ANDREA SCARANTINO
CURRICULUM VITAE
education
1997- Ph.D.
University of Pittsburgh, History and Philosophy of Science, Department of
History and Philosophy of Science (April 2005 expected date of graduation)
Thesis:
“What is an Emotion? A Philosophical Exploration”
Committee:
Paul Griffiths (Committee Co-Chair, ARC Federation Fellow
and Professor of Philosophy, University of Queensland),
Peter Machamer (Committee Co-Chair, HPS Pittsburgh), Robert Brandom
(Philosophy, Pittsburgh), Ruth Millikan (Philosophy, University of Connecticut)
1995-2000 Ph.D. Università Cattolica of
Milan (Italy), Economics, Department of Economics
Granted, March 2000
Thesis: “Is the market a viable
solution for the organ shortage? An economic study on the limits of financial
incentives” (in English)
Committee: Luigi Campigli (Committee
Chair, Economics, Università Cattolica of Milan), Stefano Zamagni (Economics,
University of Bologna), Pierluigi Sacco (Political Economy, University of
Bologna)
1999-
M.S. University
of Pittsburgh, Bioethics, Center for Bioethics and Health Law (part-time, April
2005 expected date of graduation). Thesis director: Lisa Parker
1998- M.S. University of
Pittsburgh, Philosophy, Philosophy Department (part-time, December 2004
expected date of graduation).
1996-1997 M.S. The London School
of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Granted “with distinction”,
September 1997
Thesis: “What is an action? When is
an Action Altruistic?”
Thesis director: Thomas Uebel
(Philosophy, University of Manchester, UK)
1989- 1994 B.S. Bocconi University
(Italy), Economics, Department of Economics
Granted “summa cum laude”, July 1994
Thesis: “Rational Fools: a
Study on the Requirements of Rationality Beyond Internal Consistency” (in
Italian)
Thesis Directors: Stefano
Zamagni (Economics, University of Bologna) and Lorenzo Sacconi (Economics,
University of Trento)
AOS:
Philosophy of science, philosophy of mind
AOC: Metaphysics
and epistemology, ethics, bioethics
honors
2004 Michael R. Bennett Prize in Philosophy, Philosophy
Department, University of Pittsburgh, for the paper “Did Dretske Learn the
Right Lesson from Shannon’s Theory of Information?”
2004 Graduate
Student Travel Stipend, American Philosophical Association, Central Division,
for the paper “Blindfright and the Cognitivist’s Dilemma” to be presented at
the 2005 conference in Chicago
2002 Graduate Student
Travel Award, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, for the paper “A deeper
problem for Dretske’s theory of informational content” presented at the annual
2002 conference in Edmonton
2001 Andrew Mellon Dissertation Fellowship, University of
Pittsburgh
2000 Student Paper Award from the
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, best graduate student paper
submitted at the annual 2000 conference in Salt Lake City, for the paper “The
Interplay Between Science and Values in the Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys”
1997
Andrea Mannu Prize, London
School of Economics, best Master Thesis submitted in the Department of
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method in the academic year 1996-97, for “What
is an Action? When is an Action Altruistic?”
1994 Fondazione Lanza Prize for the
dissertation “Rational Fools: a Study on the Requirements of Rationality Beyond
Internal Consistency” (in Italian) (the dissertation competed in the category
“economics and philosophy”)
1994 Golden Medal “Amici della Bocconi” from
Bocconi University given to all graduates “summa cum laude” for the academic
year 1993-1994
publications
Andrea
Scarantino, Review of Thinking About
Feeling (ed. Robert Solomon), Mind
(Forthcoming)
Andrea
Scarantino, Review of Emotion, Evolution and Rationality (eds. Dylan
Evans and Pierre Cuse), Mind (Forthcoming)
Andrea Scarantino, Review of Passionate
Engines by Craig DeLancey, Philosophy
of Science (2004), 71, pp. 227-230
Andrea Scarantino, “Efficiency and Equity in
Organ Allocation”, Keiron (2000),
October, pp. 42-57 (publication in Italian)
papers submitted
“Did Dretske Learn the Right Lesson from
Shannon’s Theory of Information?” (submitted to Philosophy of Science, draft available upon request)
“Blindfright and the Cognitivist’s Dilemma”
(submitted to Philosophical Quarterly,
draft available upon request)
related work experience
Referee for Philosophy of Science
Translator of the book Executive Economics by S. Maital from English to Italian (ed. Il Sole 24 Ore)
conference
presentations
2005 “Blindfright
and the Cognitivist’s Dilemma”, to be presented at the American Philosophical
Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago, April 27-30
2004 “Blindfright and the Cognitivist’s
Dilemma”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology and European Society for
Philosophy and Psychology, First Joint Meeting in Barcelona
2003 “Towards a New Theory of Semantic
Information”, Graduate Student Conference at the University of California at S.
