## Cover Sheet for Proposal to the National Science Foundation

### Program Announcement/Solicitation No./Closing Date
- **PD 98-1371**
- **08/15/00**

### FOR CONSIDERATION BY NSF Organization Unit(s)
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### Name of Organization to Which Award Should Be Made
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### Awarded Organization Code (if known)
- 5300001194

### Name of Performing Organization, if different from above
- Georgia State University Research Foundation, Inc.

### Address of Performing Organization, including 9 Digit ZIP Code
- Atlanta, GA. 30303

### Title of Proposed Project
- Attributes of Federal Independent Regulatory Commissioners, 1887-2000: Construction of a Multi-User Data Base

### Requested Amount
- $137,642

### Proposed Duration (1-60 Months)
- 26 months

### Requested Starting Date
- 07/01/01

### Show Related Preproposal No., if applicable
- 1006 General Classroom

### P/I/PD Department
- Political Science

### P/I/PD Post Address
- Atlanta, GA 30303
- United States

### P/I/PD Fax Number
- 404-651-1434

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Revised: 08/15/2000
Project Summary

The primary objective of this project is the assemblage of an extensive and definitive database on the personal, career, and political attributes of commissioners and board members who have been appointed to independent federal agencies since 1892. The database will include qualification and background variables, such as political party affiliation, gender, race and ethnicity, age, education, and prior and subsequent employment for the entire history of a broad collection of important federal agencies. In addition, the database will include the temporal sequence of prior and subsequent career experiences, and the timing of all relevant appointment, reappointment, and term expiration dates. This information, together with the careful documentation of seat numbers that will also be included in the dataset, will allow detailed analyses of membership change and transitions. The near-term product arising from this project will be to facilitate studies of appointment patterns to independent agencies. The longer-term objective of this project is to allow linking to voting data for commissioners, and the development of commissioner-based research on decision-making at independent agencies. The dataset is expected to document approximately 1150 distinct appointments (or 800 distinct appointees) at 15 independent agencies between 1887 and 2000.
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Appendix Items:

*Proposers may select any numbering mechanism for the proposal. The entire proposal however, must be paginated. Complete both columns only if the proposal is numbered consecutively.

NSF Form 1359 (10/99)
Overview

It is an irony that most research on the behavior of regulatory agencies is conducted with little regard to the identities of the commissioners responsible for voting on specific cases and rules, or even to the fact that there are multiple commissioners. Not only are the commissioners typically unspecified in research on the bureaucracy, no central data store exists that would allow a researcher to easily assess changes in the characteristics of the commissioners directing the agency. This proposal envisions creation of an authoritative database of appointments to most of the important independent commissions in American politics. The database would be extensible to include future appointees, additional variables, and other agencies, and would parallel other public datasets currently available for the judiciary, by providing detailed event history data for all appointments and service dates of commissioners, together with biographical characteristics and prior and subsequent employment history.

The proposed project consists of four main stages of activity. First, the complete roster and service dates of commissioners for each of the 15 agencies covered under this study will be collected and organized (see Table 1 for a list of agencies). Practically all of this stage can be conducted through available archival sources or through relatively simple communications with administrative staff at the various commissions. This first stage is complete for four of the agencies covered in the proposal. Second, the researchers will gather detailed data on nomination, committee referral, confirmation, and term expiration dates for each commissioner in the study. Third, the researchers will gather detailed personal history data for each commissioner. Most of the information for the second and third stages will come from a wide variety of available archival and reference sources. Some in-person searches of commission, White House, and Senate personnel files will be necessary (see Appendix A for a variable list). Fourth, the researchers will compile the information into a computer file format, together with software syntax, suitable for redistribution (see Appendix B for a partial and preliminary example dataset). The record format and syntax have already been developed, and will allow researchers to choose between individual commissioners or appointment opportunities as the units of analysis. The syntax will also allow researchers to aggregate across commissioners, in order to establish time series data for specific agencies. The dataset will be submitted for storage and redistribution by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), with arrangements for subsequent regular updates to the data. Based on data already collected, and considering commission size, term length and other elements at the remaining agencies, the dataset is expected to document approximately 1150 distinct appointment opportunities involving approximately 800 distinct individuals.
There are many useful applications for such a data collection. This proposal describes three: study of the revolving door, study of commission decisions at the individual level, and study of appointment dynamics.

