College of Arts & Sciences
Neurophilosophy Forum
This is an interdisciplinary group of faculty and students who meet for discussion and debate on issues at the intersection of philosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. Join us! All talks will take place in the Philosophy Department at Georgia State University, 34 Peachtree St., 11th floor (See below FAQ for direction). Feel free to bring your lunch and spread the word. You may also want to check out events at the newly formed Emory Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture.
Spring 2009
Friday, January 23, 1:15-2:45 pm
G. Lynn Stephens (University of Alabama, Birmingham)
Addiction and Compulsion
Abstract: Is a drug addict compelled to take a drug like cocaine, heroin, and amphetamine? Does compulsion distinguish addictive from non-addictive drug use and consumption? Does addiction qualify as a mental disorder or pathology because it is compulsive? The talk will explore these questions in the light of Kent Berridge’s and Terry Robinson’s recent work on the neuropsychology of drug addiction. Berridge and Robinson have written that one of “the defining features of addiction [is] its compulsive nature?” Again: “The development of addiction involves a transition from casual to compulsive patterns of drug use”. Are they right?
Recommended paper: Lynn Stephens and George Graham, (ms), An Addictive Lesson: a Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience.
For further information about Professor G. Lynn Stephens, consult his website
www.uab.edu/philosophy/faculty/stephens
Friday, February 20, 1:15-2:45 pm
Robert N. McCauley (Emory University)
Accomodating Diachronc theores in Philosophical Models of Cross-Scientific Relations
Abstract: Unified accounts of intertheoretic relations in science (what is commonly termed ‘reduction’), whether those of logical empiricists or those of the New Wave reductionists, have dominated both philosophers’ views of cross-scientific relations as well as the views of the broader scholarly community. The cost of the unity which those accounts achieve, however, is that they fail to make at least two important distinctions among types of intertheoretic relations. The first concerns the distinction between successor and cross-scientific contexts. The other concerns the distinction, especially as it pertains to cross-scientific contexts, between structural as opposed to diachronic theories. Unified accounts of intertheoretic relations have proven blind, in particular, to the productive influences in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive neuroscience, of theorizing about long-term processes in large-scale systems.
For further information about Professor Robert N. McCauley, consult his website
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~philrnm
Friday, April 24, 1:15-2:45 pm
Terence Horgan (University of Arizona)
The Phenomenal Intentionaliy Research Program
Abstract: Since the late 1970’s, the main research program for understanding Intentionality or the aboutness of the mental has been the attempt to ‘naturalize’ Intentionality by identifying a natural relation that holds between internal states of the brain and external states of the world when and only when the former represent the latter. But some philosophers are skeptical of the entire approach and have argued that reference to phenomenal consciousness has an essential role to play in the theory of Intentionality. Skeptics about a theory of Intentionality that divorces the aboutness of the mental from consciousness appear to be developing an emerging research program – what may be called the ‘Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program’ (PIRP). What is at the heart of this nascent research program? What arguments support PIRP’s key theses as genuine alternatives to the externalist naturalization program? Where might PIRP theorists disagree among themselves? What future work needs to be done to advance the program? The goal of the talk is to outline answers to each of those four questions.
For further information about Professor Terence Horgan consult his website
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~thorgan/index.html
Fall 2008
Friday, September 19, 12:45-2:30 pm
Lawrence W. Barsalou (Department of Psychology, Emory University)
Grounding Knowledge in the Brain’s Modal Systems
Abstract: The human conceptual system contains categorical knowledge that supports online processing (perception, categorization, inference, action) and offline processing (memory, language, thought). Semantic memory, the dominant theory, typically portrays the conceptual system as modular and amodal. According to this view, amodal symbols represent category knowledge in a modular system, separate from the brain’s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection (e.g., affect, mental states). Alternatively, the conceptual system can be viewed as non-modular and modal, sharing representational mechanisms with the brain’s modal systems. On a given occasion, multimodal information about a category's members is reenacted (simulated) across relevant modalities to represent it conceptually. Behavioral and neural evidence is presented showing that modal simulations contribute to the representation of object categories, abstract categories, and to the symbolic operations of predication and conceptual combination. Although simulation plays important roles in the conceptual system, linguistic processes are important as well. Additional behavioral and neural evidence is presented showing that simulation and language contribute to conceptual processing simultaneously. Furthermore, either system can dominate under different task conditions, such that different profiles of conceptual processing emerge.
Recommended paper: L. Barsalou (2008), Grounded Cognition, Annual Review of Psychology, 59:617–45.
Friday, October 31, 12:00-1:30 pm
Lindley Darden (Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park)
Reasoning in Scientific Discovery: Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms
Abstract: Biologists often work to discover mechanisms. A new analysis of what mechanisms are aids in finding reasoning strategies for their discovery. Abstract schemas for mechanisms often play the roles of theories in biology--providing explanations, predictions, and guiding experimentation. Reasoning in discovery is analyzed via reasoning strategies for constructing, evaluating, and revising mechanism schemas. These strategies are based on work in history and philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science.
Recommended paper: Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden, and Carl Carver (2000), Thinking About Mechanisms, Philosophy of Science 67: 1-25.
Friday, November 21, 12:00-1:30 pm
Liane Young (Department of Brain & Cognitive Sciences, MIT)
How the brain makes up the moral mind: The neuroscience of mental state reasoning in moral judgment
Abstract: What can neuroscience tell us about morality? While neuroscience can't determine whether our moral judgments are right or wrong, neuroscience can show us the processes that support moral judgments - and in so doing reveal whether we are right or wrong when we introspect on how we make those judgments. In this talk, we'll look at (1) patterns of brain activation in healthy adults making moral judgments, (2) moral judgments of healthy adults with "virtual lesions" to specific brain regions due to transcranial magnetic stimulation, and (3) moral judgments of patient populations with specific cognitive deficits. We'll focus on the challenge of forgiveness, and discuss implications for moral philosophy.
Recommended paper: Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser, and Antonio Damasio (2007), Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements, Nature, April 19, 446(7138): 908-911
FAQ
How do I get to 34 Peachtree Street?
34 Peachtree Street is located on the corner of Peachtree and Walton streets, across the street from Woodruff Park, and just north of the intersection known as Five Points at which Edgewood Ave, Decatur St, Marietta St, and Peachtree St all converge. From campus, take either Edgewood Ave west or Decatur St northwest to the Five Points intersection. The street running roughly north/south (i.e. the street roughly perpendicular to either Edgewood Ave or Decatur St) is Peachtree Street. Cross to the other side of Peachtree and then turn right onto it, following it for less than a block. 34 Peachtree St will be on your left. If you reach the intersection of Walton and Peachtree streets, you have gone just slightly too far. Once inside the building, take an elevator from the left side set of elevators (those on the right only go to upper floors) to the 11th floor. Exit the elevator, take a right, and you will be at the front desk of the Philosophy department. The Neurophilosophy Forum takes place in the conference room of the philosophy department.