Diego, La Jolla
2002 “Affordances Explained”, Philosophy
of Science Association, Biennial Meeting in Milwaukee
2002 “A Deeper Problem for Dretske’s Theory of
Informational Content”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Annual Meeting
in Edmonton
2001 “A Study on the Interplay between Science
and Values in the Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys”, American Society for
Bioethics and Humanities, Annual Meeting in Salt Lake City
2000 “Local justice in organ allocation”, invited
paper, Conference on Equity in Health Care in Reggio Emilia (Italy)
university positions
1997- Graduate Teaching Fellow.
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
Full
responsibility for course contents, readings, and lecturing for the following
four courses (all taught more than once):
Course:
“Morality and Medicine”. An undergraduate course in bioethics, covering topics
such as abortion, euthanasia, the physician-patient relationship, etc.
Course:
“Magic, Medicine, and Science”. An undergraduate course in history of science,
which traces the historical development of the organic, magical and mechanical
traditions from the Pre-Socratics to the Scientific Revolution (ending with
Newton)
Course:
“Principles of Scientific Reasoning”. An undergraduate course in logic,
covering deductive arguments, inductive arguments, and probability theory
Course:
“Problem Solving: How Science Works”. An undergraduate course in scientific
reasoning, which includes basic thermodynamics and statistics
Teaching assistant for the following
three courses:
Course:
“Mind and Medicine”. An undergraduate course in the history and philosophy of
medicine (taught by Prof. Bob Olby)
Course:
“Morality and Medicine”. An undergraduate course in bioethics, covering topics
such as abortion, euthanasia, the physician-patient relationship, etc. (taught
by Prof. Rachel Ankeny)
Course:
“Mythology in the Ancient World”. An undergraduate course on the evolution from
myth to science in the ancient world, with special focus on the contribution of
the Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle (taught by Prof. M.L Gill)
1995-1996 Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics,
Bocconi University, Italy
Course:
“History of Economic Thought”. An undergraduate year-long course on the history
of economics from Aristotle to the 1980s (taught by Prof. Zamagni)
teaching competence
Graduate level: philosophy of
science, philosophy of mind
Advanced undergraduate:
metaphysics and epistemology, ethics, bioethics, moral psychology, philosophy
of psychology, philosophy of biology, philosophy of economics, history of
science, science and values, logic
Introductory: introduction to
ancient and modern philosophy, introduction to philosophy, introduction to
critical thinking
languages
Italian: native language
English: fluent
French: very good
Spanish: good
research interests
The
following are some of the topics I intend to work on in the next few years:
·
Definitions and Vagueness. In my dissertation, I have
developed a theory of descriptive definitions for vague terms, namely
definitions in which the definiens aims to match the vagueness of the
definiendum, and a theory of explicative definitions for vague terms, namely
definitions in which the explicans aims to remove the vagueness of the
explicandum as well as increase its inductive potential. My immediate rationale
was to develop an instrument for capturing the specific vagueness I detected in
emotion terms. I am convinced that the theory I have elaborated has wide
applicability to many concepts of philosophical interest (e.g. cause,
knowledge, perception), and I would like to explore how it could be applied to
each of them.
·
Emotions and Intentionality. Emotions are intentional, in
the sense that they have conditions of satisfaction. In both philosophy and
psychology, the intentionality of the emotions has often been assimilated to
the intentionality of propositional attitudes. This strikes me as a bad idea,
because this assimilation hides from view some the most distinguishing features
of the emotions (e.g. their informational encapsulation, their dedicated neural
pathways and their commonality across species). In my dissertation, I tried to
shed light on the conditions of satisfaction of the emotions by sketching a
theory of non-conceptual intentionality, which I plan on developing in the
future.
·
Emotions and Machiavellian Behavior. I am convinced that, as argued
by a strand of the social constructionist theory of the emotions, the emotions have
essential strategic dimensions. We cannot understand anger, sadness or embarrassment
without understanding that in many occasions they are aimed at the negotiation
of a social transaction between the emoter and an interactant. This Machiavellian
aspect raises a puzzle: How can the emotions be sincere and yet strategic? The
answer demands developing an understanding of the peculiar natures of emotional
consciousness and emotional teleology.
·
Emotions and Natural Kinds. It
is important for the scientific study of the emotions to establish whether or
not they carve the mind at its joints. To even discuss this issue, however, we
need to abandon the view that what makes a kind natural is the possession of an
essence, understood as a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient
structural properties. I would like to further develop the cluster theory of
natural kinds I sketched in my dissertation, and argue in light of it that it
is a serious mistake to investigate vernacular emotion kinds under the
assumption that they form natural kinds. This thesis, first defended by
Griffiths, has been attacked by many, but it is an important thesis whose
methodological consequences have yet to be fully appreciated in emotion theory.
·
Emotions and Moral Perception. The long-term objective of my
research on the emotions is to understand the role they play in the moral
domain. I would like to explore two ideas in particular. One is that the
emotions may be crucial in grounding what McDowell has described as our capacity
to detect moral properties in an “intrinsically motivational” way. This is
because the emotions appear to combine the roles of beliefs and desires into an
inseparable whole. The other is the idea, advocated by Gibbard among others,
that what distinguishes moral norms from other sorts of norms is the network of
emotional dispositions in which they are embedded. In particular, I would like to better
understand what we can learn about moral norms from the study of the role
played by the emotions in primate proto-morality.