**Importance of the Data**

Some highlights from the revolving door literature demonstrates that a publicly available dataset of the kind proposed is needed and will be used to produce important research published in prominent venues. Over the course of this century, a number of authors have compiled broad biographical datasets similar to the one proposed here, and published their research at prominent university presses. Pendleton Herring’s *Federal Commissioners* (1936, Harvard University Press) established a relatively complete biographical portrait of all 143 commissioners to have served prior to 1935 on one of eight important independent agencies.\(^1\) The dataset included names, service dates, term expirations, Senate confirmation delay, partisanship, prior and subsequent employment history, geographical origin, education, and religion. Herring even documented reappointments, a crucial aspect for independent commissions. His study was not limited to employment patterns, but his work was one of the first to empirically document the revolving door phenomenon. However, Herring’s complete dataset was never published. As a result, only descriptive statistics survive to the present. Two decades later, Stanley, Mann, and Doig’s *Men Who Govern* (1967, Brookings Institution) established a dataset similar to Herring’s, for all 335 commissioners to have served between 1933 and 1965 on one of seven important independent agencies.\(^2\) The *Men Who Govern* dataset was posted to ICPSR many years ago, but is no longer accessible. Once again, only the published descriptive statistics of the data have survived. Twenty years later, the National Association of Public Administration (NAPA) constructed a biographical dataset as a corollary to the *Men Who Govern*, for the approximately 300 commissioners to have served between 1964 and 1984 on any major independent board.\(^3\) Mackenzie’s *The In-and-Outers* (1987, Johns Hopkins University Press) was the primary publishing venue for the NAPA study. Unfortunately, the NAPA dataset is irrevocably tied to a survey of those same elites, for which respondents were promised anonymity. Thus, even though most of the dataset is based on public documents, the personally identifiable appointment and biographical information gathered for the NAPA project will never be

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\(^1\) The agencies included in Herring’s study include ICC, FTC, FRC/FCC, SEC, FPC, Fed, and USTC.

\(^2\) The agencies included in *Men Who Govern* were ICC, FTC, FCC, SEC, FPC, CAB, and NLRB.

\(^3\) The NAPA study did not identify which agencies were included.
released. Only a sanitized version of the dataset (which omits key biographical variables and even appointment dates) is publicly available. Thus, after three major and broadly empirical analyses of appointment and the revolving door this century, there is still no publicly available dataset of the kind proposed for a collection of agencies, or even for any one of the agencies in this study.

More recent research on the revolving door at specific agencies provides further evidence that a publicly available dataset of the sort proposed will be used by scholars and can be used to publish prominent research. Gormley’s analysis of the revolving door at the FCC (1979, American Journal of Political Science) required him to duplicate the work of earlier scholars to assemble his own dataset of prior and subsequent employment for FCC commissioners of the early 1970s. In another duplication of effort, Cohen (1986, American Journal of Political Science) assembled his own larger dataset on prior and subsequent employment for FCC commissioners between 1955 and 1974. This data has been lost. The data collection for prior and subsequent FCC employment was duplicated once again by Spiller (1990, Journal of Law and Economics) for the 1939-1984 period, but is not publicly available. Clearly, a permanent and publicly available dataset of appointments to independent commissions would be useful to the discipline and would be used by scholars.

Perhaps more important than updating an existing line of inquiry to modern times, the proposed dataset will facilitate expansion of the field of bureaucratic politics in a new line of inquiry. Very little has been done to study the voting of individual commissioners on multi-membered independent boards (for exceptions, see Cohen 1986, Krause 1994). This database will encourage individual analysis of voting dynamics, from a variety of theoretical perspectives.

