "prima facie valid and should be enforced¼" In the present case, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant

were aware of and agreed to the exclusive venue clause. The forum selection clause was not "buried" or hidden from the

Plaintiff, rather it was clearly brought to his attention and he agreed to waive jurisdiction to Orange County, California. It is no

more "inconvenient" for the Plaintiff to bring suit in California than it is for the Defendant to travel to Georgia. Both parties

agreed to the venue selection and it should be enforced based on the decisions of the Court in the previous cases.

 

CONCLUSION

The Defendant is a California corporation. It has been selling tennis racquets for almost ten (10) years. During that time the

Defendant has sold 1000 items. Of the 1000 items sold, four (4) were to Georgia residents. Defendant’s contacts with

Georgia have not been continuous or systematic and do not measure up to those required by the Georgia Long Arm Statute.

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract containing an agreement to settle any disputes that may arise under their

contract in Orange County, California. Plaintiff clearly agreed to this clause. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

 

Respectfully submitted this ___ day of April, 1999

 

BINDER, ADAMS & CARTER

432 Main Street, Suite 322

Jonesboro, Georgia 30233

(770) 325-9875

__________________________

PERRY Z. BINDER, ESQ.

Attorney for the Defendant

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