The institutional work that has been conducted in the judicial politics arena is a superb model for a research agenda in the administrative arena. Without citing all the contributors a large and sophisticated empirical literature has developed on decision making in the American judiciary. The breadth and depth of the field are testament to the usefulness of studying decisions at an individual-level, based on appointment and background factors of the key decision makers. Rather than studying the majority decisions of the Supreme Court or the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals and trying to work backwards from aggregate patterns to individual behavior, judicial scholars studied the votes of individual justices/judges in specific cases with spectacular result over the past three decades. The field has developed a rich set of theoretical perspectives, backed by empirical evidence, on the decision making dynamics of judges and justices.

Generally speaking, researchers of federal agencies have not pursued an individual-level approach. Instead, most scholars have looked at the aggregate decisional

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4 Personal communication with the author, Spring 2000.
or caselog behavior of agencies over time (Calvert, Moran, & Weingast 1987; Moe 1982; 1985; 1987; Weingast 1981; 1984; Wood & Waterman 1994; Krause 1999). As Krause noted,

“Research examining commission or board-type bureaucracies invariably uses the final decision of the commission as the outcome. This in turn has been operationalized as agency output(s). Although this mode of analysis is somewhat useful in analyzing multiagent bureaucracies, it ignores the degree of internal support for agency decisions and implicitly assumes that all commission members are appointed by the same [president].” (Krause 1994, page 127)

The aforementioned literature has established many useful findings on the nature of bureaucratic control. However, where inferences have been derived about the incentives of agency policymakers, they tend to be attributed to the agency as a whole, without regard to the possibility that institutional maintenance may be only a very small component of the decisions of individual commissioners. In addition, the attributions of incentives have ignored the possibility that agency decisions may be based on relatively complex interactions between conflicting commissioners in a way that is dependent on the political context. Individual-level analysis of judicial decision making demonstrates that institutional maintenance considerations are indeed swamped by partisanship and political attitudes of the panelists (Segal & Spaeth 1993). A related literature suggests that complex strategic interaction among panel members is indeed an important determinant of Supreme Court outcomes (Epstein & Knight 1998).

Finally, the proposed dataset will allow expansion of a new line of inquiry in appointment dynamics to independent agencies. As with voting studies, the study of appointments and vacancies has probably been best developed in the judicial politics field. By examining judicial nominations, confirmations, and retirements, scholars have examined appointment success for presidents (Ruckman 1993; Segal 1987), confirmation votes of senators (Cameron, Cover, & Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron, & Cover 1992; Overby et al 1992; Overby & Henschen 1994; Overby & Brown 1997), and turnover dynamics of the Supreme Court (Hagle 1993; Squire 1988; Cameron & Segal 1998) and lower federal courts (Barrow & Zuk 1990; Zuk, Gryski, & Barrow 1993; Barrow, Zuk, & Gryski 1996; Spriggs & Wahlbeck 1994; Nixon & Haskin 2000; Allison 1996; Hartley & Holmes 1997; Nixon & Goss 2000).

The study of judicial appointments and replacements has had great utility beyond the judicial politics field, by illuminating the legislative-executive bargaining process for scholars of the presidency and Congress. The proposed dataset will allow extension of the analysis of appointment and turnover dynamics for positions other than the lifetime positions of federal judges.

Very little has been done to study appointment dynamics to independent agencies,
presumably because of the paucity of confirmation conflict. However, as scholars have recently recognized, vacancy delay serves as an important and useful aspect for examination of appointments when roll call votes are infrequent. This database will facilitate the study of appointment dynamics for independent commissioners, by providing detailed event history data on vacancies, nominations, referrals, and confirmations. Many such studies using event history techniques have already been published, studying vacancy delay for judicial positions (Allison 1996; Hartley & Holmes 1997; Nixon & Goss 2000), cabinet posts (McCarty & Razaghian 1999) and one independent agency (Nixon 2000).

Expansion of the revolving door literature, facilitating development of an individual-level approach to commissioner decision making, and generating an appointment literature for an interesting group of positions are three worthy and likely results of this project. Doubtless there are many other uses for a dataset such as the one proposed. Because the PI’s immediate publishing efforts will be focused on appointment vacancy, the remainder of the proposal focuses on that literature.

The Pace of Appointments

A great deal of attention has been brought to bear on the explosion in vacancies and appointment duration for the federal court system in recent years. Less noticed is the fact that the pace of appointment for all manner of positions has virtually ground to a halt in the waning years of the Clinton administration. In fact, filling non-judicial positions has probably become an even greater problem than the recognized judicial vacancy crisis. Agencies have many fewer seats than a typical circuit, so each vacancy is critical. In addition, commissioners resign from their unexpired terms far more frequently than federal judges. Between 1964 and 1984 (the last period for which there is any comprehensive data), the average length of service for an independent regulatory commissioner was only 3.4 years (Fisher 1987). During that time period, 23% of independent commissioners served only 1.5 years in their appointive office (Brauer 1987). As early as the middle 1980s, the EEOC struggled to operate with only two of its five seats filled. The agency was thus hobbled, unable to muster a quorum. One vacancy on the FCC in the early 1990s took over 3 years to fill, which directly parallels several recent vacancies on the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Some research on appointment delay for the court system has come out recently (Allison 1996; Hartley and Holmes 1997, Nixon & Goss 2000; Cameron & Segal 1998). One article addresses appointment delay for cabinet positions (McCarty & Razaghian 1999), and another addresses appointment delay for independent commissions (Nixon
Note that *Judicature* will begin publishing a special issue on judicial selection in 2001. This research proposal will allow parallel research in a diverse set of independent agencies. Nothing is known, for example, about how frequent quorum crises arise on independent commissions. In what sense does the lifetime tenure of a federal judge make appointment politics for that office unique? That question cannot be answered without examination of appointments to other offices. Appointment to independent commissions presents an interesting contrast, in that terms of service are fixed (the officer cannot be unilaterally removed by the president), but not indefinite (full terms range from 5 to 14 years among the agencies in this study).

Appointments to independent commissions also provide an interesting contrast to other types of appointments in that, unlike judicial or cabinet positions, statutory restrictions often determine an important character of an appointee - his or her party. For example, the charter statute of the FTC established that no more than three of the five seats may be filled simultaneously by members of the same political party. This statutory partisan restriction complicates appointment by occasionally requiring a cross-party presidential nomination. Nixon (2000) has shown that such circumstances significantly impact the bargaining process, contributing to vacancy delay for the FCC. Little is known about whether this impact varies, or even exists, at other agencies.

Research on appointments to the federal courts usually highlights the importance of legislative-executive relations in the process. From a bargaining standpoint, scholars have investigated the factors that determine the ideological position of a Supreme Court justice on which the president and Senate are able to agree. This literature suggests that the current makeup of the Supreme Court and the ideological center of the Senate are the key determinants of the outcome (Lemieux & Stewart 1990; Moraski & Shipan 1999). This confirms the predictions of formal models of appointment bargaining (Snyder & Weingast 1997; Chang 1997; Nokken & Sala 2000). In this setting, qualifications for office have been shown to play an insignificant role in the outcome (Moraski & Shipan 1999). But scholars have also used event history techniques to investigate legislative-executive bargaining, in terms of the factors that lead to delay in the confirmation (Cameron & Segal 1998; Allison 1996; Hartley & Holmes 1997; Nixon & Goss 2000). Here the findings diverge between that for the Supreme Court, where Senate control is a key factor (Cameron & Segal 1998), and lower courts, where Senate control is relatively unimportant (Allison 1996; Hartley & Holmes 1997; Nixon & Goss 2000; Nixon 2000). Interestingly, one study has shown that personal characteristics of the judge clearly unrelated to judicial competence and never addressed in formal theories (namely, gender and race) significantly contribute to confirmation delay (Nixon & Goss 2000).

From a legislative standpoint, scholars have investigated the factors that lead a
senator to vote in favor of confirming any particular nominee. (Cameron, Cover, & Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron, & Cover 1992; Overby et al 1992; Overby & Henschen 1994; Overby & Brown 1997). This literature demonstrates that partisanship is the overwhelming influence on a senator’s vote to confirm a Supreme Court nominee. At this more detailed level of analysis, qualifications have been shown to play an important role in individual Senator’s voting calculus on Supreme Court confirmation (Cameron, Cover, & Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron, & Cover 1992).

From a purely presidential standpoint, scholars have investigated the factors that lead to a relatively higher chance of confirmation for the president’s nominees (Ruckman 1993; Segal 1987; Palmer 1983; Scigliano 1971). Again, the current makeup of the Supreme Court and the partisan balance in the Senate are the key determinants of the outcome.

In judicial politics, the pattern emerging from these studies is straightforward and backed by a great deal of empirical evidence: political attitudes (almost always well represented by party identification) drive the appointment process. That is, raw partisan conflict between the president and his opponents in the Senate determines the votes of Senators and, consequently, the outcome of the president’s nomination. Needless to say, this is an unusually important phenomenon in the post-WWII era dominated by divided government.

Prior experience on the bench and other measures of qualification have been shown to be unrelated to Supreme Court confirmation (Segal 1987; Moraski & Shipan 1999), but have also been shown to be significant determinants of Senator votes and confirmation outcomes (Cameron, Cover, & Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron, & Cover 1992). However, the qualifications of justices explored is based on normative considerations (quality ratings), rather than conflict of interest or political bias issues such as revolving door considerations.

Research on appointments to the executive branch, by contrast, often has focused on the personal characteristics and qualifications of appointees. To what degree is prior or subsequent industry employment an important component of appointment and voting of commissioners? This orientation to appointments comes out of the regulatory capture literature - one of the organizing principles, if not the organizing principle of the bureaucratic politics subfield. From a decisional standpoint, research shows that prior industry employment is a significant determinant of voting by commissioners of the FCC (Gormley 1979). However, Cohen (1986) questions this connection, and finds partisan factors to be much more important in voting by commissioners at the same agency. Interestingly, Cohen (1985) failed to find partisan factors to be important in voting by commissioners at the ICC. Nevertheless, pro-industry voting is clearly a significant contributor to employment in the industry after service on a commission (Cohen 1986; Spiller 1990).
From the standpoint of membership turnover, Deering (1987) argues that Senate committee background checks are a significant and growing contributor to vacancy delay. Brauer (1987) also suggests that poor pay is one of the most important reasons commissioners leave public service in the first place. In what way have frequent and protracted vacancies on independent commissions been the result of crossed career incentives? In what way has vacancy delay been an explicit tool of politicians in pursuit of their ideological and patronage goals? The proposed dataset will allow researchers to employ multivariate duration regressions and other sophisticated event history techniques in answering these questions and more.

Rationale for Agency Selection

The relevant data will be collected for the 15 independent agencies listed in Table 1 (below). This study is limited specifically to independent boards and commissions (i.e. officers who serve for fixed terms of service). There are a large number of such appointive offices, practically all of which are for multi-membered panels. Among the population, the selection of agencies has been oriented around two principles: importance and variation.

Importance

Agencies were selected if they engage in important political decision making that will be of interest to future researchers. Past research may serve as a guide for future interest. As Table 1 illustrates, each of the agencies identified has been the subject of research in at least one (and often many more) prominent book or article in political science. Several other agencies are politically important and merit inclusion in a list of “major” independent agencies. This roster of agencies encompasses, but is not limited to, the independent agencies studied by Stanley, Mann, and Doig (1965), Cushman (1941), and Herring (1936).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>agency (incept date in parentheses)</th>
<th>prominent research</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aeronautics Board (1940)</td>
<td>Weingast 1981; Spiller 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Civil Aeronautics Authority, 1938-1940)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Federal Radio Commission, 1928-1934)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Election Commission (1975)</td>
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</table>

Table 1: Independent Agencies Covered in this Study
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1977)  
(Federal Power Commission, 1930-1977)  
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1914)  
Federal Trade Commission (1914)  
Interstate Commerce Commission (1887)  
National Labor Relations Board (1935)  
National Transportation Safety Board (1967)  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1974)  
Securities and Exchange Commission (1935)  
Meier 1985; Woolley 1993; Krause 1994  
Katzmann 1980; Moe 1982; 1987; Meier 1985;  
West 1985; Calvert Moran & Weingast  
1987; Wood & Waterman 1994;  
Fritschler & Hoefler 1996; Harris &  
Milks 1996  
Mitnick 1980; Barke & Riker 1982; Spiller 1990; Wood & Waterman 1994  
Moe 1982; 1985  
Weingast 1981; Wood & Waterman 1994  
Weingast 1981; Moe 1982; Weingast 1984;  
Krause 1999

Variation

Agencies were selected to present variation along several important dimensions of bureaucratic politics. For example, the agencies selected present a full range of charter dates (ranging from 1887 for the ICC to 1975 for the FEC). They also exhibit varying experiences with institutional change (FTC has never been seriously reorganized since its inception in 1914. Yet FPC was transformed and transferred into the FERC in 1977 after 47 years of existence; FRC was dissolved only shortly after its inception, and transferred to the new FCC, and both CAB and ICC were dissolved entirely). Board size (often inversely related to term length) ranges from 3 for many years at the NLRB to 11 for most of the history of the ICC, and has even varied for a number of agencies (for example, the ICC, at various moments, has operated with 5, 7, 9, and 11 authorized commission seats; FCC was downsized from 7 to 5 members in 1987; the NLRB was expanded from 3 to 5 members in 1947).

Most agency charters contain statutory partisan restrictions on membership such that no more than a bare majority of seats may be occupied by members of a single party. This restriction proves extremely important in appointment politics. However, there is variation among the selected agencies on this score. The FEC statutory restriction is distinct (strict partisan balance must be maintained); neither the Fed nor the NLRB have partisan restrictions on appointment, but both agencies have corporatist restrictions. The Fed also has geographic restrictions on appointment, as does the FCC.

Agency clientele populations differ dramatically among this collection (SEC has a relatively narrow base lacking a significant public interest component; the NLRB base is explicitly balanced between labor and business; CPSC has a very broad business reach and significant public interest involvement).
Substantively, of course, the agencies present a broad range of policy arenas. Several agencies regulate a field where gender and/or racial issues are a prominent aspect of politics (EEOC, FCC radio and tv licensing), while gender and racial issues are quite muted at other agencies. Prior research has highlighted the importance of gender and race in judicial appointment politics (Goldman 1995; 1997; Goldman & Saronson 1994; Goldman & Slotnick 1997; Slotnick 1984). The only research on vacancy delay at independent agencies suggests that racial minorities take much longer to confirm to FCC posts, but that women are not similarly disadvantaged (Nixon 2000). Variation among agencies presents opportunities to explore whether the character of the policy arena is related to the degree of importance for gender, race, or other issues.

Overall, the selection of agencies is such that data on the appointment and personal characteristics for this collection will be useful to scholars and will actually be used by scholars.

Sources and Reliability

Perhaps surprisingly, agencies themselves are not a particularly good source for the data collection proposed. While every existing federal agency maintains both a public reference room and a library, the information in these offices is restricted almost entirely to specific case adjudication files or rulemaking documents. Most agencies do not employ and have not ever employed even a single historian. The Office of the Secretary for each agency is responsible for documenting the votes and roster of the commissioners at any one time. However, in no case has an agency collected information on the nomination dates of commissioners. Nomination and confirmation are issues generally beyond the purview of the Secretary. Similarly, biographical information is not generally gathered by the Secretary, and is available on an ad hoc basis only for recent commissioners. In a few cases, even the dates of service for historical commissioners is unavailable in summary form to the Secretary.

As a first pass at the problem, the annual reports to Congress for the various commissions have been consulted. With rare exceptions, these reports outline the full complement of commissioners who have served, and provide specific dates of service for commissioners. For four agencies (FCC, FTC, NLRB, and SEC), the complete rosters and service dates for commissioners have already been gathered and compiled. The service date information is available in annual reports for the remaining agencies.

Authoritative nomination and confirmation dates is contained in references serendipitously available here in the southeast. In the process of collecting data for the appellate biographical database (NSF #9311999) and the district biographical database
Auburn University’s library has acquired a nearly complete collection of the *Journals of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*. Where gaps in the collection exist, one of the only more complete repositories is located in Washington, DC, in the Senate Library. Photocopies of the summary tables, which contain most of the nomination and confirmation dates for appointments prior to 1958 (the Senate discontinued printing of summary tables in *JEPS* after 1958), have already been obtained. When subsequent checks are necessary, or complete volumes must be searched (in the cases of post-1958 appointments, for example), problems can be resolved through a quick trip to the Auburn University library (only one hour drive), or through contacts with the Executive Clerk of the White House, Executive Clerk of the Senate, and staff at the Senate library (both Clerks have been contacted, and Senate sponsorship has been arranged through the office of the senior senator of Georgia).

Biographical information will be gathered along three tracks. First, while no single reference source provides biographies for a comprehensive list of executive branch appointees, Sobel’s (1977) *Biographical Directory of the U.S. Executive Branch* comes closest. Some key biographies are missing, but this serves as an important baseline for the data. *Who’s Who*, and the many various editions serve as less complete, but complementary references. A few more modern sources provide similar biographies for specific administrations, but these tend to be printed at the beginning of administrations, rather than at the end - which limits their usefulness. Second, a number of sources have compiled some or all of the relevant information for specific agencies across specific time intervals. Table 2 describes these sources for one particular agency - the FCC. Similar sources will undoubtedly turn up in the more detailed bibliographical searches for specific agencies. Third, prior experience gathering data for the FCC has shown that detailed searches of newspaper and trade periodicals is likely to uncover most of the biographical information for the project. As the newspaper of record for the nation, the *New York Times* often provides brief biographical sketches on commissioners at the time of their appointment or departure. Many clientele industries publish a trade journal that invariably provides biographies of new and retiring members. Many agencies publish their own newsletter that similarly provides biographical information. *New York Times* stories have been abstracted and can be searched online through Lexis-Nexis. Depending on the publication, many trade journals are also abstracted and can be searched online through Lexis-Nexis. The PI has full Lexis-Nexis access that can be used personally or by research assistants.

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Table 2: Published Data Sources for FCC

<table>
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<tr>
<th>source</th>
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<th>service roster</th>
<th>appointment dates</th>
<th>biographical information</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flannery 1995 (book, biographical profiles)</td>
<td>1927-1994</td>
<td>complete</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerlage 1955 (M.A. thesis, some tables)</td>
<td>1934-1954</td>
<td>complete</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting (trade journal)</td>
<td>1935-2000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>very good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham &amp; Kramer 1976 (House committee report)</td>
<td>1949-1974</td>
<td>partial</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herring 1936 (book, some tables, some historical narrative)</td>
<td>1927-1934</td>
<td>complete</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cushman 1941 (book, historical narrative)</td>
<td>1927-1941</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>fair</td>
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<td>Who’s Who &amp; related pubs</td>
<td>1927-2000</td>
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<td>5%</td>
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The PI has substantial experience gathering data of this type, and a reliability hierarchy among sources is clear. For appointment data, reliability is highest among archives of the Senate and White House Executive Clerks. Appointment data is also available in the *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate* and various bibliographic sources, in that order of reliability. If conflicts between sources are discovered, the Executive Clerk archives will be considered definitive for appointment data. For biographical information, experience shows that reliability is highest in agency newsletters and trade publications and falls as one progresses to national periodicals and bibliographic sources.
A. Variable List

1. Personal Identification Number (based on Agency and Appointment Sequence. Ex: fcc005=fifth appointee to FCC)
2. Appointment Identification Number (based on Agency, Seat Number, and Appointment Sequence. Ex: fcc02005=fifth occupant of second seat on FCC)
3. Appointment Identification Number of Immediate Predecessor
4. Is Appointment a transfer from an existing seat? (0-no, 1-yes)
5. Was appointment granted during Senate recess? (0-no, 1-yes)
6. Date of Recess Appointment, if given (mm/dd/yy)
7. Date of Nomination (mm/dd/yy)
8. Date of Referral to Senate Committee (mm/dd/yy)
9. Date of Committee Vote on Report (mm/dd/yy)
10. Date of Confirmation Vote (mm/dd/yy)
11. Date Sworn In (mm/dd/yy)
12. Senate Committee of Jurisdiction for the Agency
13. Recognized Home State Senators (those who received blue slips)
14. Party of Commissioner
15. Date of Birth
16. Gender
17. Race/Ethnicity
18. Date of Departure (mm/dd/yy)
19. Means of Exit (died, resigned, term expired, impeached, active service)
20. Prior Experience in Related Private Sector? (0-none, 1-yes)
21. Nature of Prior Private Sector Experience (qualitative)
22. Prior Experience in Related Public Sector? (0-none, 1-yes)
23. Nature of Prior Public Sector Experience (qualitative)
24. Prior Elective Office? (0-none, 1-yes)
25. Nature of Prior Elective Office (qualitative)
26. Prior Appointive Office? (0-none, 1-yes)
27. Nature of Prior Appointive Office (qualitative)
28. Post-Service Employment in Related Private Sector? (0-none, 1-yes)
29. Nature of Post-Service Employment in Related Private Sector (qualitative)
30. Post-Service Elective Office? (0-none, 1-yes)
31. Nature of Post-Service Elective Office (qualitative)
32. Post-Service Appointive Office? (0-none, 1-yes)
33. Nature of Post-Service Appointive Office (qualitative)
### B. Partial FCC Appointment Dataset

#### 2nd seat sequence, 1934-1986

1. personal identification number (based on agency, appointee. Ex: fcc005=fifth appointee to fcc)
2. appointment identification number state (based on agency, seat number, appointment sequence. Ex: fcc02006=sixth appointment to second seat on fcc)
3. appointment ID of immediate predecessor
4. state
5. party
6. name
7. appointment type (0-normal nomination/confirmation, 1-recess)
8. reason for exit (0-term expired, 1-resigned before term expired, 2-died, 3-unconfirmed recess, 4-seat abolished)
9. gender
10. race/ethnicity
11. nomination date (month, day, year)
12. confirmation date (month, day, year)
13. start of service date (month, day, year)
14. end of service date (month, day, year)
15. term expiration date (month, day, year)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>ID</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Confirmation</th>
<th>Start of Service</th>
<th>End of Service</th>
<th>Term Expiration</th>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>2 7 35</td>
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<td>9 19 52</td>
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<td>fcc2003</td>
<td>UT</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td>recess</td>
<td>(never confirmed)</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>white</td>
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<td>10 14 52</td>
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<td>4 15 53</td>
<td>6 30 54</td>
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<td>fcc2002</td>
<td>fcc2004</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>(term expired)</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>white</td>
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<td>white</td>
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<td>white</td>
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References Cited


